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ABSTRACT
PLEASURE, FALSITY, AND THE

GOOD IN PLATO’S PHILEBUS

SEPTEMBER
CIRIACO M. SAYSON,
M.A.,
Ph.D.,

JR., A.B.,

1999

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews

The argument

in Plato’s Philebus presents three successive formulations of
the

hedonist principle. Commentators often take Socrates’ argument in the dialogue
to be
dealing solely with the third formulation, which states that pleasure, rather than
intelligence, is closer in nature to the good.

I

argue

that, nonetheless, in the

Socrates remained concerned to provide a direct refutation of the

of the straightforward claim that pleasure

is

the

good

first

dialogue

formulation, that

for all living beings.

Chapter One ascribes to the Philebus a conception of intrinsic good, which

shown

to underlie the dialogue’s notion

detail the

of true pleasures. Chapter

Two

examines

problem of the “one and many” concerning pleasure, and argues

problem of forms

in relation to other forms, rather than that

particulars. This interpretation is the

one

is,

of forms

is

then

in

that this is the

in relation to

that is consistent both with Protarchus’

understanding of hedonism in the dialogue, and with the dialogue’s methodological
passages,

i.e.,

the passages

In Chapter Three,

it

is

on the “god-given method” and on the four ontological

shown how

division into forms

is

kinds.

required by Socrates’ conception

of the nature of pleasure. Some of the forms of pleasure are ways

in

which falsity

is

admitted into the nature of pleasure. Three accounts
of false anticipatory pleasures
those of Kenny and Gosling, Mooradian, and Penner

VI

—

are

examined

in

some

detail.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

.

IV

ABSTRACT

V

Chapter

I.

ON THE ARGUMENT OF THE PHILEBUS
A.
B.

Three Versions of the Hedonist Principle
The Structure and Aim of the Argument

C.

Plato

22

THE METHODOLOGICAL PASSAGES

28

A.

Introduction

28

B.

Pleasure as a One-and-Many

29

1.

Three One-and-Many Problems

29

2.

The Second Question
Why Pleasure is a One-and-Many

3.

34

42

Hedonism
The God-Given Method and the Divisions of Pleasure
and Knowledge

47

E.

The Four Ontological Kinds and

62

F.

Conclusion

C.

D.

III.

5

on the Kinds of Good
The Ends of Pleasure

D.

II.

1

Protarchus’

the

Good

53

72

PLEASURE AND FALSITY

74

A.

Division and the Nature of Pleasure

74

B.

Pleasure and Desire

98

C.

Falsity

1

.

2.
3.

and the Objects of Pleasure

The Gosling-Kenny Account
Mooradian’s Account
Penner’s Account

vii

105

Ill

122
136

D.

Overestimation, Falsity, and Evil
Pain and Falsity: Mixed Pleasures
.

E.
F.

Conclusion

142
.145

149

BIBLIOGRAPHY

152

viii

CHAPTER

I

ON THE ARGUMENT OF THE PHILEBUS

A. Three Versions of the Hedonist Principle

The argument of the Philebus

When the

intelligence.

5)?

the

is

good

pleasure, Protarchus

is

the

dialogue.

first

is

be settled

is,

whether enjoyment, having

(dya^ov eivai x6 xai'peiv

Ttdai d;cooiq,

living beings are capable of having pleasure.

On

1

lb4-

behalf of

the

good

for living beings.*

that will

be considered

in the

Socrates and Protarchus understand (PI), (PI) involves two constituent

claims: (a) that pleasure

pleasure

about to take over from Philebus

defend the following claim;

is to

is

all

is

of three versions of the hedonist principle

As both

sentient beings.

form of a contest between pleasure and

that is to

for all living beings

(PI) Pleasure

This

The question

thus assumed that

It is

the

dialogue opens, Protarchus

the defense of pleasure.

pleasure,

is in

On the

is

a good; and (b) that pleasure

other hand Socrates

the good, but that intelligence

living beings. Socrates

is

to

is

is

is

the highest

good

for all

to argue, not that intelligence rather than

better

and more desirable than pleasure for

all

defend the following claim;
2

(S) Intelligence is better than pleasure for any being that can partake in

it.

1

In this chapter

and

in the next,

Protarchus' positions used in

I

Dancy

shall partially

adopt the abbreviations of Socrates' and

1984.

2

Thus

it

is

not assumed that

holds that "intelligence, mind,

reasoning
in

...

[are] better

all

living beings are capable of intelligence or mind; rather, (S)

memory, and

the things that go with them, right judgment and true

and more desirable than pleasure for

them" (aupTiaaiv oaaTiep auxwv 5uvaxd pcxoA-aPsiv,

1

all beings that are able to partake

lb9-cl).

(ppovriau; and vouq interchangeably for the most part; here the former

1

In the text, Plato uses
is

translated as

(S) does not

pleasure

better

deny

that pleasure is a good. Socrates

and more desirable (dpci vco Kai ^6co,

constituent claims; (a) that intelligence

1

Id- 12a, Socrates sets

question: Is there

is

the

some

men the happy
good

intelligence

claim claim

for

is

man. Socrates’ claim

more akin

is

is,

(auyyevfic;) to

this condition

that

it

1

of soul

is

is

on whether
is

is

a higher

capable of furnishing

is,

then this condition

good turns out

to be,

it

view

that

some

third thing, other than

to be the good; in that case, all that Protarchus

more akin

some

\\)

to pleasure than

The modified hedonist
such

that;

become eudaimon; and

iii)

i)

v|/

would

none other than pleasure or enjoyment.

life

of thought

is

pleasure

position

is

(1 le-12a).

now the

a condition of soul;
is

more akin

to

\\)

may

to intelligence, so that

it is

Thus,

of the dialogue has become, whether pleasure or intelligence

closer in nature to the good.

is

this

(S) in terms of this

pleasure (1 le-12a). Protarchus,

of pleasure “holds sway” (Kpaxsi) over the

(P2) There

is

ld6)? If there

whatever

than

his assent to the

that this condition is

this point the question

is

a good; and (b) that intelligence

up the argument between (PI) and

enjoyment or thought, could turn out

This

is

(tov pfov cubaipova,

However, Socrates secures

life

later

lb9) than pleasure. (S) likewise has two

1

condition of soul (e^iv \vvxf\q) that

life

seem, ought to say that

the

examine

pleasure.

At

for all

to

a good, and if so, in what sense, but (S) only
claims that intelligence

is

good than

means

at

is

following:

ii)

v|/

causes

than

is

intelligence.

life to

the dialogue’s second formulation of the hedonist position. According to (P2),

“intelligence” and the latter as “mind”. All translations here used, unless otherwise noted, are

mine. All quotations from Plato’s Greek texts are from Burnet 1901.

2

\\f

is

some psychological

that life s

property or state that,

when

human

present in a

becoming eudaimon. Furthermore, the property

is

v|/

life, is

closer in nature to

pleasure than to intelligence. Accordingly, Socrates’ implied
strategy

by refuting

the cause of

now to show

is

(S)

(P2).

In fact, Socrates does not pursue that strategy. Nonetheless,
(P2) introduces a
significant shift in the terms of the argument. (PI)

is

a principle that applies to all living

beings, including those that have the faculty of pleasure alone, and those
that have both
the faculties of pleasure and intelligence.
the argument of the dialogue.

It is

The former

however,

class,

whose

because of both pleasure and intelligence. In the move to (P2)

the

human

good. However, there

is

no indication

of the human good and

is

that Plato

explicitly identifies the

become happy. Eudaimonia, however, seems

to

we

can be eudaimon

find a recognition of

means

good with

come about

that

is

life

life is

human
life to

of our possession

strategy.

He

proposes to consider

life

of pleasure without

of mind without pleasure. Protarchus quickly agrees that neither of

adequate or choiceworthy in

The good

which causes a

as a result

pleasure and intelligence as items in two pure kinds of life, one a

mind, the other a

to identify the

therefore not to be identified with that good.

At 20c-22c, Socrates introduces another

life.

lives

(P2) establishes a strong conceptual link between happiness (eudaimonia) and

good with happiness. (P2)

these lives

not relevant to

possible to compare the values of pleasure and

intelligence only for beings that are capable of both, beings

this point.

is

a

mixed

life,

itself,

and neither

life

therefore can be the

one that combines these two items

3

in a certain

good

way.

However, there must be a cause of the goodness of the mixed
Soc.

...

life;

(F)or perhaps each of us would assign a cause to
this combined

life (xdxa ydp
mind is the cause, you that pleasure is,
and if this is so, though neither of them would be the good
... perhaps one or the other is
the cause. ... Concerning this I would contend with
Philebus still more that, in this
mixed life, whatever it is in taking which (oxi tox' eoxi xoOxo 6
XaPwv) this life has
become as choiceworthy as it is good, not pleasure but mind is more
akin and more like
to it (oi)x fidovf) dXXa voOc; xouxcp auyyeveaxEpov xai
opoidxspov eoxi) ... (22dl-7)

av TOO Koivou TOUTOO pioo aixiwpeOa),

So now the question of the dialogue

more

like

whatever

it

is

is,

that

I

whether pleasure or intelligence

that is responsible for the

goodness of the mixed

echoes the earlier question about what condition of soul
eudaiinoTi, but the

two questions

is

are quite different.

is

more akin

to or

This

life.

responsible for rendering a

The hedonist position

is

life

now

differently formulated;

(P3) There

and

some ^ such that; i) causes the combined life
pleasure is more akin to ^ than is intelligence.

is

ii)

(|)

We are not told what sort of thing
“condition of soul” (c^iv

(j)

vj/oxfic;).

is,

But

unlike

we

v|/,

which we

are told that ^

life

being the good

life

good, but not as a psychological condition of that

component

in

it.

life.

Thus,

(j)

is

some property

to

become good;

are clearly told

is

is

some

the cause of a certain kind of

or set of properties that also

life,

Following Christopher Bobonich [1997,

makes a

or as any psychological

p.

124]

let

us call

\\f

and

(|)

the

3

“good-making” properties.

The

psychological property, while

to (P3) corresponds to the

(j)

difference between the

is

two

another kind of property.

move from

is

then that

And

so the

a psychological argument against

v;/

is

move from
hedonism

different one.

In his discussion,

Bobonich applies the term only

4

to

what

is

a

here designated

(j).

(P2)

to a

It

should be noted that Philebus never subscribes to
any reformulation of (PI)

(12a, 27e); nevertheless, (P3)

is

the final interpretation of hedonism that Protarchus

accepts and, since early in the dialogue Philebus turned
over the argument for pleasure
entirely to Protarchus (11c, 12a-b), the discussion
proceeds with (P3) as the agreed

statement of the hedonist position.

However,

I

shall argue that there are

upon

good reasons

to

think that Socrates, like Philebus, never abandons (PI) as the
statement of the hedonist
position.

B. The Structure and

Aim

of the Argument

The ensuing examinations of pleasure and of knowledge proceed out of this
context. There

one

is

more akin

examination

into

its

a need to examine both pleasure and

is

or closer to that

may be

which makes the mixed

said to take the

makes up nearly half the
claim, as N.R.

life

a

which

good mixture. The

form of an analysis of pleasure and knowledge each

Murphy

is

devoted to pleasure. The analysis of pleasure thus

entire length

of the dialogue. In view of this

does, that in the Philebus “Plato

fresh treatment of pleasure at least partly for

But there
total length,

1

in order to find out

various forms, and this occupies about half of the dialogue, from 31 b-59c. The

bulk of this section, up to 55b,

the

mind

One and

is

own

is

may have wanted

plausible to

to undertake a

sake...” [Murphy, 1938; p. 120].

a series of sections preceding this, more than a third of the dialogue's

which appear
the

its

it

Many

to

be relevant to

it.

These sections

in 13e-15c; (b) the treatment

are:

(a) the discussion

of the method of Dialectic

8d; and (c) the ontological division into the Four Kinds at 23c-26d.

5

of

in 15d-

These are the

methodological sections of the dialogue, in which the
concepts and methodologies

needed

to solve the

problem of the dialogue

are introduced

and discussed. In the

rest

of

the dialogue, these concepts and methodologies are
applied towards a resolution of the

main problem. Of the

three methodological sections, (a) and (b) are
continuous, and

constitute the first major section of the dialogue. In this
first major section, from 11a-

20c, the hedonist position

is

identified with (PI). (P2) is introduced early

on but

is

quickly set aside. Socrates then points out a problem entailed by
holding (PI), namely
that to hold (PI) is to fail to account for the

similar concepts.

general, but this

one-and-many character of pleasure and other

A method is proposed for dealing with one-and-many problems in

method

is set

aside. In the

20d to31a, the hedonist position

is

second major section of the dialogue, from

redefined as (P3), and then a scheme

proposed for

is

classifying all existents into four kinds: the indefinite, the limit, the mixture of the

indefinite

27e,

it is

and the

limit,

and the cause of this mixture. Towards the end of the

contended that pleasure belongs

pleasure itself is indefinite.

wisdom

On the

that orders all things (30e),

in the class

other hand,

and

mind

of the

is

indefinite,

and

at

section, at

31a

asserted to be akin to the divine

concluded that intelligence belongs

it is

that

in the

class of the limit (31a).

One might

think that at this point (P3) has been refuted and (S) proved true, and

so the dialogue could have

knowledge follows
intelligence is

(P3)

is false.

at 3

come

to a close. Instead, the lengthy analysis

lb-59c, and

more akin

to that

it is

only

at

59c-66a that

which makes the mixed

A ranking of goods is then presented,

6

in

life

it is

finally

of pleasure and

shown

that

a good mixture, and thus that

which pleasure

—

that is to say.

some kinds of pleasure

is

assigned no more than

other hand, occupies third place, and (S)

is

fifth

shown

thus

place overall. Intelligence, on the
to

be tme. The lengthy series of

sections from 31b up to the end of the dialogue at 67b comprise
the third major section of
the Philebus. These sections, in

of the dialogue

is

introduced in the

first

two

my view, belong together because

in

them

the problem

solved by applying the different sets of concepts and methods
first

two major

sections.

The following

is

an outline summary of the

sections and an argument outline of the third section of the Philebus:

(I)

The

:

1

First

la- 12b:

Methodological Section; lla-20c

The hedonist position
position as (S); (PI)

is

is

introduced as (PI), the anti-hedonist

modified to(P2).

12c- 13d: Pleasure as both one and many.

13e-15c:

The general problem of the One and

the

Many.

15d-17a: Dialectic as the “god-given” method for solving one-and-many

problems.

1

7a-l 8d: Illustrations of the application of the god-given

method

in the

sciences.

1

8d-20c: The application of the god-given method to the problem of
pleasure

(II)

:

is

postponed.

The Second Methodological

Section: 20c-31b

20c-22c: The hedonist position

23c-26d:

An
is

is

reformulated as (P3).

ontological classification of all existents into four kinds

introduced; the four kinds are: the indefinite, the

limit, the

mixture of the indefinite and the

limit,

and the cause

of the mixture.

26e-3 lb: Pleasure

is

assigned to the class of the indefinite (27c);

on the other hand, is said
the goodness of the mixed life (31a).
intelligence,

7

to

be akin to the cause of

(III).

Analysis and Solution of the Problem of the
Dialogue; 3 lb-67b

31b-32b;

Pleasure

always a replenishment, the restoration of a
disturbed harmony.

32b-36c:

36c-40e:

40e-42c:

(1)

Some

(2)

is

pleasures are of the soul

itself, and consist in the
pleasant anticipation of pleasant things; such
pleasures
involve sensation, memory, and desire.

(3)

Given

(2),

one way

when they

are based

pleasure

about.

is

in

on a

which pleasures can hQ false

false belief concerning that

is

which the

A

second way in which pleasures can be false is when
(4)
they appear, in anticipation, to be greater or less than
they really are.

42c-44a:

(5)

A third way in which pleasures can be false is when what

are really neutral states are considered

44a-50e:

by us

to

be pleasures.

(6) Pleasures are generally

mixed with pain; of these mixed
pleasures, some are of the body (44a-47b), others are of the
body and soul together (47c-47d), and still others are of the
soul alone (47d-50e).

50e-53c:

(7)

But there are pleasures

some involving

that are

unmixed with

pain,

the physical senses while others involve

only the soul; there are, then, true pleasures, for with
pleasures purity

53c-55c:

(8)

And

is

the

yet pleasure

mark of truth.

is

a process and not an end, and so

pleasure cannot be good.

55c-59c:

(9)

59c-64a:

(10)

Knowledge,

like pleasure, has

Though not

all

many

kinds.

the kinds of knowledge are equal in

we may admit all of them into the mixed life,
provided we have the best kind, namely that whose objects
are eternal and unchanging; we cannot, however, admit all
in value,

the pleasures, only the true ones.

64a-66a;

(11)

We can see why (10) is true, for the marks of

goodness are these; fineness, symmetry, and

8

truth.

66a-67b:

(12)

Thus pleasure does not win

second or

third; first prize

to fineness

nor even
goes to measure, second prize
first prize,

and proportion, third prize to mind and

intelligence, fourth prize to science, crafts
beliefs; finally, we may give fifth prize to

of the

soul.

[Therefore: (S) Intelligence

the

main claim of (P3)

the dialogue, then, to

goods?

It

original hedonist principle (PI),

is

is

i.e.,

is

compatible with the

that pleasure is

is

(j),

Is

cannot catch the good with a single form”

we need to

grasp

it

to

which

the nature of (j)?

dialogue, Socrates enumerates the elements that

is

the higher good,

(he;

it is

open

Socrates willing to grant this?

(pf)

make

it

holds pleasure to be more

Towards

the end of the

for goodness. Since, he says,

pia buvdpefta

ibeqc

and “out of their being good the [mixed

“we

to dyaftov

by three things together. The good turns out

a unity of three ideas: fineness, symmetry, and truth (KdA,X,8i Kai

(8id TOUTO

of

involved in the refutation of (P3). (P3) asserts the superiority of

akin than intelligence. What, however,

dA-riftefa, 65a2),

the central purpose of

a good. As long as the main

some sense a good.

pleasure in terms of the good-making property

ftripcuoai, 65al),

it

component claim of the

first

whether pleasure or intelligence

to Philebus to say that pleasure is in

Consider what

it.]

that intelligence ranks higher than pleasure in the
scale

should be noted that (S)

question of the dialogue

better than

with the implied rejection of

is (S),

that pleasure is superior to intelligence. Is

show

the true pleasures

is

pleasure for any being that can partake in

The culmination of the dialogue’s argument

and correct

to be

auppexpia Kai

life] itself

has

become good”

dyaftov 6v xoiauiriv auxfjv yeyovevai, 65a4-5). The abstract properties

of fineness, proportion, and truth together account for the goodness of the mixed

9

life.

These properties are ontological features of
things. They are what make any
mixture
whatsoever a good mixture, and any thing whatsoever
a good thing. Thus fineness,
proportion, and truth are the good-making
properties and are together equivalent
to

When

Socrates reformulated the hedonist position
as (P3) at 20c-22c, he had argued
that

whatever

is

the

good must be perfect

choice (aipETOv).

is

the

good

f

good
life

life;

must

It is

clear that these characteristics

they merely

be.

(tePicov), adequate (iKavov),

mark out necessary

The mixed

life is

and worthy of our

do not explain why the mixed

conditions in our choice of what the

good, rather, because the elements of the mixed

possess the abstract, formal properties of fineness, proportion,
and truth.
closer in nature to the

The pure

good because mind possesses these properties

pleasures, nonetheless, have the

measured” (EfipETpcov, 52dl), and,
fineness (Ka^^dc;)

all

unmixed with pain

their

in

own

any way;

then, that for Plato, there

is

(5 Id).

life

good-making

like the objects in

They

is

to a higher degree.

They

properties.

are

which they are taken, they have a

are not cessations

their purity thus

And mind

life

from pains (51a), and are

marks them out as

true.

One might

think,

a class of pleasures that are good in themselves, since these

pleasures possess the good-making characteristics.

And

yet immediately after

enumerating the pure pleasures, Socrates gives an argument whose conclusion amounts to
a strong denial that any pleasures can be good in themselves.

distinction

between being (ouaia) and becoming (yEVEaiq). Becoming

of’ (EVEKa) being, and

it

is

is

to a

“for the sake

being, not becoming, which belongs “in the portion of the

TOO dyaOou pot pa, 54c 10). Pleasure, however,

good” (ev

xfi

being to

whatsoever” (ouaiav 5e pr|5’ f|VTivouv

it

The argument appeals

10

is

a becoming, “there

auifit; civai, 54d5-6),

and so

is

no

pleasure cannot belong in the portion of the
good. The underlying thought

must be an end,

it

must be the

sort

being. Pleasure, because

it is

thing that can be good in

itself.

states

a process, a

means

rather than an end,

to suffer thirst,

hunger and other similar

First,

it

would follow

that

we

of deprivation, since these

states

dcA,oyia) that

would

it

would be the

result “if one sets

down

constrained to say that a

man

is evil

a virtuous man, and that a

Here the contrast

pleasures,

which are

not.

is

man

between

The

sort

of great absurdity

pleasure as the good for us”

(edv Tiq TTjv f|5ovf)v wq dya^ov ppiv TiOpTai, 55al0-l

(55c).

thus not the sort of

normally precede pleasurable experiences and are part of
the coming-into-being of

(7ioA,A,f)

is

is

Socrates goes on to illustrate the absurd
consequences of

pleasure. Protarchus assents to this, saying

he

good

of thing for the sake of which other things
come into

supposing that a process such as pleasure could be an end.

ought to choose

that the

is

1).

Secondly,

(Kaxov, 55b6) whenever he
is

is

we would be

in pain,

outstanding in virtue insofar as he

virtues,

which are goods

is

even though
in

in an unqualified sense,

It is

significant that Plato introduces these remarks just after he has enumerated

on

to

examine the forms of knowledge.

significant that here, late in the dialogue, the hedonist position

preceded

that this section has

it

for the sake

else.

the true pleasures, and before he goes

comments

and

contrast implies that virtues have being or are being,

whereas pleasures are merely processes of coming-into-being, and are always
of something

enjoyment

is

It is

also

stated as (PI). Hackforth

no obvious connection with what has immediately

[Hackforth, 1945; p. 105].

He

finds

point of view which treats pleasure as a simple,

11

it

“puzzling” that Plato should revert to a

i.e.,

to (PI), since this

seems

to ignore the

classification of pleasure into kinds that
Socrates has just given in the long section
from
3 lb-5 lb.

Hackforth concludes that the pleasure-as-genesis
view

is

not Plato’s own, but

rather represents the opinion of a group of
“subtle” thinkers (KOjiVj/oi, 53c6) of Plato’s

acquaintance, and that

one which a

its

introduction in this part of the dialogue

is

modem author would have relegated to an appendix.^

by way of an

Socrates, in the

dialogue, then remarks that the Kopvj/oc; must be “laughing
scornfully at those

that pleasure is

good” (54d6-7).

aside,

who

assert

Hackforth comments:

This conclusion, reached
the sole

at 54d, clearly means not merely that pleasure is not
the good,
good or even the chief good, but that it is not a good, in fact that ‘good’
cannot

be predicated of any pleasure. Now it is certainly surprising that such a
conclusion
should be reached, particularly at this stage of the dialogue. For that some
pleasures are
good is admitted by Socrates at 13B, and implied at 28A; and although the pure and
true
pleasures enumerated at 51Bff. are not actually called good, it is hardly
possible to doubt

them as good, and we shall subsequently find them admitted into the
mixture which constitutes the good life [Hackforth, 1945; p. 106].
that Plato regards

Hackforth suggests that Socrates’ conclusion that pleasure
accepted as more than provisional, since

“So then pleasure,
yeveaiq eaiiv

if at

... ).

any

It is

rate,

it

it

is stated, at

a coming to be

is

is

a genesis

is

not to be

54c6, as a conditional premise:

(oukouv

.

f|8ovtj ye,

einep

similarly stated at 54dl.

4

J.C.B. Gosling takes a similar view: “This section, together with 55b, does not continue the

argument of the preceding passage.
pleasure which

is

It is

hostile to hedonism.

unwilling to abandon

could not blend

it,

rather an abrupt introduction of a current

One
it

view on

gets the impression Plato had this piece to hand,

in

smoothly, so

in

desperation inserted

it

badly

was

at this

point” [Gosling, 1975; p. 220].
5

Hackforth notes the
specific person in

mind

.

shift to the singular in the text, suggesting, plausibly, that Plato

had a

Hackforth thinks Speusippus and his followers to be the most likely

candidate [Hackforth, 1945; pp. 106; 108].
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It is

true that the pleasure-as-genesis claim

conditional, but Socrates

is

is

advanced

in the

form of a

clearly endorsing that claim in this
passage,

and the claim

is

consistent with the analysis of pleasures that he
has given. Hackforth, however, thinks
that the

remarks about pleasure being a genesis do not apply to
the true pleasures, which

are shortly to be admitted as a class into the

yev8CTi<; to

apply to the nature of pleasure

the previous sections, in

is

good mixed

life.

The use of the word

no more than a change

which pleasure was analyzed as a

in

kcvcoctk;,

terminology from

an emptying,

alternating with a Ti^ifjpcocic;, a filling up^ [Hackforth,
1945; p. 107]. Plato, Hackforth
thinks, has in

mind when he

which

up

filling

1945; p.l07,

declares pleasure to be a genesis the kind of coming-to-be in

alternates with a corruptive state

n.].

And, since the

true pleasures

(

90 opd

)

of emptying [Hackforth,

of the soul are exempt from the corruptive

alternation that characterizes the great majority of the sense pleasures, Hackforth thinks
that Plato

does not mean to include the true pleasures under the pleasure-as-genesis view.

But, the point of the pleasure-as-genesis view

is to

exclude

all

processes from the

category of ends, and thus from the category of things that belong “in the portion of the

good.” The emphasis in the passage

is

on the fundamental

of states, rather than on the alternation of emptying and

The point

is

that only states that are not processes

fulfilments, of human action.

at

31e-32a and

at

35a-35c.

7

At

3

1

e 1 0, for instance.

8

As Frede

1993,

iv,

between two kinds
g

filling that constitutes pleasure.

can be thought of as ends, that

is,

as

Only ends belong “in the portion of the good.” According

6

Notably,

distinction

points out.
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to Plato s view, therefore, pleasure
is not a fulfilment of human
activity,

and cannot be

its

proper aim.

Concerning the pleasures excluded from the good

why

life,

there

is

no problem about

they are not ends, for their association with pain
and falsity disqualifies them from

being good, and thus from being ends. But the true
pleasures have neither pain nor
in

them: are they then

fit

difference between being

human

life,

human

life

be ends of human action? However, there

fit

to

at for

The

human

life, this is

emptying phase

The

is

it

fulfillment

in

fact, therefore, that

initial

all their

—

sense.

But

if

we

own, are not

to

be aimed

in the

albeit

good mixed

—

an unfelt lack

life,

to a

these pleasures

take the pleasure-as-genesis view as Plato’s own,

that the true pleasures are

good not

life.

They

responsible for the goodness of that

life.

But

is

then accompanied by the true

condition of lack

they are included in the good mixed

it

something

the true pleasures are not corruptive in their

And, since they are included

some

would seem

goodness

is

at;

not the relevant point; even the true pleasures are processes because

filling.

must be good

whose

at

they involve a movement, from an

then

elements in a good

not because they have been aimed

true pleasures, while having a goodness

themselves.

subsequent

fact that the true pleasures are

does not imply that they are proper ends of human action. Whenever
the true

might well have been aimed

pleasures.

clearly a

is

be an end, on the one hand, and being a part of the good

on the other hand. The

pleasures occur in a

else

to

falsity

in themselves, but

are parts

of the good

in that case

that these pleasures share in.
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we need to

life

only insofar as

without being

ask what kind of

C. Plato on the Kinds of Good

In a well

we welcome,

known passage of the Republic

not because

aoTOi) evsKa, 357b6).

no

results

we

He

(357b-c), Plato refers to “a kind of good

what comes from

desire

it,

but ...for

its

own sake'" (auio

gives, as examples, joy and the harmless
pleasures that have

beyond the joy of having them. He

contrasts these with a second kind of goods

that

we choose

partly for their

that

we choose

not for themselves but wholly for their results. The
fundamental

work here

distinction at

valued for

is

a

means

to

its

is

own

sakes, partly for their results. Thirdly, there are
goods

the distinction between a kind of thing that

owti sake, and a second kind of thing that

something else that

is

valued for

its

own

is

is

good because

good because

we

shall call

3.

valued as

sake. Let us call the second kind an

instrumental good. Instrumental goods are means to the attainment of the

good, which

it is

it

final good, to capture the point that

its

first

kind of

being valued

is

not to

be explained in terms of some other act of valuation but in terms of itself alone. Plato
expresses this by saying that a final good

to

av

have (6

object’s goodness

is tied

for its

to

is

own

something that

sake

we would welcome

(amo amoO

evexa).

or desire

Here, an

being welcomed or desired. The following would then be

its

the definition of a final good:

(D1 ) X

is

a final

good =

for the sake

(Dl) defines a

sake.

For someone

good as something

But Plato refers

to

an object that

ccv lyje.iv, the optative

(6

me

final

def.

to include

S,

S desires x

& S desires x

of x.

that is actually desired,

we would welcome

and desired for

its

own

or desire to have

with av giving subjunctive force). This seems to

our actually desiring the object, but

15

it

also says that

we would

desire to

have the object were we
however,

is that

to

be confronted with

a final good

for the sake of something

being desired for

its

own

is

desired or

which
sake

it

it,

the

way

The

crucial part

would be desired

for

of the definition,

its

own

sake, rather than

produces or something which accompanies

what the goodness of the object consists

is

Republic discussion, that something
for

it.

m which we value

it;

is

a final good

is

in.

Its

it.

In the

indicated by the nature of our desire

the notion of a final good, therefore,

is

defined in

psychological terms.

Now on this conception,
Philebus are

final

goods, since

rather than for their results.

it

seems

that the pure pleasures of the soul

if they are desired,

However, while the

they are desired for their

of the

own

sakes

true pleasures are clearly not

instrumental goods, Socrates nowhere says that they are desired for themselves,
or that

they ought to be so desired. Nonetheless, the true pleasures must be classified as

goods, since, if they are desired or valued
sakes.

But then, exactly the same thing

is

at all,

final

they are desired or valued for their

own

true of mind and intelligence: these, too, are to

be valued and desired non-instrumentally. If the true pleasures are to be compared with

mind,

the

we need

same

type,

to

compare them

we need

contrast between final

to

either as different types of

good

or, if they are

be able to compare their relative values.

The Republic's

goods and instrumental goods, then, does not help us

the distinction between pleasure and intelligence as goods.

an instructive contrast between types of good.
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goods of

to understand

We must look elsewhere for

In the Laws, Plato divides goods into

human and

divine goods.

Human goods

are

such things as health, beauty, strength, and wealth
(63 Ib-d). Divine goods are the virtues
of wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage.
desired for their

own

Laws, however, Plato

sakes, and so are final

is

Some of the human goods

goods by the Republic

are clearly

definition. In the

not interested in drawing a contrast between
final and

instrumental goods. For he proceeds to argue, concerning
the

human

goods, that

all these things are possessions of great
value to the just and pious, but ... to the unjust
they are a curse, every one of them, from health all the way
down the list. Seeing,
hearing, sensation, and simply being alive, are great
evils, if in spite of having all these

so-called

good things a man gains immortality without justice and virtue in
general; but
evil is less {Laws 661b-c) [trans.'

if

he survives for only the briefest possible time, the
Trevor J. Saunders, in Cooper ed. 1997].

The human goods

are

good only conditionally, depending on whether or not

possessor also has the divine goods. For this reason, the

dependent goods [Bobonich, 1997;

good by themselves, whatever

else

we may

human goods have been

The divine goods, on

p. 103].

or

may

their

called

the other hand, are

not possess. The divine goods have

thus been called independent goods [Bobonich, 1997; p. 104].

The fundamental

distinction at

work

in this contrast is

between a type of good

benefits us unconditionally, and a second type of good that benefits us only

that

we

already have the

in the Philebusl

By the

first,

more fundamental, kind of good.

of a

man who

is

if,

for instance, they

were

bereft of the divine goods, then they

pleasures are dependent goods

the life of a virtuous

on condition

Is this contrast at

work

terms of this contrast, the true pleasures of the Philebus would

not be independent goods, so that

life

that

man.

—they

It is

are goods at

all

to occur as episodes in the

would be

only

when

evils.

The tme

they occur as episodes in

instructive that at Philebus 55b-c, a contrast
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is

posed

between pleasures and

virtues. In this passage, Socrates
contrasts pleasure

goods whenever each of these

is

present in the soul. Socrates

the absurd consequences that follow “if one
sets

down

end.

in

it is

argued that pleasure

would be absurd, Protarchus

It

is

(tov ev

(i)

jiTjxe

^otipeiv

KaOapdixaxa, 55a6-8),

p,Tjx8

1).

This comes towards the end

a process, a becoming, rather than an

agrees, if we

which there was neither enjoyment nor being

here concerned to lay out

pleasure as the good for us”

(edv Tiq Tf]v f|6ovf]v d)q dyaOov f|piv TiOfjxai,
55al0-l
of the passage where

is

and virtue as

were

to prefer a life

of pleasure to a

life

in pain, but the purest possible thinking”
'

X,D7i8ia0ai, cppov8iv 8 f|v [buvaxov] cbq oiov X8

for then

we would

be choosing corruption and genesis rather

than the state of being that defines pure thought. But there are even
more absurd

consequences

in

supposing that pleasure

is

the good:

How, isn’t it absurd that there is nothing either good or beautiful in bodies
many other things except in soul, and that there pleasure alone is good, but that

Soc.

or in

courage,
moderation, mind, or any other thing the soul assigns as good, is not of this kind?
Besides this, how, whoever is not enjoying, but is in pain, to be constrained to say that
he
is then bad when he is in pain, even though he is the best of all men,
and in turn he who
is enjoying, insofar as he enjoys, at the time when he enjoys to that extent
he stands out
in virtue (55bl-cl).

The four absurd consequences of supposing

that pleasure is the

good

[i.e.,

that (PI) is

true] are the following:

(1) that there is nothing

is

good/noble in bodies, only

in the soul [since,

i.e.,

pleasure

experienced in the soul];

(2) that, in the soul, pleasure is the only

good

thing;

and courage, moderation,

reason and other goods of the soul are neither good nor noble;

(3) that

she

anyone who experiences pain would be

is

in fact virtuous;

and
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evil

while she

is in

pain,

even

if

(4) that

anyone who

pleased,

is

is

pleased, while she

is

the only thing that

implies that pleasure

from 53c-55c

is to

pleased and to the extent that she

is

virtuous.

But, (2) seems surprising. Socrates
pleasure

is

is

is

pointing out that (PI) implies the absurd claim
that

is

good

for the soul,

a good thing for the

deny

that pleasure is a

good

therefore a means, rather than an end. This
Soc. So, then, pleasure,

if,

soul,

is

at all events,

and that the virtues are

But

this

whereas the whole point of the passage

at all, since

it

is

a genesis, a becoming and

clearly stated in the

it is

not.

exchange

at

54c-54d:

a coming-to-be, of necessity would come-to-

be for the sake of some being.

Of course.

Prot.

And, moreover,

Soc.

of which whatever becomes for the sake of
something would always be becoming, this belongs in the portion of the good [ou evexa
TO evsKa Tou Yiyvopevov dsi yiyvon’ dv, ev xf\ toO dyaOou poipa skeivo eati]; but
that which is coming-to-be for the sake of something, my excellent one, must be
set
that for the sake

down

to a different portion.

Prot.

Most

Soc.
set

it

necessarily.

Then we

down

Prot. That’s certainly

Here

it is

made

most

pleasure correctly,

good

life.

indeed

it is

a coming-to-be, if we

good?

right.

this

of pleasure, he clearly means to refer

pleasure as a unity. This

is

different

pleasures are not goods for the soul, or that the

the

if

quite clear that pleasure does not belong “in the portion of the good.”

However, when Socrates says
itself, that is, to

down

will be setting

into a different portion than the

many

from saying

is

not the good.

19

that all the

many

pleasures are to be excluded from

Socrates, therefore, can consistently hold that

the soul and that pleasure itself

to pleasure in

some

pleasures are goods for

An

important point, however, comes out of
Socrates’ enumeration of the absurd

consequences of holding that pleasure
difference

is

the good. In the examples given,

m the ways that two sorts of things can be present in the soul.

or pains are present in the soul,

it

seems

that they

do not

we

notice a

When pleasures

affect the soul itself But, with

such things as courage (dvbpeia), moderation
(acocppoauvri), and reason (vouq) the soul
evidently has a different relation.

of virtue

in

it,

The

soul,

we might

whereas, though some pleasures

say, is

may be good

such do not make the soul good. Points
(3) and (4)

made good by

the presence

for the soul, the pleasures as

in Socrates’

enumeration together

imply that Socrates holds virtues to be goods for the soul unconditionally.
Unlike the
pleasures, the virtues are

good

for us to have, whatever other

goods

we may

or

may

not

possess. Thus, the virtues are independent goods.

The Laws'

contrast

between independent goods and dependent goods

applicable to the Philebus discussion.

included in the good

as part of a virtuous

life;

life.

Some

is

therefore

pleasures are good, in the sense that they are

these pleasures are good, however, not by themselves but only

The pleasures of the

virtuous

are pleasures, but because they are the pleasures of a

the goodness of such pleasures

is

man are

good, not because they

good man. However,

it’s

not that

derived from the goodness of virtue; rather, such

pleasures are good on condition that the

man who

has them also possesses the

unconditional good of virtue. Thus, the true pleasures are good because they are already

part of a life that

good

is

unconditionally good. But this

in themselves.
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is to

say that these pleasures are not

The
Republic^

virtues,

in themselves.

Here we cannot apply the

conception of a final good as an object’s being
desired for

the virtues are

this

however, are good

good independently of anyone’s

its

desiring to have them.

with the Laws" notion of independent goodness.

is

A stronger conception of good is

presented by the notion of

properties. Let us call this notion intrinsic goodness.

sake, since

Nor can we equate

needed which makes the goodness of an object a
property of the object
such a stronger conception that

own

The

(|)

itself.

It is

just

as a triad of good-making

definition of an intrinsic

good

would then be the following:
(D2) X

To

is

an intrinsic good =

def.

x

or x has symmetry, or x

is fine,

say that something belongs in the portion of the good, then,

included in the good mixed

life; it is

to say that

back to the discussion of the four kinds
notion of goodness there introduced

making properties only much
making

characteristics

is

is

in the

it

has

in

its

goodness in

it is

This refers

itself.^

fully explicated in the discussion

of the good-

Whatever has a share

being, not merely as features of a

then, are

good

yet, they

are the good-making properties as manifested in a

in

not just to say that

second methodological passage, but the

later in the dialogue.

good

its

is

is true.

life.

The

themselves because they have the good-making properties,

human

life.

good-

in the

virtues,

or, better

The

virtues are

9

Christine Korsgaard notes that,
definition to say that

[Korsgaard, 1983;

something that has

it is

valued for

p. 170].
its

The

“To say

own

that

sake:

Thus the notion of a

goodness

instrumental goodness.

its

in itself,

and

natural contrast

goodness. Extrinsic goodness

is

is

final

it is

is

something

it

intrinsically

is

to say that

it

has

its

good

is

goodness

good cannot be equated with

not by
in itself’

the notion of

misleading to contrast intrinsic goodness with

between

intrinsic

goodness and extrinsic

the goodness or value that an object gets from another source.

Instrumental goods are properly contrasted with final goods.
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thus intrinsic goods in the sense of having
in themselves the properties
that define

goodness.

D. The Ends of Pleasure
In the Philebus, then, Plato

is

the notion of an intrinsic

The second

is

element in a

is

working with two

distinct notions

good given by (D2), of something

of good. The

good

that is

in its being.

a notion of conditional goodness, of something being
good only

life that

contains the

first

if

it is

an

kind of good. This second kind of good

corresponds to the Laws notion of a dependent good.
both kinds of good, but will have the

first

first

A good human life will contain

kind necessarily, the second kind only

contingently.

Thus,

when

not to be taken to

that

some

some

Socrates states at Philebus 13b that

mean

that

any pleasures are

intrinsic goods.

are good, this

pleasures are good, and what he says apparently commits

is

capable of unlimited fullness and increase that

27e8). Socrates replies that pain in that case

28al) but, since

this is not the case, the evil

character, nor the

good of pleasure then

to

it

him

is “all

to holding that

would likewise be

good”

it

is

(jidv

“all evil” (ttccv

of pain could not be due to

its

is

At 28a, Socrates implies

pleasures are good in themselves. There Philebus has just argued that

pleasure

some

some pleasures

its

because

dya&ov,

KaKOv,

unlimited

lack of limit. Here, Socrates implies that

pleasures have a share in limit, and this suggests that they are good intrinsically.

shall argue in the next chapter,

limit as a determinant

however, that

of goodness

is

this is not the case,

specified
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and

by the good-making

that the notion

of

characteristics that

I

constitute

what

is

designated

(()

in (P3). Contrary to Hackforth’s
view, Plato

can

consistently hold that no pleasures are goods in
themselves.

Plato’s view, then,

in a

good

that the true pleasures are

Such pleasures are

life.

goodness

is

all their

own. But whatever

pleasure as a process, if we take

good

What

in itself.

still

is

it

goods insofar as they are elements

not in themselves good, though they have
a

good about pleasure has nothing

is

view that only

as Plato’s

good about pleasure

is

fxoipa,

in the portion

since pleasure

is

that

it is

this

ousia can be

is

some end

for the sake

of

end which belongs ev xp xou ccyoc&ou

of the good. Since that which

a genesis, there must be

is

do with

due to that thing, for the sake of which

pleasure comes-to-be. At 54c6-10 Socrates suggests that there

which pleasure comes-to-be, and

which

that

to

is

good

in itself must

some being (xivoq

be an ousia, and

oi)aia<;, 54c6-7),

something

capable of being an end, for the sake of which pleasure comes-to-be. But this can hardly

be taken to

to

mean

is

mean

that all pleasures

that pleasure,

Thus,

let

(D2).

Then

i/-good

(El)

whenever

have an end

it

is

good

that is

in itself.

a good, has an end which

= “dependently good,” and /-good =

“intrinsically

class

it

can be taken

a good in

good”

itself.

in the sense

p

is

a pleasure and p

is

t/-good

=

there

is

some

of ps

that are ^/-good is the class

y for the sake
is

/-good.

of pleasures included

in the

good

life,

the class

of ys that are /-good includes primarily the virtues. If in the exercise of a virtue some

of pleasure comes about, such a pleasure

therefore

is

of

the following equivalence holds:

of which p comes into being, and y

The

is

What

is

a good. But the pleasure

not a good in itself like virtue. Since

23

it

is

is still

sort

a process, and

a contingent fact that virtue

is

accompanied by any

pleasure,

it

follows that no pleasure which accompanies
a virtue has

the attributes of the virtue necessarily. The
following example from J.O.

Urmson may

help clarify Plato’s account:
Let us suppose that I am engaged in geometrical thinking
and on the verge of completing
an important proof Certainly such a situation as this
could result in a glow of excitement
and elation welling up within me ... (T)his excitement might
well intercept and impede
my geometrical thought ... I might have to light a pipe and pace about until
the
pleasurable excitement died down and I could again be
absorbed in my geometrv
[Urmson, 1967; p. 328].

On

Plato’s account, the physical

qualify as d-good. But this

presently extend the

list

is

glow of excitement

not because

it is

is

example would not even

a sensory pleasure. Socrates would

of pleasures that are part of the good mixed

bodily pleasures. But Plato would not allow,

impede phronesis

in the

good

in

I

life to

think, that an experience

which could

any way, for then the pleasure would not be for the sake of

(ev8Ka) ihe phronesis. Occurring simultaneously with the physical excitement
purely mental enjoyment that accompanies the phronesis. This
as a true pleasure of the soul.

some

include

is

is

what Socrates

a

refers to

However, while both the physical excitement and the

mental enjoyment are merely contingently related to the phronesis
pleasures, but not the former, are t/-goods.

from impeding phronesis, even enhance

The
^

it.

true

itself,

the latter

and pure pleasures of the

Such pleasures

soul, far

are, as Socrates is shortly to

describe them, “almost dwelling with us” (axebov oiKeiaq ppiv, 63e4). This,

I

think.

10

While
I

am

using

‘(ppovTiaic;’

it

here to

has been used throughout this chapter to

mean

intellectual activity. Plato’s usage,

6 Id, for instance, Socrates contrasts f|5ovf|v

I

mean

believe,

the faculty of intelligence,
is

inclusive of this.

At

and (ppovijasi as kinds of activities. Cf. Irwin

1995: “In the Philebus, as in the Republic, ‘intelligence’ does not refer simply to practical

reasoning but also includes the sort of intellectual activity that Plato admires so

much

in the

Republic: philosophical study and reflexion, and other theoretical activity undertaken for

sake” [Irwin, 1995;

p.

337].
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its

own

IS

Plato s

way of saying

connected

that although the true pleasures of
the soul are so intimately

phronesis or with virtue, they do not occur with
them necessarily.

Perhaps

seems probable

we may

why

see

(P2)

is

that the psychological

with virtue, since

it

condition of soul.

is

virtue

replaced by (P3) in the dialogue’s argument.

good-making element

which makes a

life

had been allowed

If (P2)

hedonism, Socrates would have had

show

to

to

v|/

in (P2)

It

can be identified

good or eudaimon, and

virtue is a

remain as the agreed upon statement of

that intelligence rather than pleasure is

akin to virtue. But Socrates’ argument would then hinge on the
claim that virtue

is

more
the

good. Since virtue and pleasure are both “conditions of soul,” that claim
would simply

have begged the question against hedonism. For, Protarchus could just as well
have
insisted in the beginning, at

that

makes a

life

eudaimon

1

when

Id- 12a

is

itself,

good. The

life,

but anything at

move

was

introduced, that the condition of soul

none other than pleasure or enjoyment. By adopting (P3)

the hedonist position, however, Socrates

makes not only a

(P2)

is

as

able to introduce further questions about what

including pleasure, intelligence, and virtue

all,

to ontological considerations about

goodness

is

thus a crucial one

for Socrates’ argument.

From

the

example just

sake of which pleasure can

come

pleasures included in the good

characteristics,

cited,

it

is

about.

life.

he had extended the

evident that virtue

Nor

is

not the only good for the

are the pure pleasures of the soul the only

Even before Socrates enumerated
list

the good-making

of pleasures that are included in the good

life;

11

For a characterization of virtue as a condition or
Irwin 1978, chapter VIII section 9; and Penner 1973.
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state

of soul, see: Teloh 1981, chapter

I;

l

f
further

n

“d mi"d once again: “Do you stand
your mixture?”— we would say in questioning
mind and
turn. “What kinds of pleasures?”—
perhaps they would say.

f
need of pleasures

intelligence in

in

in

Prot. Probably.

Then our speech after this is as follows. “In addition
to those true pleasures,” we
do you need still further the greatest and most
intense pleasures to dwell
with you? “And how, Socrates,” perhaps they
would say, “when they

tSoc.

shall say,

put in our

way

a

myriad obstructions, disturbing the souls in which we
dwell through fits of madness, and
from the beginning do not let us come to be at all, and
the children bom to us for the
most part they wholly corrupt, creating forgetfulness in them
through heedlessness?
But the pleasures you spoke of as tme and pure, recognize
them as almost dwelling
with us, and besides these the pleasures that come with
health and with soundness of
mind, and moreover mix in all those pleasures that attend the
whole of virtue, just as
if she were a goddess and follow along with
her everywhere; but those that always

come with thoughtlessness and all other evils, surely it is utter
who wished to see the most beautiful and tranquil mixture and

senselessness, for one

blending, to be engaged
mixing them with mind, so that he might try to learn in this whatever
by nature is
good in mankind and in everything, and whatever form he should divine
that it is.”
in

Shall

we

sensibly,

not say that in the present statement,

mind has answered thoughtfully and
on behalf of itself, and also of memory and correct belief? (63c-64a)

Here, the physical pleasures that attend health and soundness of mind (xaq
vyiEiaq Kai

TOO

CTCotppoveiv), as well as those

These pleasures are

to

which accompany

virtue, are included in the

good

life.

be admitted because they blend harmoniously with the functioning

of mind. Thus, nous and phronesis are themselves ousia for the sake of which pleasure
12

comes

about.

Together with the virtues, they make up the class of /-goods.

The

pleasures which attend their exercise are thus goods too, though not goods in themselves.

When

Socrates arrives at the final ranking of goods

at

the end of the dialogue,

place in the ranking goes to “that which relates to measure in any

way

the seasonable and the everlasting, everything of that kind” (66a6-8).

It

should be recalled that at 55b, vouq

is itself

oco(ppoai)VT|
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—

first

the measured and

Second prize goes

referred to as a virtue, alongside ccvbpeix and

to “that

which

relates to the symmetrical

and the

fine, the perfect

and the adequate, and

everything that in turn are in these kinds” (66bl-3). In
third place are mind and
intelligence {nous kai phronesis, 66b5-6). Fourth prize
goes to “knowledges and crafts

and correct beliefs” (eTuaifipac; xs Kai xe'xvaq Kai bo^aq
finally, are the

found in a human

There

life.

which awards second

to

be

is

a ranking oi actual goods to be

another ranking arrived

is

prize to mind,

Both rankings establish the

shown

66b9). In fifth place,

pure pleasures of the soul, both those which follow upon
knowledge and

those which follow upon sensations (66c4-6). This

life.

opMq,

first

at implicitly here,

prize having already been

awarded

to

to the

superiority of mind over pleasure, and thus (S)

that

mixed

is finally

true.

Yet Plato clearly had reservations about pleasure being a good

seems

namely

have been interested

pleasure in the scale of goods.

in

showing more than

Not only do these

And he

at all.

that intelligence ranks higher than

facts

come up

in the pleasure-as-genesis

passage, but a closer examination of the methodological sections of the dialogue and the
analysis of pleasures

accepts and

is

pleasure be

shown

I

this to

arguing against

to be not a

Philebus, therefore,

two chapters

shows

is

is

be the case. The formulation of hedonism that Plato

(PI), not (P3),

good

in

and the rejection of (PI) requires

an ontological sense. Plato’s main aim in the

simply the refutation of hedonism, interpreted as (PI). In the next

shall try to

show

this in greater detail, first

by examining the

methodological sections and then by looking into the analysis of pleasure.

that the notion

role

shows

that

of falsity plays the

that Plato is

critical role in the analysis

working against (PI), not
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(P3).

I

shall argue

of pleasure, and

that

such a

CHAPTER II
THE METHODOLOGICAL PASSAGES

A. Introduction

The

first

methodological passage, which deals with the logical
question of how

things can be both one and many,

comes before

therefore be intended as a response to

it.

the introduction of (P3), and cannot

The passage

The second methodological passage, which proposes
ontological kinds,

comes

right after the introduction

is

meant, rather, to address (PI).

the division of all things into four

of (P3), and

is

indicated in the text to

be a direct response to the just-reformulated problem of the discussion. Neither
pleasure
nor knowledge

mixed

life

is

now

going for

“first prize,” since this

has

now been awarded to

of mind and pleasure, but rather only for “second prize.”

the text, however, that the results of the

be abandoned;

we

first

It is

I

also indicated in

methodological passage are by no means to

should wonder, therefore, whether the problem that

been abandoned too.

the

it

shall argue in this chapter that in fact the results

investigation into the nature of one-and-many problems

is

addresses has

of the

kept firmly in mind by

Socrates, not only through the analysis of pleasure, but also in the second methodological

passage itself Moreover, those results are a key to the solution of the central problem of
the dialogue. This problem

moved on

is

to (P3), Socrates is

and thereby refute (PI)

really

still

none other than (PI). While the discussion has

concerned to refute a constituent proposition of (PI),

itself
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B. Pleasure as a One-and-Manv
1.

Three One-and-Many Problems
Socrates claims that pleasure has a one-and-many
character: “...as

called, pleasure is

these are in

some one

some way

thing (ev xi), but surely

different

it

has taken

is

is

plainly

forms (popcpdq) and

all

from each other” (12c6-8). This

it

Socrates’

own

characterization of the one-and-many problem (hereafter,
'OMP') concerning pleasure.

The problem

is

we

all

call

them

that the various

forms of pleasure are different from each other, and yet

by one name, and so we think

that the various pleasures

common

have a

that pleasure is

some one

single thing, and

But eventually Socrates gets

nature.

Protarchus to agree that there can be many, different pleasures, just as there
are
different

forms of knowledge (14a).

A little later on, at

many

14c, Socrates states the

OMP

with no particular reference to pleasure:
I mean the argument that has turned up just now, and which
has something
of an amazing nature. For, that the many are one and the one is many are amazing

Soc.

things to say

(SaopaaTOv

A,£xOev), and

it's

easy to dispute anyone

who takes up

must "establish

argument

either of these positions (14c7-10).

Just before this passage, Socrates

had said

that they

more" by agreeing on something, which turns out
above, that the

and asserting

many

that

it

are one

and the one

is

many.

to

this

be just the statement quoted
Plato here

is

generalizing the

Protarchus. Then do you
has

OMP,

applies to other concepts besides pleasure. Protarchus responds with

a question:

who

still

come

to be

each other, the same

mean

by nature,

me

that

whenever someone says of me, Protarchus,

that again the me's are

being both

tall

and

other things (14cl l-d3)?
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short,

many and

heavy and

different

light,

from

and countless

Socrates replies that these are not the kind
of one-and-many puzzles that he finds

amazing. These are the "commonplace puzzles"
about the one and the many; they are
childish and easy, and are an impediment
to discussion (14d).

those which concern unities that do not

come

into being

The important

OMPs are

and perish. Socrates gives the

following examples of such unities: ox, humanity,
beauty, and the good. Thus the

OMP

applies to a certain range of concepts, namely those
that denote non-sensible unities.

Evidently

it is

to this

things of their sort

group that pleasure belongs, and "concerning these unities
and

much

zealous controversy arises with their division"

Twv evdScov xai twv toioutcov
yiyvexai, 15a6-7).

.

f)

noXX^

aTioobfi

(Trep'i

toutcov

biaipeaecoq dpcpiapi^xriaK;

We must note here Socrates' concern with the division of these

13

.

unities.

There then follows a much-disputed passage, 15bl-8, in which Socrates
enumerates some problems concerning these

unities.

There

is

a dispute about

how many

13

this

Mirhady 1992 thinks that the phrase pexd biaipeaecoq is out of grammatical sequence in
passage, and concludes that it is a late interpolation by someone who (incorrectly) anticipates

OMP

the discussion of division at 16dff (p. 172, n. 3).

Mirhady denies that the
is introduced by
Plato as a philosophical problem about the non-sensible unities; instead, he thinks that for Plato,
the

OMP is a social problem that results from the propensity of young men, untrained in

argument, to make divisions indiscriminately— taking delight
1

73).

Mirhady supports

his

view by pointing out the consistently

here; he also notes that the phrase
often,

f|

7io^X,f]

anoudf) (which he

though not always, used by Plato with ironical

phrase connotes misspent effort
both as a social problem

in

in the

(p. 172).

It is

intent,

confusion this creates

ironical tone

(p.

of the discussion

translates as 'the great fuss')

and that when he does so use

quite possible, of course, that Plato

saw the

it

is

the

OMP

Mirhady's sense and a philosophical one. But Mirhady also claims

method of division at 16d is a solution to the OMP only as a social problem, and not to
any philosophical concerns brought up in 15b (p. 173). However, if it can be shown that 15b 1-8
does bring up serious philosophical concerns, and that 16dff is a solution to these concerns, 1
that the

don't see

how 5b 1-8
1

can be held to address only a social problem of the one and the many. That

15bl-8 does bring up such philosophical concerns, and that these concerns affect the division of
pleasure,

is

what

this section tries to

show.
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questions are raised in this passage; there are also
conflicting views about just what these
questions are.

OMPj,

will call

(a)

is

But Socrates has

possible,

is

now referred to two OMPs. One

the problem of explaining

xisF„xisF 2
where x

is

,

...xisF„

a particular and F,...F„ are

of the characteristics are different from the others,
being both

tall

and

short,

problem of explaining
(b)

is

possible,

X

is

where

concern

it

is

heavy and

light, etc.

is

opposite-F„

...

x

is

thus

Clearly, however,

of being opposite,

precisely, therefore,

OMP,

some

e.g.,

is

the

F„

as being trivial

and an impediment

to discourse,

and

we may assume

it.

OMP that Socrates raised, however, is clearly relevant to the dialogue’s

OMP about pleasure having many forms (popcpdq).

generalized, this problem constitutes a distinct

it

is

(c)

is

is

how

central problem. This is the

2;

in the sense

More

OMP,

characteristics.

not relevant to the central problem of the dialogue, and that 15b 1-8 does not

The other

OMP

its

and opposite-F, are contraries rather than contradictories. Socrates

F,

OMP,

has dismissed

both that

F„ X

we

how

how a particular can have many characteristics.

concerned with

of these, which

possible.

the problem of explaining

(j),

is

F,

(j)2

is

F,

... (j)„

Here F,...F„ and

Hahn 1978 provides

(j)

is

OMP, which we may

Suitably

designate

how

F

are intensional entities,

i.e.,

characteristics, forms, or

a comprehensive survey of the positions that scholars have taken on this

passage.
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kinds, of different types.

m (c), where

({),..

.(t)„

Thus

would be types of pleasure and F

which the many

clear sense in

Form. But could

the problem of pleasure having

we

are one,

i.e.,

not say of Pleasure

the

Fis0„Fis02,

(d)

is

in

possible.

which F

It

Here F

is

it

is

dispute whenever

fall

under one

Forms?

OMPj

are other

Forms

how

any non-sensible monad

like Pleasure

if

and

0,...(t>n

which one Form

is

also

many.

15bl-8 turned out to be irrelevant to OMPj, since in this

purportedly enumerating the further questions that

we

We thus have a

Pleasure.

participates in other

participates. This gives another clear sense in

passage Socrates

represented

is

FisO„

...

would be surprising

Form

many sub-forms of pleasure

itself that

then could also be the problem of explaining

the

many forms

come up

for

talk about non-sensible unities like ox, humanity, the good,

and

3.

As

pleasure.

1

.

the text stands, the three questions raised in the passage are these:

15bl-2

:

First.

truly being

.

.whether

we

(FIpwTov pev

are to suppose that there are

ci

xivaq Sei

monads of this kind
xoiauxaq civai povdbaq

i)7roX,apPdvEiv dA,r|Od)q ouaaq);

2.

15b2-4

:

Then

again,

how these,

each one being always

itself

neither of coming-into-being nor of perishing, nevertheless

one

is

most securely

piav eKdaxr|v ouCTav dei

xf)v auxqv Kai
yEVEQiv pfjxE o^iE^pov 7ipoa5Exopevr|v opcoq Eivai PEPaioxaxa

this

pT]X8

(eixa 7i6q ai) xauxaq,

and admitting

pi'av xauxriv;)?

15b4-8

:

And

are unlimited

all,

we must

whole separated

as a

whether among the things that come to be and

after this, in turn,
set [each

in itself,

down

one]

which

one and the same thing coming

it

to

as scattered and

would appear

the

Kai dTiEipoiq eixe biEOTiaapEvriv

ai)

Kai noXXa yEyovuiav ftEXEov,

6Xr|v auxfjv auxfjq

d6uvaxc5xaxov

cpaivoix' dv,

xauxov Kai ev dpa ev evi xe Kai

yiyvEaftai).
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or

most impossible of
be simultaneously in one and in many
is

(pExd 5e xoux' ev xoiq yiyvopEvoiq
Eift'

become many,

o

Tidvxcov

TUoX^-oiq

Clearly, the

first

question

is

asking whether

Most commentators

unities.

question

is

more

we must suppose

that there really are such

agree with this interpretation, though
Gosling thinks that the

naturally interpreted as whether such

monads

are truly unitary, as

opposed to being pseudo-units such as ‘barbarian’
[Gosling, 1975;
question asks, what
their instances?

is

The

The

p. 147].

the relation between these unities and the
particulars

third question thus introduces another

third

which are

OMP, OMP3, which

is

the

problem of explaining how
(e)

is

possible.

OMP3

is

X2

X, is F,

Here

x,

.

is

.

F,

...

x„ is

F

.x„ are particulars,

a third and distinct

OMP, that

and F

is

a characteristic

of Forms in relation to

noticed that (e) has exactly the same structure as

(c),

with the

common to

particulars.

many

It

them. Thus
will be

in question being

particulars rather than Forms.

While

reasonably clear what the

it is

first

and

third questions are, however,

commentators are sharply divided on the interpretation of the second question. There are

two main

difficulties:

continuous with

(a)

and

it;

whether the second question

(b) if the

is

distinct

second and third questions are

meaning of the second question? Nearly

all

the commentators

distinct,

who

second and third questions constitute a single problem agree that

how a

single

form

relates to

many

particulars,

15

See Hahn 1978, pp. 159-60.
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i.e.,

OMP

.'^
3

from the

third, or else is

what

is

the

believe that the

this is the

Most of these

problem of

commentators, accordingly, do not see Plato as having
accepted three
two, namely

2.

OMP,

.*^

OMP

and

OMPs but only

3

The Second Question
The second question

presents a difficult problem of interpretation.

concessive adverb opcoq (usually translated "nevertheless")
in
unintelligible contrast:

xauxriv). Since xauxr|v

1,

is

same monad

"
. .

.each

monad

is

contrasted with

its

it is.

“most securely one

is

it

must

either "...each

monad

this”

monad

most securely a

is

most securely

is

most

So, in either case the monad's unchanging character

is

being

in line 4;

monads" (povctbac; xauxaq)

and

(b)

unity, or that

is

(a)

between piav £Kdaxr|v
Thus, in the

between xauxaq

in lines 2-3

first contrast,

monads taken

together,

this

and

the plural "these

an attempt by Plato to contrast

on the one hand, with

taken singly, on the other hand. Friedlander [1969,

the unity of each

De Chiara-Quenzer

1993,

whose views
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monad

p. 319], for instance, thinks that the

16
is

in

contrasted with "this one" (piav xaux-qv) monad.

Various commentators, including Hahn, have seen in

exception

one

each one

is

|iiav xauxriv in line 4 [Hahn, 1978; p. 163].

An

this

unity.

and piav xauxriv

the unity of all the

povdbac;

Both of these can be

Robert Hahn thinks that opcoc; provides a double contrast:
line 2

(Pcpaiotaxa piav

refer to (each of) the

most securely one monad."

interpreted as holding that each

securely the unity that

is

feminine and singular,

and so the concessive phrase

monad," or

4 poses what seems an

line

A monad is said to be always itself, neither coming into being nor

perishing; nevertheless, the

m line

The use of the

will be considered below.

second problem of the passage
are, at the

similar

same time one monad,

view was proposed

How can

is:

are yet

it

How are the separate monads, unchangeable as they

is:

i.e.,

in 1901

how can they

be parts of the one (or unity)

by Archer-Hind, who thinks

A

second question

be that these monads, each being individually
self-identical and eternal,

one single unity? Archer-Hind further proposed

how the

that the

itself?

forms are related

to the

supreme Idea,

i.e.,

that this question is really about

to the

amo 6 eaxiv dyaOdv of the

Republic and the auxo 6 eaxi ^coov of the Timaeus!^ Thus
Archer-Hind saw in the

second question an attempt to ground the being of the forms

Hahn (1978)

Idea.

the

explicitly relates the being

Good, which he

in the being

of the supreme

of the monads to the being of the Form of

identifies with the unhypothetical first principle

of the Republic that

accounts both for the being and the unity of the forms, as well as for the relation
between
the forms and particulars.

interconnected.

The

first

Thus Hahn thinks the three questions of 15b 1-8

question deals with the being of the forms, the second connects

their being with the source

how the Good
it

are

of that being in the Form of the Good, raising the questions of

allows the forms to be gathered together into a unity and also

how it makes

possible for each form to be a unity; and the third question raises the problem of how

the

Good

allows the unities to be related to the multiplicity of phenomena. Thus,

thinks that the point of the

povdbaq and piav

first

xauxriv,

is

contrast introduced

by opcoq,

that

Hahn

between xauxac;

that to understand a single unity is to see that unity as

being related to the other unities. Plato means here to refer to the problem of

unit/e^ are so unified to be revealed as unities...” [Hahn, 1978; p.l63], to

17

Archer-Hind 1901: 231. Broos 1951,

p.

1

14, accepts the
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same view.

“how

which the

implied solution

is

that they are so unified

Good, which “gathers” the
p. 163].

under

The

itself,

their connection

unities together into the

third question then asks

and

by

with the

Form of the

same ontological order [Hahn, 1978;

how each form

unites the multifarious

to this, similarly, the solution is to be

phenomena

found in the way in which the

forms as non-sensible unities are related to the Form of the Good.

Against

this interpretation

plural simply because

it

by opcoq, the phrase

friav TauTT|v; but the contrast

function of opcoq

in this case

is

is

ouaav.

itself, its

monad

that

Commentators tend

fr-qxe

is

in the first question.'*

As

eKCtarriv does stand in contrast with

what follows the

first

The

phrase.

by a participle,

to

then, consists in discovering a sense in

unchanging character, can be said

clearly

which

to stand in contrast

it is.

assume

that the contrast

posed by opcoq must indicate

They then

no incompatibility here. To

cite

find the question puzzling

one example, R. Klibansky

18

Hahn agrees
contrast with

that xauxac; refers

piav xauxT]v.

back

to povdbac;, but insists that xauxac;

See Hahn 1978,

p. 163.

19

See Smyth 1956:

to

6A,e0pov, and each monad's also being

the terms being contrasted are incompatible.

because there

in line 2 is in the

Thus, what opcoq contrasts are the following: Each monad's being

a monad's being always

being the

Tauxaq

to render explicit the contrast indicated in or implied

PePaioxaxa piav xauxr|v. The problem,

its

^ii'av

spelled out only in

del xf|v auxf]v Kai |iqxe yeveaiv

with

out that

back to the plural povdbaq

refers

the second contrast posed

may be pointed

it

sect.

2082.
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is

meant

to

that

writes:

.

.

there

.

for a Platonist

is

identical...

is

the unit that

no sense

it is’;

in saying that a unit is ‘eternally
self-

the last character

is

implied in the

first”.

Klibansky then proposes to emend the text by transposing
opcoq before dei
yielding:

less

then again,

how each

in line 3, thus

of these, though being one particular nature,

most assuredly always the same one

that

is

none the

subject to neither generation nor

it is,

destruction’.^*^

The

difficulty with this solution

problematic.

On this view the

and yet continue

it

is

to exist

the being of the

be nor perish.

And

there really aren

being.

To

’t

that

it

second question

makes

is

asking:

we

yet there

is

no indication

be interpreted as

monad does

facts about its being, while,

In Klibansky’s edition

But

it is

The

that Plato seriously

unities, or that if there are

then goes on to ask, what follows

That a

itself?

doubtful whether

first

question of this

are to suppose that there really are unities that neither come-to-

any such

this

monad

How can a monad be a unity

that Plato sees as problematic here.

the contrary, the second question proceeds

being— whether

the being of the

unchanging and remain always

monads

passage asks whether

is

not

if

to

suppose that

such unities they do not have true

on the supposition of their

truly

their really existing or as their being truly units— and

we suppose

come

means

these

monads

to

into being nor perish, that

on the other hand,

that

it is

this

have true being?

it

is

monad,

always

that

it

is

itself,

are

the unit that

of A.E. Taylor’s translation of Philebus. See Taylor 1956: 258.

Textual emendation has been resorted to by commentators ever since debate on this passage
began. For a survey, see

Hahn 1978.
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IS

It IS,

a fact about

exists, in that

what

It

since

all

means
the

each one

monads
all

Each of the monads

unity.

is

to say that

samebeing as

the

its

is, i.e.,

unchanging and never comes

we

or truly

is,

into being nor perishes.

That

is

can suppose a monad as dXr]^(oq ovaaq,
truly being. But,

are ungenerated, imperishable, and unchanging,
then each

the others. This might lead one to think that
the

are an undifferentiated unity. But then, the unity
of each

distinctly

has being, really

piav xauxriv (one

the other monads.

However,

incompatible with

its

this, this one),

it

monad, the

implies that each

monads

collectively

fact that

each one

monad

different

is

can hardly be said that the being of an entity

unity. Hence,

I

one has

from

is

all

is

think that the contrastive force of opcoc; indicates,

not incompatibility, but mere difference between the two terms being
contrasted. The
line

the

of thought,

I

suggest,

is

the following:

same aspect of the monad

as

its

We might think that the being of a monad is

unity, but in fact the

two aspects

can therefore ask: Given that a monad has being, nonetheless

we

how

are different, and

can

it

we

have unity? If

suppose, in other words, that these monads have the being that they have,

how do we

account for the uniqueness of each monad?

In the Phaedo, Plato does not

its

unity.

Thus,

what

at

is

The being (ouaia) of a form
Phaedo 65d Plato

fine

It is

make
is

a distinction between the being of a

what the thing

that the

Form

writes that if there are such things as what

(KaXov), or what

is

clear that this distinction

good (dyaOdv), then the being of

is

one that Plato makes,

Form and

designates itself \s.

is

just (biKaiov),

(xfjq

ouciaq) such

at least in the later dialogues.

In the

second hypothesis of Parmenides, 142c-d, Plato refers to being (x6 eoxi) and unity (x6 ev) as
parts (pepri) of the one which

is

(xou evoc; ovxoc;).
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things just

is

what each thing happens

78d, Plato refers to the

to be” (6

ouaia of the Equal

Tuy^dvEi CKaaiov 6v). Farther on,
(auTo x6 ictov) and the Fine

itself

itself

at

(auto

TO Kakov) as “unvarying, constant, and never admitting
of any change whatsoever”
((haauTcoc;

Kaid xama E/ei Kai oubenoTE oubapfj

oi)6E|iiav evSExexai); moreover, the being of a

which

is” (ai)x6

EKaaxov 6 eaxiv, xo

Form comprehends two

things: (a)

its

itself (ai)xo

that the single

is

Beauty

of each (“6 Eaxiv” EKaaxou); the singularity of a Form

of a form and what the form
the entity that

it is is

the

Philebus, a distinction

uniqueness as an

is

is

as the unit that

same thing

it

is

unvarying,

itself is, its character as

itself

(KaXov auxo

form of each (ibeav p,iav eKdaxou)

being. In these two middle dialogues, then, Plato

is

contained, as

makes no

it is.

itself is, that

Thus, in the Phaedo the being of a

what the Form

says, of

dUoicoaiv

“what each thing

real existence, the fact that

At Republic 507b Plato

dyaOov),

Form

6v, 78d2-3).

constant, and admits of no change; and (b)

particular unity.

oi)5apwc;

distinction

it

its

and Good

“the being”

were, in

its

between the being

In these dialogues, to

as to be acquainted with

is

)

a

know

a

Form

as

being. But in the

assumed between the being of a monad and

its

unity or

its

entity.

Philebus 15b2-4 can thus be seen as posing the question of how a Form, having
being, can also have unity.

The question brings up

related to other forms since, in order to

the

problem of how a Form can be

have unity, a form must be related to the form of

Unity, in order to have being, to the form of Being, and in order to be different from other

forms, a form must participate in the form of Difference with respect to the other forms.
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and so on.

The second

way, with no

question, then, can be interpreted as stating

specific reference to pleasure.

But with reference

terms of the question
introduces the

comes
Plato

in

is

is

But

12c, Socrates says that although pleasure

different forms, fj,op(pd(;.

also the problem of explaining

Abstractly,

OMP

2

is

the

in regard to pleasure,

is

2

how pleasure

pleasure to

is

the

pleasures

2

in

When he

by one name,

it

it

likely that

with reference

can have different forms under
in relation to other forms.

how the Form

how the Form

Pleasure can have various

it.

De Chiara-Quenzer
problem of forms

OMP

addresses two distinct problems; (a)

Pleasure can participate in other Forms; and (b)

sub-Forms under

called

The use of popcpaq makes

one-and-many problem of forms

OMP

how

Pleasure can participate in other forms.

thinking of kinds, rather than instances, of pleasure. Thus

to pleasure

it.

instance,

OMPj

These and similar questions are properly formulated

how the Form

OMP at

many and

false.

in a general

2

to pleasure,

problem of how pleasure can be other things besides itself—
for
can be good or bad, true or

OMP

[1993, p. 43] agrees that

problem

forms. This problem, she points out,

how pleasure
is

2

However, she

in relation to other forms.

(b), that is, to the

OMP

is

a distinct

restricts

OMP and is the

OMP

2

as

it

applies to

can have many, and contrary, sub-

implicit in the discussion in the opening pages of

the dialogue, at 12cl-14a9; but, she claims,

it is

explicitly referred to for the first time in

22

D.J. Casper similarly argues that Philebus 15b2-4 raises the question:

How can the same

form have many characteristics [Casper, 1977; p. 20]? Casper argues that the contrast posed by
opcoc; is that between a monad’s being the monad that it is and its having characteristics. It is not
the particular characteristics (being always

contrast to the
its

monad’s being

having any characteristics

“this
at all,

itself,

one” monad;

unchanging, imperishable,
rather,

what

so that aside from being

things [1977, pp. 20-21].
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itself,

the

etc.) that stand in

monad is the fact of
monad is many other

pluralizes the

the immediate sequel, at 14cl-15a6 [De
Chiara-Quenzer, 1993; p. 43 ].
referred to at 14cl-15a6, however,

Socrates declares that “the

say.

It

must be noted

fact Socrates refers to

many

is

the

What

OMP itself, without reference to pleasure;

are one” and “the one

is

many”

are

in the plural, saying

it

is

there

amazing things

that these expressions are not necessarily
equivalent,

them

is explicitly

and

to

that in

easy to dispute “either of these

positions” (tw TOUTtov OTioiepovouv TiOepevcp, 14c9-10).
Socrates then goes on to say
that

he

is

not interested in

At

OMP,.

this point in the dialogue,

we do

not

know what

that Socrates is interested in, but the only possibilities that

De Chiara-Quenzer thinks
the second question

is

that there are

about

OMP about pleasure at all.

OMP

3

.

the serious form of the

remain are

two questions being raised

But she doesn’t think

She thinks

is

addresses the

In

that in this passage, Plato is

OMP

3

is

in 15bl-8,

OMP

3

.

and that

merely raising general

OMP

3

[1993; p. 43].

raised in 15b 1-8, however, think that

OMP

3

OMP about pleasure.

my

view,

it

is

unlikely that Plato

concerning the Forms here

all.

that

and

that this passage concerns the

questions about the Forms, and in the course of doing so, mentions

Most commentators who think

OMPj

OMP

if the

would introduce a discussion of problems

discussion did not concern the

OMP about pleasure at

This passage purports to be about difficulties concerning the type of unity that

is

represented by Pleasure, since with the division of these unities "a great deal of zealous

controversy arises" (15a). If Socrates raises problems about the Forms

the discussion

If

OMP3

is

the

is

at all,

it

is

because

confronted with serious difficulties concerning the division of Pleasure.

OMP that concerns pleasure, then we must understand how
41

it

does

so.

3.

Why

Pleasure

is

a

One-and-Manv

The problem of the discussion
and the good are

at this

point

whether monads

is

really subject to division. This in
turn

these unities get pluralized, or

become “many.” There

particulars, such as Protarchus, can be simultaneously

participate in

by having many

it

is

unclear

instances, then

OMP3

philosophical difficulty concerns

To

two

how a unity

is,

possibilities.

scattered and

whole Form

The

is

is

is

no problem about how

A particular can

one and many.

unities that neither

a many. If a

can have

many

monad becomes many

instances.

many

in having

its

instances.

instances, the

one Form

The

present in each instance.

The second

possibility is that the

separated in itself (6A,riv auxT)v auxfjq xcopi'q), so that only part of the

is

text gives

itself is

becomes many (5ica7raap£vr|v xai noXXoL yeyovuiav), and thus

is

come-

surely relevant, since here the question that

such as a Form can be present in

first is that

how

the relevant problem. In that case, the

how pleasure

view, Philebus 15b4-8

this

being raised

how a one becomes

humanity, ox,

depends on the question

many, even contrary. Forms. But concerning the

to-be nor pass away,

like

the

Form becomes

Form

is

present in

each instance. The second option, Socrates thinks, would appear to be the “most
impossible of all” (tuxvxcov dSuvaxcoxaxov), since the same entity would then as a

whole come
the

many

unitary

to

be

(i.e.,

would be present) simultaneously (dpa)

one

(in itself)

and

in

(in its instances).

These

are, in fact, the difficulties that present

Form

is

either the

in

present in

its

whole of the Form

instances. If a

is

Form

themselves

is to

when we suppose

be present in

its

instances, then

present in each of the instances, or only part of the

42

that a

Form

IS

present in each. At Parmenides

1

3

1

a-e Plato

objections to both alternatives. If the whole

being one and the same (pia Kai

t]

had put

Form

is

into the

mouth of Parmenides

present in each of its instances, then,

amii, 131b3-4), the Form

will at the

separate from itself (auxf) auific; xcopiq, 131b4-5).
But, in that case the

be one and the same,
numerically as

would then be

i.e.,

the

many Forms
the

Form

Form would

If,

same time be

Form would

not

not be unique, since there would be

as there are sensible instances of it.

itself.

the

on the other hand, only a

Each of the instances

part of the

Form

is

present in

each of its instances, then, Parmenides objects, the Forms themselves
are divisible

(pcpiaxa auid id

Form

is

And

in that case, as Socrates readily agrees, the

really divided (d^ri^eioc p8pi(!^Ea0ai, 131cl0), and, consequently,
the

not be one (ev,

instance, then

we

ci5r|, 131c5).

1

3 IclO). But, if we hold that only part

we

of the Form

is

one

Form

will

present in each

could not justify subsuming the instance under the Form, and therefore

could not explain predication. For predication to be possible, the whole Form must be

present in each instance, but then this

would mean

that the

Form

alternative has unacceptable consequences for the unity of the

is

not unique. Either

Form. These objections

are echoed in the Philebus passage, and both alternatives are there rejected as a solution

to

OMP3.

Thus OMP3, as Plato presents
so far has eluded him.

becomes pluralized
explaining

OMP3

is

pluralization does not

in Philebus 15b4-8, is a

an ontological problem;

in particulars.

how monads

it

But

if the

problem

it

is

problem whose solution

the problem of how a

in this part

of the Philebus

monad

is that

of

are subject to division in our discourse, then the relevant sort of

seem

to be that

of pluralization into

43

particulars.

The monads

are

plurahzed in our discourse by

their

involvement in other monads, not by having
many

instances. If particulars are relevant to the issue of
division at
fall

into different kinds. Pleasure is to be divided into
kinds, and

particular instances,

it

is

only because they
the kinds, not the

which constitute the many of pleasure.

Gosling suggests
that

all, it is

that the

OMP is a problem about the multiformity of units, but

the multiformity becomes obvious in and even perhaps arises
from the occurrence

of those features in the changing world of instances" [Gosling, 1975;
supplied]

.

It

seems undeniable

that the multiformity

p. 144,

underscoring

of particular instances becomes

obvious in the occurrence of features that distinguish one instance from others

in the

changing world. But, that the multiformity of instances could arise from such
occurrences in the world seems to

me

contrary to Plato’s view, for

it

doesn't

seem

to

be

necessary in Plato's view that there be actual instances of sensible particulars which
display the different characteristics of a Form.

divided in our discourse, in two ways:

participates

its

and which are

its

characteristics,

and

in

seems

sufficient that the

Form can be

terms of the other Forms in which

characteristics and, second, into the other forms

different sub-kinds. Thus, the

the twin problem of how a

first,

It

which are

OMP concerning pleasure is best seen as OMPj.

monad, while remaining a

how it can have

unity, can

other forms under

it.

It is

it

It is

have other

thus the problem of how

forms are connected with other forms, in such a way that discourse becomes possible.

The point of the OMP,

how the form
apparent

how

Pleasure

is

then, is that dividing the pleasures

both one and many.

And

Socrates wishes to divide Pleasure.
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is

equivalent to showing

very early in the dialogue,

It is

it

becomes

with moral differences among the

pleasures that Socrates

is

concerned, as he shows

pleasures of the intemperate

man

is

man

takes in being

not merely that pleasure takes

various forms reveal moral differences, so that

its

to contrast the

with the pleasure that the moderate

moderate (12d). What concerns Socrates
but that

when he proceeds

it

would be

many

forms,

‘thoughtless’

(dvoTiToq, 12d5), for instance, to say that the pleasures of the
moderate and those of the

intemperate

Protarchus

man

is

are alike. Socrates’ complaint against Protarchus,
then,

arguing that pleasure

the

is

good without

first

is this:

having distinguished

its

different kinds, but an examination of the forms of pleasure
readily discloses that there

are

is

good as well

as bad pleasures.

The

basic distinction Socrates vvishes to make, then,

between good pleasures and bad pleasures as kinds of pleasures.

The

distinction has a direct bearing

on

(PI), for Socrates is reminding Protarchus

that if (PI) is true then the following is also true:

(G) All pleasant things are good.

But Protarchus does not wish

some sense bad; he
conditions

(octt’

to

deny

that the pleasures of the intemperate

replies that in Socrates’

man

example the pleasures are from contrary

evavxicov 7ipaypdTcov,12d7-8) whereas,

not contrary. Pleasure, “this thing itself’ (touto

in themselves, the pleasures are

amb eauxco,

12el), could not possibly

be unlike pleasure (12d). Protarchus would not go from (PI) directly to (G);

him

the following conditional holds:

(PGl)

And

If pleasure is the

good, then pleasure

so too, this further conditional:

Cf

are in

White, 1982; pp. 55-56.
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itself is

good.

rather, for

(PG2)

If pleasure itself is good, then all
pleasant things are good.

Thus, Protarchus accepts the link between (PI) and
(G) on the assumption that there

such a thing as the pleasure

Considered
contrary to

itself,

in itself, pleasure is

and

“most

it

is this,

pleasure in

itself,

like pleasure” (12e),

which he thinks

is

good.

is

and pleasure cannot be

itself.

Socrates replies by raising an analogy: Color, too,

is like color,

and yet

its

parts

(pepri) can be contrary; black not only differs from white but “happens to be the
most

contrary to

(tw bidcpopov eivai Kai evavxicoTaxov 6v Tuyxdvei, 12e5-6).

it”

Similarly, the parts of pleasure,

colors

is.

is

kinds, can be contrary.

that a unity can contain opposite,

However,

umty

its

if

even contrary, parts and

good pleasures and bad pleasures

‘Pleasure,’ then clearly there

is

The point of the analogy with

are contrary kinds

a problem. For, this

that pleasure is the good, since if pleasure is the

still

is

be the unity that

subsumed under the

incompatible with saying

good then by

definition all pleasant

things are good. Socrates thinks of the unity of pleasure in terms of what kinds

may

not

fall

able to find

under the Form Pleasure. If pleasure

among

its

is

it

the good, then

sub-kinds the kind ‘bad pleasure’. But this

may

or

we ought not to be

is

simply to say that

pleasure must have no connections with evil.

Protarchus thus agrees to the color analogy on the assumption that pleasure

something that

in itself,

really

in itself already

has a nature.

Protarchus thinks that pleasure, considered

does not divide into kinds; and, since pleasure in

no bad pleasures.

It is

only as

it

is

is

itself is

good, then there are

called in speech that pleasure
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may

divide into

kinds;

some of the kinds

are

even ealled bad pleasures, but

bad conditions, not because they are
of Good Principle

too, but

this is

because they arise from

in themselves bad. Protarchus thus
accepts the

Unity

he thinks of the unity of pleasure differently from
Socrates.

For Protarchus, the articulation of pleasure

into kinds is misleading;

it

conceals the true

unity of pleasure.

C.

I

think

we

Hedonism

Protarchus’

can clarify the unity of pleasure from Protarchus’ point of view
by

asking whether there

is

some

feature that

all

instances of pleasure have in

common.

Socrates holds that, if there were such a feature, this could not be the feature being
a

pleasure, since, similarly,

the extent that

some

are

only colors have, and

it

all

colors are alike in being a color and yet colors

even opposites (12e-13a). For, there
won’t do merely to say

is

no one feature

which

all

differ to

that all

and

that colors are all alike in being colors.

Protarchus apparently accepts this claim in regard to color, but his position
color, there is such a feature

may

and only pleasures have, and

is that,

unlike

that this accounts for

the unity of the kind Pleasure. Furthermore, for Protarchus this feature

is

necessarily

good, either by being identical with the quality goodness or by being necessarily a good
feature. Therefore all pleasures are pleasures

by virtue of possessing

this feature,

and

all

pleasures are good by virtue of this feature possessing the further quality of goodness or

being identical to the quality of goodness. Protarchus thus accepts, but Socrates

the following principle:

(R) If X and y are F, then x cannot be unlike y, and x cannot be contrary
to y.
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rejects,

Does (R) express

Protarchus’ position adequately?
Protarchus’ view

both pleasures, then x cannot be unlike;;
they cannot be contraries. Thus

(R 1 )

we

in

so far as x

andy are

is that, if x

both pleasures, and so

can make (R) more precise:

If X

and ;; are F, then x cannot be unlike in being
F, and x cannot
y
be contrary to;; in being F.

Thus the pleasures of the intemperate man and those of
the moderate man do not

qua

and;; are

differ

pleasures; for Protarchus, they differ only in that
they arise from contrary conditions.

Furthermore,

it

seems

an activity [Gosling 1975,

that for Protarchus pleasure is

Frede 1993,

p. 74;

p. xviii].

something that accompanies

If this

view

is correct,

then the

following further revision of (R) more closely approximates
Protarchus’ position:

(R2) If X and y are F, then there
y, and x and

jv;

F by

are

is

some ^ which accompanies x and

virtue of having

f

If (R2) adequately represents Protarchus’ position, then

of the unity of pleasure

common. Thus, what

in terms

the

qua

good

all

human

(f)

in (R2) is

always

instances of pleasure have in

is

that there is

some one
is

in itself good. Thus, that pleasure is

beings entails that there cannot be any pleasant experiences which,

pleasant, are not good, so that for Protarchus, (G)

directly attributed

say that Protarchus thinks

pleasurable experiences. Moreover, Protarchus

to the claim that the

for

all

we can

unites various pleasures into one kind

thing which accompanies

committed

of something that

also

by Socrates

is

implied by (PI). (G)

to Protarchus, in 13b4-5 (“...for

things are good...”).
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you say

is in fact

that all pleasant

Socrates, however, evidently rejects (R2), for
immediately after attributing (G) to

Protarchus he challenges him to

name

that

pleasures have, “and by which you call

all

one feature which both the good and the bad
pleasures good” (13b). Protarchus rejects

Socrates’ demand:

Prot.

How do you

concede
that

this,

mean, Socrates?

having

set

Do you

really think that

someone

will

down

pleasure to be the good, and allow your saying
pleasures are good, while some others are bad?

some

Soc. But then at least you will say that they are unlike one
another and
are contraries.

Prot.

Not

at all, insofar, at least, as

some

they are pleasures (13b6-c5).

Protarchus will not be led into making the apparently contradictory claim that
bad
pleasures are good. His view

good, and

this

accompanies

qua

is that all

pleasures, in so far as they are pleasures, are

can be interpreted as the claim that whatever that feature

all

pleasures has the quality goodness. This

pleasures, alike.

Thus

all

means

is

which

that all pleasures are,

pleasures are good only if all pleasures,

qua

pleasures, are

alike.

On the other hand,
all

Socrates’ position implies that if there were

some

feature that

pleasures possess by virtue of being pleasures, then this feature would have to be

shared by both the good pleasures and the bad. Their character as good or bad would

supervene upon the feature that

differences

among

is

common to

all

pleasant experiences, so that moral

pleasures entail a difference in what the pleasures are. Thus, even

Socrates were to grant that

would not individuate the

some one

feature

(f)

accompanied contrary pleasures, the

pleasures. Moreover, given (R2), (PI)

since (R2) neither states nor entails that the feature
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<zJis

would not

if

(f>

entail (G),

good. The instances of

which

accompany contrary pleasures could just
them

are

A pleasant

good and some bad.

would be due not

as well be contraries, for instance
if some of

<z>is

not eo ipso good;

to its pleasant character but to

An impasse is

something

avoided when Socrates points out

could likewise be said that there are

many knowledges

goodness,

its

if

it is

good,

else.

regard to intelligence,

that, in

{epistemai), and

some

it

are

contrary to each other:

Soc. All the knowledges taken together will be thought to be many
and some of them are
unlike one another, if indeed some turn out in some way to be
contraries, would I be

worthy of conversing right now if, fearing this thing itself, I declare that in its
coming to
be, no knowledge is unlike any other knowledge, and then in
this way our argument, just
as if it were a myth, would perish and be lost,’ while we ourselves are
saved on the
grounds of some absurdity? (13e9-14a5)
It is

at this point that Protarchus

pleasure, just as there are

Kai 5id(popoi,

concedes that there are

“many and

14a8-9). Protarchus

many and

unlike knowledges”

now

contrary kinds of

( 7ro?L?iai

5e eTriaxfiiiai

grants that there are contrary kinds of pleasure

because he sees that Socrates will similarly encounter contrary kinds of knowledge;
Protarchus

is

confident that just as there won’t turn out to be bad kinds of knowledge,

Socrates will see that there really aren’t any bad kinds of pleasure.

Socrates

is

other hand,

confident that even if the kinds of knowledge were laid out and some kinds

turned out to be contraries, there

bad

On the

in themselves,

still

wouldn’t turn out to be kinds of knowledge that are

whereas there would turn out

to

be pleasures

that are

bad

in

themselves.

Thus,

if pleasure is the

unity, then all pleasant things

good then pleasure must be a

must be good, and they
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are

unity.

good

And

if pleasure is a

in so far as they are

pleasant. If not

pleasant things are good qua pleasant, then
either pleasure

is

good, or else pleasure does not possess a single nature.
Protarchus, therefore,

is

concerned

all

maintain that

to

have seen that

pleasant things are good in so far as they are
pleasant.

all

can be interpreted as the claim that there

this

instances of pleasure possess, and which

pleasure

is

the

good then

If pleasures differ,

conditions. This

earlier (13c)

asked

entails the claim that this

why,

I

is to

all

think, Protarchus

are

makes

many and some

say, Protarchus thinks that

(M)

pleasures are alike in being pleasures;

arise

is

it

is

that

makes them

common

feature is

(I)

Pleasures are

all,

is

all

it

is

are alike

many and

qua pleasures,

we would have the
1

.

that

by definition good.

are contrary to each other.

compatible with saying that

the claim that they are

its

which Protarchus has just reasserted

pleasures are

empty claim

all

that all

alike in possessing

natures.

Thus (M)

in 13a, namely:

alike.

makes (M) incompatible with

kinds are contrary, then

i.e.,

all

pleasures, and therefore that contrary kinds of pleasure

qua pleasures,

Socrates’ position, however,

pleasures are

all

the concession that Socrates had

from contrary conditions of occurrence rather than from contrary

consistent with a principle

(I),

The claim

pleasures.

alike in so far as they are pleasures. For Protarchus, this is not the

whatever

feature that

namely:

for,

(M) The pleasures
That

makes them

some

is

We

not qua pleasures that they differ but as arising from
contrary

it is

is

not the

it

(I),

that is to say, if the

cannot be the case that

all

pleasures

they must differ in their natures. If (M) entailed the falsity of

following, valid, argument:

If pleasure is the

good

for living beings, then all pleasant things are good.

(Pl)^(G)
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2.

All pleasant things are good only if pleasure

is

some one
(G)

3.

Pleasure

is

some one

thing only if pleasures are

all,

(O)

qua

pleasures, alike.

4.

many and some

If the pleasures are

then pleasures are not
5.

The pleasures

6

Therefore:

.

7.

are

Not

all,

qua

pleasures, alike.

many and some

all

(M) ->

are contrary to each other.

pleasant things are good.

Therefore: Pleasure

is

have the fourth premise, he needs

to

show

~(I)

(M)
~(G)

not the good for living beings.

But Socrates does not have, nor does he claim

them unlike one another qua

are contrary to each other,

~(P1).

to have, the fourth premise. In order to

that pleasures

pleasures. If he can

show

can differ in a way that makes

this,

then he will have shown that

for pleasures (though not for knowledges), contrariety in kind

means

nature, not merely in attendant conditions, and thus that

pleasures can be bad in

their nature.

It is

some

just this that the notion of a false pleasure

demonstration that there

is

refutation of the claim that

is

contrariety in

intended to show. The

a genos of pleasures that are bad in their natures constitutes a

all

pleasant things are good, and therefore of (PI). At this

point Socrates announces the need for further examinations of both pleasure and

intelligence: “. .let us
.

(e>L8yxdp8voi) in

be daring (xo^iimpcv) and find out whether, being questioned

some way, they would

pleasure or thought or whether

it is

some

reveal whether one ought to say that the

other third thing” (14b3-4).
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good

is

D. The God-Given Method and the Divisions of Pleasure
and KnowleH^ P

The method of this examination
56aiq, 16c5).

It is

is

the god-given

the method, Socrates says,

has been discovered.

Some commentators

method (Oewv eiq dvOpcortouq

whereby everything

that belongs to techne

see a Pythagorean provenance to the method,

but the ensuing description of the method makes

sound similar

it

to the

method of

Collection and Division prominent in Plato’s late dialogues. The method

based on the

is

claim, purportedly revealed through a divine source, that “whatever things
are said to be

always come out of the one and many, having within themselves both
unlimitedness”(e^ evoq pev Kai 7roX>.d)v ovtcov

tqv

limit

and

dei ^.syopevcov eivai, Ttepaq

6e Kai dTtcipiav ev auxoiq aupcpuTov exovxcov, 16c9-10).

The method involves

positing (Oepeiv) a single form (piav ibeav) for each one of the things that are

generated out of the one and the many. That

we must
must

of phenomena or

hold (pciaXaPeiv) of this one idea
are in

some way”

rate

is

a

we

(ei Ttcoq siai, 16d3).

method of systematically

this is division,

however, Plato

bifurcatory, for he continues:

examine

to say, faced with

an indefinite plurality

look for one idea under which to unite the members of the plurality,

collect the multiplicity

it

is

these, “until

unlimited, but also

we

is

articulation

is

idea. After

This sounds like the method of division, or

clearly not claiming that the division

“and

we

get

next posit two ideas, and examine “whether they

if not, three or

some

they are (pexpi^^P
xiq,

is

at

any

necessarily

other number,” and

see of the original one not only that

how many

one

we

arriving at the various articulations of a concept. If

noXXoc Kai dTieipd eaxi povov iSp
the method, then,

particulars under

i.e.,

it is

we must

also

one, or many, or

to Kax’ apx^q ev

pf) 6xi

dXXcc Kai OTioaa, 16d5-7). What

is

ev xai

essential to

the positing of one idea over an indefinite manifold, and the

of this idea into subordinate ones,
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until

we

reach a definite number; only then

can

we

apply the form of the unlimited to the manifold (too
dTicipoo i6eav npbq

7rA,fjao(;

Tipoacpepeiv,! 6d7-8).

...

unlimited and the one (xov

When we

dpiOpov auxoC Trdvxa

Kai xou evoq, 16d8-el), then we may
unlimited (eiq x6 driEipov

have seen the

pe&evxa xctipeiv edv,

number between

of the intermediate ones into the

Thus one should not dismiss

16e2).

an indefinite plurality before one beholds (KaxiSp) the exact number of ones

between (pexa^u) the

initial

one and the unlimited.

initial

one and the elements

understand a unity
then

we

is to

know

its

—

i.e.,

intensional entities)

in the indefinite manifold,

parts of the one under investigation. Thus,

all

that are

suggest that these ones or units are

I

intermediates of some sort (forms, kinds, characteristics

between the

the

xov pexa^u xoO dTieipoo xe

...

“let loose” all

entire

that Plato

and as such they are

need be saying here

parts well. If we maintain this

is

that to

minimal interpretation

can make sense of both the examples that Socrates proceeds to give, and see the

relevance of this passage to the problem of the dialogue.

Socrates’

((pcovf]) is

one,

first

i.e.,

vocalized sound

knowledgeable about
are indefinitely

example of the application of the method

many

letters is

not merely to

letters is that

they are and what their nature

attributes to a certain

a unity that

we

that

of letters. Sound

can hold in our minds. But to be

know this,

nor

is it

merely to

know that

there

vocal sounds producible by humans. Rather, what makes us

knowledgeable (aocpoi) about

many

is

is

Theuth

in

is

(oxi

we know,
noaa

x’

concerning vocal sounds,

how

eaxi Kai OTioia, 17b8-9). Socrates

Egypt the discovery of the

craft

of grammar

24

Plato uses the phrase

(peftevxa)

is

peSevxa xotipsiv eav, which

implies that the “setting loose”

a dismissing (xai'peiv) of the unlimited plurality from one’s mind, putting

or renouncing

it.

See the entry on xaipca (v, 2) in Liddell and Scott.
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it

away

(Ypan^aTiKTjv xe^vriv,

1

8d2). Theuth

proper domain of this techne.

which some have sound,

i.e.,

He

was

the first to grasp vocalized sound
as the

divided vocal sound into vowels (id
(pcovfjevxa), of

are voiced, and others, while unvoiced
(cpwvric;

18cl), partake of some noise ((pOoyyou 5e

pcxexovxd xivoq,

forms make up two kinds of letters (ypappdxwv, 18c2).
are the

mutes or consonants (dcpcova,

of any noise. Then, Theuth divided

1

8c4),

18cl). These

pev ou,

two vowel

A third kind (ei8o(;) of letters

which are both unvoiced and do not partake

(bifipci) each kind as far as each single unit

(pexpi evoq eKdaxou, 18c4), and he gave the name “element” (axoixeiov,
18c6)
“each one and
similar

all

scheme

into three kinds

is

of them together” (cvi xe EKdaxw Kai cupTiaai,

amved

at in the

8c6).

An exactly

case of musical sound (17c). Musical sound

of pitch or tone (dwpEv): low (papu), high

(opoxovov). Further analysis consists
intervals that are possible

1

in grasping the

from one end of the scale

(6^i5),

number and

to the other,

to

is

divided

and even pitch
the nature of the

and finding out what

systems of notes are possible given these intervals. Schematically, both analyses

may be

represented in this way:

O

There can, of course, be any number of cps, and any number of subdivisions within each

(p,

but the feature to note here

is

that the various cps are not isolated but rather are linked

together, through their further divisions, in a continuum, so that each of the subdivisions

is

a definite position

on the continuum, with each position representing a
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definite ratio

between the two terminal

The lowermost

points.

level

of the

illustration

may be

represented in this way:

Thus the lowest

units are linked

from one end of the scale

to the other.

The schema

also

provides a sense in which the original one (to Kax’ ccpxaq ev,
16d5) can be, not only

many, but “without
16d7). For, the

limit” (dTieipa, 16d6), even though

number of possible

since a continuum

positions

identified this definite

on the continuum as

on the continuum

has a definite number (oTioaa,

on the continuum

Any

indefinitely divisible.

is

definite collection of points

number of actual

positions

it

is

number may we dismiss

is

indefinitely

many,

techne will, however, pick out a

any techne the

stoicheia; thus, for

a definite number. Only

the indefinite plurality

when we have

from our

attention.

Thus, the god-given method promises to resolve one-and-many problems by
displaying the limit (Trepaq) and the indefmiteness (ccTieipov) that

all

things have within

themselves (16c-d). For pleasure and intelligence, accordingly, the problem

“how each of them
at

some

(tiox;

is

one and many, and

point acquires for itself some

how each one

number

prior to

eaxiv ev Kai noXXa. ai)xd)v eKdxepov, Kai

is

its

is to state

not unlimited straightaway, but

having become unlimited

tiux; pf)

drcsipa euSuq,

aXXd xivd

25

Thus, Mitchell Miller supposes that
the one hand,

maximal

in the letter

cutting off of breath, for the (unvoiced) consonants.
position.

The nature of a

when the sound of the

example, the ends of the continuum

release of breath, for the voiced vowels, and,

letter consists in

letter is uttered.

how

Each

The unvoiced vowels mark a middle

far breath is released

letter is

are, on
on the other hand, maximal

and

how

See Miller, 1990; p.331 ff
26

As Gosling 1975,

p.

169

ff.

points out. See also Miller 1990, p. 334.
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far

it is

cut off

then a specific balance of two opposites.

7TOTC dpi^fiov

eKdxspov e^TTpoadev KCKTrixai xou dTieipa

ycyovevai, 18e9-19a2). One sense, therefore,

many forms

(ei6ti fi6ovfiq, 19b2),

these forms “are or are not, and

Kai OTiOCTa eaxi Kai
that also

and the relevant task

how many

comes out of this passage

two ends of the

which pleasure
is

is

CKaaxa

indefinite is that

that of finding out

scale.

is

is that, in

is

has

it

whether

they are and what kinds” (eixc eaxiv eixe

orroia, 19b3). But another sense in which pleasure

each of the kinds of pleasure
the

in

ai)xd)v

pfj,

indefinite

the beginning of an inquiry into pleasure,

an as yet undetermined

ratio

between the phenomena

at

Understanding whether these kinds “are or are not” then

consists in specifying the definite ratio that constitutes each kind. Suppose

we

think of

one end of the scale as maximal purity of pleasure with no admixture of pain, and the
other end as minimal pleasure with maximal admixture of pain. Then

we

each kind of pleasure in terms of a definite

pain.

Does Socrates apply
intelligence in 3 lb-59c?

method

to the

the god-given

ratio

between pleasure and

method

to the analyses

can think of

of pleasure and

Unable to see the relevance of Socrates’ discussion of the

problem before them, Philebus and Protarchus each express some

impatience (18d, 20a). Finally, Protarchus asks Socrates to decide, on his own, whether
or not to divide the forms of pleasure and knowledge (21a5-8).

Even before

this,

however, Socrates had remarked that they will have no further need of matters concerning
the division of the forms of pleasure (xf]v Siaipeoiv

face of it,

being

all this

set aside

seems

and

to

mean

that the

dialogue. This, in turn,

eibwv

that the entire discussion

method

will

would imply
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On the

of the god-given method

no longer be applied

that (PI)

fiSovfis, 20c4-5).

to the

is

problem of the

was being abandoned

altogether.

And yet

if

we

look

at the divisions

of pleasure and intelligence that make up 31
b- 59 c, the

divisions can be seen as following the structure
of the examples in the passage on the

A simple schematic illustration of the divisions in those passages can

god-given method.

be presented in

this

way:

Pleasure

Unmixed/True

Purelypsychic

Mixed/False

Purelybodily

Purely

^chic Of the

soul and

Pm^ bodily

body together
The Division of Pleasure, 31b-52b.

Knowledge

Dialectic

Technai concerned with

The mathematical

The mathematical

technai of the

technai of the

many

The manual technai

More

precise

technai

Less precise
technai

philosophers
The Division of Knowledge, 55b-59c.
It is

natural to see the divisions as a breaking

striking feature

of the structures

is

down

into infima species.

However, a

the horizontal continuity of the ultimate kinds of

pleasure and of knowledge. In each case, there

is

a gradation of purity from one end of

the scale to the other. Thus, the truest pleasures are those

which are unmixed with any

pain whatsoever and, in addition, are experienced in the soul alone. Pure bodily pleasures

58

that are

unmixed with pain

are better than those pleasures experienced
in the soul alone

but which are mixed with pain. The

latter, in turn, are better

than those pleasures mixed

with pain and are experienced together in both the soul and
the body. The lowest species

of pleasure are those

that are

mixed with pain and

are experienced in the

body

alone.

Thus, the classification grades pleasures along two dimensions of
purity: in terms of

admixture with pain, and in terms of involvement with the body, the

first

dimension

being more important. At a point on

line

between the

good pleasures and

the bad ones.

this

continuum Plato draws the

The two major

divisions under Pleasure,

i.e.,

unmixed/true and mixed/false, correspond respectively to good pleasures and bad
pleasures, of which the former are to be included in the

good mixed

life

and the

latter to

be excluded.

The

“division,” then,

is

not so

elaboration of a determinable into

its

much

a genus-species classification as an

determinates, with the ultimate determinates
27

making up a continuum of possibilities on a

scale.

Each determinate

is

therefore both

an ultimate kind of the thing under classification, and a specific balance of the two
28

opposites being combined.

opposites if they

fall far

Thus, any two subsets of the ultimate kinds

enough away from each other on the

may be

scale.

27

The

distinction

chapter 10].

between a determinable and

its

determinates

A more recent discussion of the distinction

is

is

due to W.E. Johnson [1921,

Searle 1959.

28

me

what Julius Moravcsik is actually suggesting in Moravcsik 1979, p.
writes: “Moravcsik (1979, 87ff.) seems to think that the
88
Philebus' divisions are concerned exclusively with determinates and determinables” [Dancy
1984, p. 186 n. 57]. In fact Moravcsik states that the classification in the Philebus is a “hybrid”
This seems to

ff, contrary to

to be

Dancy 1984, who

form of the two different schemes of classification [Moravcsik, 1979;
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p. 88].

This brings the classification into
the

OMP was first introduced at

same

with the analogy that Socrates used when

12e. There, Protarchus says that since pleasure

like pleasure, the various pleasures

instances of the

line

must be

like

one another, because they are

is

most

all

thing. In reply, Socrates says that color, too, is
like color,

and yet

various colors can differ and be contraries. The various colors,
however, are related to
color not so

much

as species to genus as various determinates to a determinable.

Similarly, pleasure and

knowledge can both be thought of as determinables whose

determinates are ultimate kinds arranged along a scale.

The means

for dividing pleasure

and knowledge are therefore on hand by the

conclusion of the passage on the god-given method. Why, then,
pleasure and of knowledge carried out at that point?

still

(PI),

bad

in

and

it is

isn’t the division

The hedonist

of

position at that point

is

clear that a division of pleasures that yields a class of pleasures that are

themselves would have been a decisive refutation of (PI). But, refuting (PI) does

not by itself establish (S),

not to say that intelligence

i.e.,

is

are capable of both pleasure

to refute (PI), then the

to say that pleasure is not the

better than pleasure,

and

method

for all living beings is

even for the limited class of beings

intelligence. If the purpose

is

good

of the god-given method

that

is

not sufficient to establish (S). The introduction of (P3)

as the reformulated hedonist position, however, resets the terms of the argument, since

the denial of (P3) entails the truth of (S).

In introducing (P3), Socrates claims to

that

whatever

is

the

have previously heard, or perhaps dreamt,

good must be perfect (icAeov),

our choice (aipexoc;) [20b6-21e4]. The

shift is
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sufficient (iKavov),

from the question, what

and worthy of

is

the

good

for

living beings, to the different question,

The good

life for

human

way, and since pleasure
the

good

life.

intelligence

But

by

it

what kind of life

is

the

beings must combine the different

is

one of these capacities,

it

good

human

such beings.

life for

capacities in a certain

follows that pleasure

is

an element in

doesn’t follow that pleasure in itself or by itself is a good.
Neither

itself

nor pleasure by

element in a good human

life that

worthy of our choice. And,

itself

can render a

accounts for that

human

life’s

life

good. The good

being perfect, sufficient, and

either pleasure or intelligence is closer in nature to this

element. At this point, Protarchus concedes that pleasure has “collapsed, just as

down by

the present arguments” (22e5-6). But

says this, the acknowledged hedonist position

refuted

by the argument

because (PI)

Intelligence,

prize.

is

However, with the adoption of (P3)

if

(P3) could be

first prize; like

shown

must be noted

is still

(first

on the other hand, never contended

no longer claiming

(PI),

and

that

it is

mind,

most precise inquiry by

is still

prize)

when

this

“another contrivance

.

.

.

weapons, as

it

is

argument

for the victor’s prize but only for second

it is

now claiming
would

still

only second prize.

And

so

turn out to be superior to

a need to examine pleasure, to apply to pleasure

torture” (Tf)v dKpi(38ax(XTr|v TipoacpepovTa

then remarks what a long argument

which

on behalf of pleasure.

23a7), and “to bring her to the test by paining her” (abxfj e^8A,eyxovTa

He

Protarchus

(PI), then,

by

if struck

as the reformulated hedonist position, pleasure

to be true, then pleasure

mind. Thus Socrates says there

“the

it

that Socrates has just given. (PI) is refuted

a claim for the “victor’s prize”

is

is that

still

pdaavov,

A,u7i:8iv,

23a7-8).

remains for them, and that they must have

were, different from the previous arguments, in

going for second prize on behalf of mind” (23b7-8), but then immediately adds, “perhaps
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some

are the

same ones” (23b9).

given method. But the

new

In saying this, Socrates

contrivance

is

is

surely referring to the god-

the classification of all existents into
four

ontological kinds.

E.

The Four Ontological Kinds and

Socrates proposes to divide “all the things that are
-

»

-

,

vuv ovxa ev

Good

now

in the

two

kinds, the indefinite

23c4) into four kinds.

The

first

(x6 drieipov) and the limit (x6 Tiepaq), are clearly fundamental.
introduces them he

makes an unmistakable reference

method, for he asks,

whole” (Ttdvxa id

29

^

xo) rravxi,

the

“We were

When

to the discussion

Socrates

of the god-given

saying that surely the god showed the indefinite in beings,

and the limit?” (Tov Qeov c>.£yopev ttou x6 pev dneipov

xwv ovxcov xo

5e Tiepaq;— 23c9-10). This clearly refers to the statement in 16c9-10 that “whatever
things are said to be always

come

out of the one and many, having within themselves

both limit and indefiniteness” (e^ evoq pev Kai
eivai, Tiepaq

7roA,A.(i)v

ovxcov xchv dei Xeyopevcov

5e Kai driEipiav ev auxoiq aupcpuxov exovxcov). So here

that everything that is has both the indefinite

third ontological kind, the meikton or the

and the

we

are told

limit in them. This anticipates the

mixed kind, which

is

a combination of the

apeiron and peras.

A significant logical feature of the new classification, however, is the division of
the kinds themselves into one

and many. The apeiron and peras, we

themselves each both one and

many

which consists

(23e3-6).

in being subject to the

are told, are

The one of the apeiron

more and

is its

simple nature,

Kai

ijxxov, 24a9).

the less (xo paA,A,6v xe

29

Throughout the discussion

in this section

of the dialogue, Socrates

indifferently as ei5r| or yevr| of things.
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refers to the four kinds

That

is

to say, the apeiron itself,

viewed as a

unity, is simply this condition of being

subject to indefinite quantity. This condition, in turn,
has

many

forms: the

apeiron are the different modes of being subject to the more
and the
hotter

and colder (24b),

drier

and wetter, greater and

less,

less,

along a scale, so that the relation between the one of the apeiron and

This distinction between the one and the

many

in each

by some commentators. Schipper 1965, for instance,

more

gentle,’ the ‘greater

opposite qualities” [Schipper 1965;
apeiron, however,

is

and

p. 47]-i.e., the

being

as:

which

are

all

of qualities

many may be

its

manifestations.

its

of the ontological kinds

missed

is

identifies the apeiron with “the

limitless sensed qualities, varying in degree, the ‘hotter

the ‘more violent and

such

quicker and slower, bigger and

smaller (25c), high and low, fast and slow (26a). These examples
are

said to be that of quantity to the different sensed qualities

many of the

and colder,’ the ‘more or

smaller,’

and the other

many of the apeiron

and

felt

only.

less,’

The

not simply the gradation or continuum of sensed qualities;

is

it

the

very process of shifting along the continuum of qualities, with the underlying absence of
definite quantity.

It is

never coming to

it;

end (24b). Plato

is

apeiron

is

Processes

when a
limit

of the nature of an apeiron to be always seeking completion but

when

it

finds completion, the apeiron itself would have

thus describing what

the ontological principle that

come

to

it

means

is at

for something to be a process.

work

to

an

The

in all things that are in process.

an end when “the so much” (to noaov, 24c3, 6)

definite quantity or

come

magnitude comes about. This amounts

on the process. Thus, on the other hand, peras

is

is

established,

i.e.,

to the imposition

of a

the principle of limit that halts

process and brings about definite quantity in things (24c-d).

As

to the

many of peras,

Socrates gives these as examples: the Equal and Equality (to laov xai iaoTr|Ta, 25a7);
and, the Double (to 5i7iA,daiov, 25a8). These,
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when imposed upon an

indefinite, “puts in

number” (ev^EiGa dpi&iaov, 25e2) and causes

things to

become commensurate and

harmonious (auppeTpa Kai aupcpcova dnepYCxCeiai, 25el). Thus,
the one of the
"its nature— consists in the imposition of number.

When number

indefinite quantity in process, the result is that “certain

25e4) emerge. That

is to

third ontological kind,

limit

all

and the

in the world.

innumerable things that come

upon an

indefinite.

The

be

(xtjq

the

One

The Limit

third kind are thus the

yeveaecoq, 26c8-9) whenever limit

:

first

is

imposed

Here

is

a

three ontological kinds;

indefinite quantity in process

qualitative opposites

on a

scale

One: number/ratio

Many: various

3.

the things that are said to be, including

The many of the

Many: various

2.

from combining the

combining of the peras and the apeiron.

many of the

Indefinite

all

results

the

third kind is the coming-into-being (yeveaic; eiq

constitutes the

summary of the one and

1.

to

The one of the

ouaiav, 26d8) which

we know them come-to-be. Thus we have

This kind comprises

phenomena

imposed upon an

becomings” (yeveaEiq xivdq,

x6 peiKxov or the mixed kind, which

indefinite.

objects and

say, things as

is

limit

The Mixture

definite ratios

One: genesis into determinate being

Many: various becomings

Up
of the

to this point,

indefinite,

i.e.,

what the

classifications explain

how things come

into being.

Socrates, in describing the imposition of peras

the result as causing things to

It

is

how things

will be recalled,

upon the apeiron,

at

are generated out

however, that

one point describes

become “commensurate and harmonious”
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(25el).

Now this

seems

to say

indefinite,

it

more than
seems

that things

come

into being

in addition to say that

when

limit is

imposed upon an

when such imposition takes

place, things are

constituted as commensurate and harmonious, and therefore
as the orderly and good

things that they are. Such, in fact,

that Socrates gives as

the

is

view held by John Cooper (1977). Cooper notes

examples of the meikton such things as health (25e8), music (26a4),

the seasons (26b 1), beauty and fine qualities of character (26b6-7), and the
pleasures

included in the good

life,

such as the pleasures of learning the truth (52c4-dl). Cooper

then remarks:

In fact, in placing these things in the third genus Socrates

not openly state) not just that

all

being the good things they are

is

the

is

are

to

imply (though he does

good things but

a consequence of their being constituted

combination of Tiepaq and dneipov. That

good thing just

seems

members of this genus

that their

by a

he seems to adopt the view that to be a
to be such a combination [Cooper, 1977, p. 715; emphasis in the
is,

original.]

30
It is

evident that the text of the four kinds passage supports this interpretation.

However,
Socrates

in the transition

makes

exchange

at the

clear that pleasures

it

Soc.

What
It

of pleasure,

arise in the meikton.

Here

is

the

is it

to

you just as

it

seems to

me

concerning the origin of these things?

things?

would seem

kind [ev xco

Prot.

and pains both

to the analysis

beginning of that passage:

Soc. So, then,

Prot.

from the four kinds passage

koivw

that

by nature pain and pleasure

arise, at the

same

time, in the

mixed

yevei].

My dear Socrates, remind us what ever you mean by the mixed kind you have

mentioned.

...

30

Barker 1996,

p. 156,

and Moravcsik 1979,

p.

consideration of the passage on the four kinds.

65

98, also maintain this view based on

Soc. Well, then, the mixed kind answers to
that which, of the four,

Prot The one you mentioned after the indefinite
and the
health and also, I think, harmony?
Soc.

Y ou

and

in

the

which you put

speak most finely (3 1 b8-d 1 ).

In saying that pleasure arises in the

of pleasure, that

limit,

we spoke of as

is,

mixed kind, Socrates

to the different kinds

is

surely referring to the

of pleasure as they arise in

about to enumerate and discuss these kinds.

As

us.

He

to the one of pleasure, this

many

is in fact

is

shortly to

be defined in the ensuing discussion; but, already, the one of pleasure
has been assigned
to the

apeiron in the preceding passage on the four kinds,

characterized as being

by nature

ETuyxavc TiecpuKoq Kai
subject to the

more and

indefinite in

its

fullness

at 27e. There, pleasure

and increase” (ccTreipov

Kai xm pdUov, 27e8-9),

the less. Socrates

now reminds

was

that

is, it is

intrinsically

Protarchus of their agreement on

that view:

Soc.

And

also the kind [to yevoc;] to

which pleasure belongs came

to light

some time

ago.

Prot.

Soc.
its

Indeed.

Then

let

it

remember this too about

both, that

mind was akin

to cause

kind, but pleasure

itself neither

As

us

and nearly of

is indefinite in itself and of that kind [xou yevouq] which
has nor will have a beginning, middle, or end (3 1 a5- 1 0).

will turn out, all the

many

those which are part of the good

life

and those which are

Notwithstanding the nature of the examples of the

on the four kinds, the many of pleasure
Moreover, pains likewise

arise,

member of the mixed kind

is

good and the

pleasures, both the

belong

not,

in,

the

its

mixed

and also both

kind in the passage

good and

its

bad kinds.

kind. Thus, to be a

not the same thing as to be a good thing-contrary to

Cooper’s view.
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and by

in the meikton.

many of the mixed

clearly includes both

and thus belong

evil ones,

in

What, then,

is

itself? In the section

the one of pleasure? What, in other words,

where pleasure

is

analyzed, this question

answer. Pleasure, according to Socrates,

is

is

e^plerosis, the filling

is

the nature of pleasure

the

first to

receive an

up or replenishment

restores a living being to physical harmony. In Socrates’
words, pleasure “in and

neither has nor will have a beginning, middle, or end.”
Pleasure, in other words,

process; the one of pleasure

many of pleasure, on
when some

limit

is

is this

is

itself

a

process of restoration to physical harmony.^ ^ The

the other hand, are the various “becomings” (geneseis) that

imposed on

by

that

this process.

These geneseis correspond

emerge

to the various

types of true and false pleasures whose discussion constitutes Plato's analysis of pleasure
in the Philebus.

I

suggested in the previous section

claim that everything has within

meanings:

(a) that pleasure

number of different forms;

that, in

itself both limit

regard to pleasure and intelligence, the

and indefmiteness has

at least

two

and intelligence each have an indefinite but determinable

(b) that

contrasting elements. Clearly,

it is

each ultimate form
in the sense

is

a determinate ratio between two

of (b) that

the apeiron in them. For, everything that

comes

limiting element and the indefinite. This,

we may

things can be said to have

all

into being

assume,

is

is

a definite ratio of the

true

of each of the kinds of

pleasure and of knowledge.

or that

Thus the one of pleasure is not simply [the fact] that it belongs in the class of the apeiron
a process, but what process it is. Dorothea Frede thinks that the ‘generic definition’ of

it is

pleasure

is

[the fact] that pleasure in itself belongs in the apeiron

or end [Frede 1996, p. 230]. But,

if that

and lacks a beginning, middle,

were the case, then everything

that

is in

the class of the

apeiron would have the same generic definition. The lack of a beginning, middle or end, i.e., the
fact of its being a process, I have argued here, is the one of the apeiron itself, not of pleasure.
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If

my

account of the

being (yeveaiq

eic;

first

three kinds

is

ouaiav) of pleasures, not

by the combining oiperas and apeiron.
particular thing good. In the passage

We

correct,

however,

their being

still

it

good or

is

the

coming

evil, that is

into

explained

need an explanation of what makes any

on the four kinds, we

are told that the right

combination (opOf) Koivcovi'a, 25e7) oiperas and apeiron generates
health, and also the

most complete and most perfect music (pouaiKpv aupTiaaav TEX,Ec5xaTa,
26a4). The
right combination also takes

Xiav Kai

airEipov, 26a7);

away

when

“the

much too much and

the indefinite” (to

noXh

these are taken away, then the measured (to eppEtpov,

26a7) and the commensurate (to cuppEtpov, 26a8) are produced. This suggests that
not

just

first

any

ratio

of peras and apeiron will generate a good thing.

Indeed when Socrates

speaks of the coming-into-being of things out of the combining of peras and apeiron,

he refers separately to “the so much,”

definite quantity (to Tioaov, 24c6)

i.e.,

measured” (to pstpiov, 24c7). He describes the more and the
TO Tioaov vanish, but also capable of taking

in

to Tioadv.

less as capable

When the

good mixture.

definite ratio

of the limit to the indefinite.

It is,

however, a determinate quantity

of making

apeiron takes in

definite quantity, then the apeiron ceases to be, but the resulting mixture

necessarily a

and “the

is

not

or, in other

words, a

33

A point raised
Here
Soc.

is

by Neil Cooper

my translation

And

always,

we

in

Thus, the presence of a limit does not by

Cooper 1968,

p. 13.

of this crucial passage (24b4-d7):
say, the

more and

the less are in the hotter and the colder.

(continued)

Prot. Certainly.
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Itself determine a thtng to

what makes
that

it

be a good thing; a limit

is

not what

makes a thing good but

determinate. Without a limit nothing can he a
good thing, but only things

have the proper limits are good

Soc. Well, then, our

completion

things.

argument always indicates

(pf) xiXoc,

and

I

to us that the pair does not have a
suppose being without completion it becomes

absolutely indefinite (TiavxdTiaaiv dneipco yiyveaSov).
Prof. Extremely so, Socrates.

Soc. Well said, friend Protarchus, you’ve taken

it

so which you uttered, and “slightly” too, have the

up well and recalled

same power

as the

that this “extremely”

more and

less (xfiv

xw pd>.X6v xe xai nxxov); for, wherever the pair is, it does not
much (oi)K cdxov sivai noaov CKaoxov) but, always imposing more

auxf)v buvapiv ex^xov
allow each to be so

extreme than more

slight,

and the contrary

every condition,

in

it

more and

creates the

less

and makes the so much vanish (pf) dtpaviaavxe x6 noaov). For, as just now stated, if it
does not make the so much vanish, but allows this and the measured to come-to-be at the
base of the more and less and the extreme and slight (ev

a(p65pa Kcd fipepa e5pa eyyEveaSai), they

xfj

xou pd^Xov xai rjxxov xai

will be driven

was (ai)xd Eppsi xaOxa ex xfjq ai)xd)v x^paq ev f|
much, it no longer is either hotter or colder; for the hotter

the pair

so

not abide, and likewise the colder, but the so

much

according to this argument the hotter and

contrary would

yiyvoix’

their

own

evfjv). For,

once

it

where

takes the

always advancing and does

is

still

place,

and ceases

become

to advance. So,

indefinite

(aneipov

av x6 &8pp6xepov xal xouvavxiov apa).

In this passage there

of limit and

its

stands

from

indefinite.

is

no suggestion

that every definite quantity (rroaov)

Henry Jackson long ago suggested what seems

view, namely, that x6 pexpiov

to

me

is

a correct ratio

to be the correct

one type of xo rroaov [Jackson 1881; pp. 278-281]. However,
Jackson draws further conclusions from this. According to Jackson, all the various noad which
fall

short of the appropriate

is

pexpiov on a

consequently incapable of being known”
short of perfection,

anything

is

do not

fully

in

Jackson’s view implies that

known, since they

class to

fall

it

identical,

and the further

is

them, or they could not be existent”

some

(p.

existent things that belong in the

279).

mixed

And

so,

they do

class cannot be

short of the goodness of the appropriate measure that defines the

which they belong. But

this is unacceptable,

the kinds of pleasure that are excluded from the
pleasures.

and existence are

fall

from existence” (pp. 278-279). But then, Jackson
those noad which fall short of the appropriate pexpiov “must have

something of order or goodness
exist.

278). Furthermore, such noad, because they

really exist, “for perfection

from perfection, the further

goes on to claim that

being deviations from the standard, “are

scale,
(p.

Such pleasures, though not good, are

given the careful elaboration by Socrates of

good mixed
fully

short of Jackson’s reading.
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life, i.e.,

knowable

the false and the mixed

in their nature.

Plato’s text falls

A further indication that Plato does not equate the goodness of a thing with
presence of a limit in that thing

is that

Socrates proceeds to introduce a fourth kind,
the

cause of (xfjv aixi'av) the combination of the limit and the
explanatory scheme complete, or in other words
the goodness of a

good

thing,

it

is

ended with the mixed kind. But,
aitia,

we

are told,

is

if peras

were a

sufficient explanation for

clearly the aitia has an explanatory task of its

is,

been reached and when the

aitia itself,

halt,

both (presumably)

is

It is

also responsible,

when

text that follows,

of the

i.e.,

in us, but universal

final section

(1)

The universal Nous orders

(2)

The universal Nous

is

a definite quantity has

merely a category to which nous

evident that the real force that drives mixtures to come-into-being

nous or the nous

all

aitia,

imposed on an apeiron.

right definite quantity is

however,

all.

own. The

Kai

of both the one and the many of the third kind. The

however, for processes coming to a

say, not individual

the

reasonable to expect that the classification would have

therefore, is responsible for there being any processes at

The

Were

indefinite.

the cause “of the mixture and the becomings” (xfiq

yeveaecoq, 27b9), that

the

is

Nous. Here

is

assigned, and

nous
is

a

it

is

itself, that is

to

summary of the

of the passage on the four kinds;
things [28d5-e6].

the cause of things

becoming

orderly, fine, and pure

[30a9-c7].

(3) Therefore:

The

universal

(4)

The nous

(5)

Wisdom and mind

Nous belongs

in us is akin to universal

in the

kind cause

{aitia) [30dl0-e3].

Nous [29b3-d5].

(aocpia xa'i vouq) come-to-be (ycvoiaOriv) through soul

(il/uxfiq) [30c9-10].

(6)

The universal Nous

acts

(7)

[Wisdom and mind

in us are activities

by causing souls
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to

come-to-be [30dl-4].

of soul.]

The nous

(8) [Therefore:

In this last section,

seems

it

in us

comes-to-be through the

argued that our souls are akin to the universal mind
or Nous. (2)

is

to anticipate the specification of the

good-making properties as the

fineness, symmetry, and truth at 65a. But, if the aitia

being of everything in the mixed kind, then

it

is

of the good things in the mixed kind. However,
the aitia

is

the cause of the goodness of those

mixed kind must be due

to the nature

is

of

triad

the cause of the coming-into-

also the cause of the coming-into-being

this is not the

good

same thing

as to say that

The goodness of things

things.

of the universal Nous

The

itself.

Aristotelian terminology, an efficient cause, while universal

Nous

is

aitia

in the

to use

is,

the final cause of the

35

goodness of the good things

in the

mixed

given a one-many distinction. Instead,

kind.

we

With the fourth kind we

are

no longer

are given a distinction of aspect according to

function.

It is

the

thus with the fourth kind that

mixed kind

we

reach an explanation of why any

member of

good or bad, and therewith, of a resolution of (P3). Socrates quickly

is

reminds Protarchus of this;
Soc.

Come

then,

what

is

our argument after this? Wasn’t

whether second prize belongs to pleasure or thought?
Prot. Indeed

Soc.

it

it

carry out

concerning

this

that

we were

finding out

not the case?

we have

divided in this way, that

was.

Then would

we would

it

Was this

not perhaps

now

more firmly

the

we had

initially

be the case, after

judgment concerning

first

and second

prize, since

taken opposing stands (27c3-10)?

34

Statements

in

brackets are those

I

deem

to be implied though not openly stated in the text.

35

Thus,

I

think that Benitez 1995, p. 122,

is

mistaken

Philebus, Plato conflates final and efficient causes.
in itself, universal

nous

is final cause.
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The

in

claiming that

aitia

is

in this portion

of the

universal nous as efficient cause;

Socrates

ftirther

reminds Protarchus that the mixed

(27d); of Its two components, however, pleasure

and mind

is

akin to the aitia (28e).

The

is

life itself

clearly

belongs in the mixed kind

more akin

to the

apeiron (28a),

aitia is responsible for the very order that

we

find

in things (30b).

F.

At

the end of the passage

on the four kinds, (P3) has been

rather generalized way. Pleasure in

is

Conclusion

itself,

refuted, but only in a

the one of pleasure, belongs in the apeiron and

of the nature of the apeiron while, on the other hand, mind

is

closer in nature to the

cause of the coming-into-being of all mixtures, including the good mixed

many of pleasure

remains to be examined.

many of pleasure may
pleasure

may

What needs

be admitted into the good mixed

to

be shown

life,

and

why

expect that there

is

some analogy between

mixture good. That

is to

say,

mixture a good thing. Indeed
four ontological kinds

thing

is

which among the

these kinds of

we

really ought to lead us to

good pleasures and

the

should expect that

if

is

it

may

to give

pepoq dyaOoO, 28a3)

case of pleasure, nous

is

the

which makes the

is

at all, this is

what makes any

be said that one main purpose of the section on the

an account of what

to pleasure.

part of the explanation for

that

any pleasures are good

because such pleasures have a share in the nature of nous, which

(xi

But the

be admitted.

The argument of the second methodological passage

good”

is,

life.

why

it is

a

it

is

that provides

“some

part of the

Certainly the presence of limit in a good

good

more fundamental
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thing; but

it

is

my view that

in the

part of the explanation. For, nous

is

that

for the sake of which (cvcKa) the

enabled to reach their proper

pleasures

become

part

The ensuing

many

limits.

pleasures that come-into-being in our
souls are

It is

on account of nous,

of the good human

therefore, that

some

life.^^

detailed examinations of the

many of pleasure

thus constitutes an

integral part of the task of the dialogue. Socrates’ declared
resolve to bring pleasure to

the test

by “paining” pleasure seems more than a play on words. To “pain” pleasure

examine the

intricate structures

opposite, pain.

Thus he

of its many kinds

in terms

is to

of their connections with their

declares, in the beginning of the examination of pleasure, that

pleasure cannot be sufficiently examined apart from pain (3 lb5-6). But

connection with pain alone that

is

examined. The connection with

it is

falsity is

not the

looked into

as well. This suggests that pain and falsity are both playing a criterial role in the

elaboration of the kinds of pleasure. Socrates

as

is

not so

showing the possible mixings of pleasure with

emerge more

Thus,

it

much

falsity

dividing pleasure into kinds

and with pain. This point will

clearly in the next chapter.

could be said that the one of the kind Cause

is

universal Nous',

various individual minds for the sake which there are true pleasures. There
fifth

its
is

class to denote individual minds, as Oliver Letwin does [cf Letwin, 1981;
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many

are the

no need

to posit a

p. 188].

CHAPTER III
PLEASURE AND FALSITY

A. Division and the Nature of Pleasure

Many commentators believe that Plato
in response to the objections to

it

that Plato

revised the middle period theory of Forms

himself had raised in Parmenides. The

objections revolve around questions of the unity of a Form, given
that a

some way hQ present

in its

many

instances. This,

Form must

noted in Chapter Two, gives

I

in

rise to

one of two serious forms of the one-and-many problem, OMP3. In the Parmenides,
the

many of a Form

are

particulars

whose

ostensible participation in the

Form

an ontological

OMP.

of a Form, not

to its instances, but to other forms. This point requires that the

about the unity of a
status, as

an

In the Philebus, the

Form be

OMP regarding Pleasure concerns the relation

much

interpreted, not so

as a

problem about

its

problem

ontological

a problem about the explanatory function of the Forms in discourse. Indeed,

OMP about Pleasure comes up at all,

certain

generates

views about

and hence

its

how Pleasure combines

one-and-many

with other forms; and (b)

character,

its

because in our discourse

it is

if

we presuppose

with other forms. The divisibility of a Form,

must then be seen

articulation into

its

in

terms

of:

(a) its

connections

subordinate forms or sub-kinds.

these hinges the explanatory function of a Form.

It is, I

think, Plato’s

On

view of the

explanatory function of the Forms that underwent a revision from the middle dialogues to
the late ones.

De Chiara-Quenzer offers the

following

summary account of the

revision

in Plato’s view:

In the Phaedrus, Sophist,

forms. Every form

is

and Statesman there

not one.

Some forms

evolution in Plato’s theory of forms, there

is

a development in Plato’s view of the

are divisible and thus are many. With this

is

a corresponding evolution in Plato’s view of

what constitutes knowledge of a subject matter. No longer does knowledge of a subject
matter entail understanding only one form. Rather, since a general form is not simply
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one, but

is

specific

fom ^any) between the general

one-and-many, knowledge of that general form
entails understanding every
form (one) and the tokens of the specific
forms
[De Chiara-Quenzer 1993, p. 51],

(infinite)

I

would add

that understanding a specific

form involves,

of the specific form with other general Forms. This

Here O,

4^,

and

combine with

Y are general Forms and

4^

and others with Y.

with other Forms qua unities. This

In this illustration, the higher level

is

Moravcsik (1992,

p.

shown

in the following illustration:

are sub-forms of O,

(|),...(1)„

some of which

A Form that has sub-forms may also connect directly
is

represented below:

Forms

4^

and

Y are connected to

Y could be, for instance, more abstract forms than O.

Julius

in turn, tracing the connections

<t>

qua

unities. 4^

and

37

228) sums up the one-and-many puzzles of the Philebus

in these

two questions:

API

:

AP2:

How can one Form fall under several higher, or more generic. Forms?
How can one higher, or more generic. Form have many abstract parts?
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{continued)

In the Philebus, the

into Its sub-kinds,

to

many of a Form

are generated

with other Forms, and to see
require that

its

all

being a pleasure,

it

sub-kinds share a single

which

and-many because “Every pleasure

is

—both of which Socrates had

the

Form

among

in

pleasures are alike in being pleasures. But,

is

many of pleasure,
To

also a many.

Pleasure”

many pleasures

many

The sense

characteristic? In the beginning of

a characteristic of each of the

is

problematic to say that the

how each of its kinds combines

common

all

problematic that the one Pleasure

(14c7-I0).

Form

these combinations together. But, does the
unity of a

the dialogue, at I2e, Protarchus claims that

renders

articulation of the

and from the combinations of those sub-kinds
with other Forms. Thus,

understand a Form as many involves understanding

Form

by the

fails to

is

not what

say that pleasure

is

specify the sense in which

are one and that the one of pleasure

is

it is

also a

characterized as being “amazing” statements to

which a particular

characteristic

one-

make

of pleasure effectively pluralizes

pleasure must, then, be one which takes into account the contrarieties found

many of pleasure.

the

pleasures

Thus, Protarchus’ claim that

all

pleasures are alike in being

immediately countered by Socrates: “But... color, too,

is

to this, color as a

is like

whole would not admit of differences, though we

all

color; according

perceive black and

take API to include my own question, how a Form is connected with other forms qua unities or
monads whether those other forms be higher, i.e., more abstract, forms or not. In the one-andI

—

many

passage of the Philebus (13e-15c), Plato refers to the Forms as povctbaq rather than as

eibr).

This

is

to

emphasize

their character as unities, since Plato is contrasting this with their
is: Do Forms connect qua unities? Moravcsik,
my question, how a Form can be articulated into its

character as pluralities. Plato’s question, then,

however, would include under API

subordinate forms or sub-kinds (1992,

how

p.

228).

AP2,

for Moravcsik,

is

the different question,

such highly abstract forms as Goodness and Fineness can cross-cut into the classifications

specified by

however,

is

API, so

that such

forms can themselves have abstract

that this latter question

Form can connect with

other,

more

is

better seen as the question,

abstract.

Forms. This

illustration in this chapter.
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is

what

parts.

how
I

My own view,

the sub-kinds of a given

wished

to illustrate in the first

white, and

we

contrary to

it.

perceive that black not only differs from
white but happens to be the most

And moreover shape

is

most

like

shape according to

this;

it

is all

one

in

kind, but as to the parts, the parts themselves
are the most contrary to each other,
and

surely they happen to admit of countless
differences, and
that are like this.

will discover

So. .do not rely on this kind of talk, which
makes
.

things one. I’m afraid

we

pleasures” (12e3-l 3a5).

the

we

will discover

in being

others

most contrary

the

that are contrary to other

This reply indicates that Socrates

members of a kind, though one

qua members of the

some pleasures

all

many

looking for a sense in which

is

members of that

kind,

may

yet be contraries

kind.

Edith Schipper, however, treats Protarchus’ claim that
pleasures are alike in being
pleasures as if it were Socrates own. She writes;

though many

same

in so far as they differ

characteristic; the

many

from each

^

In the P/n/cftwj'... the

other, are

alternative to the impossibility of one

‘apart

from

itself,’ i.e.,

in

form being dispersed

‘apart

things.”

But Socrates’ reply shows

which

problematic to say that the

it is

in so far as they

things,

have the

beautiful things are also one in being beautiful. This

presupposed through the discussion, and in the statement

would be

one

many

from

that

itself as

many

15b that an impossible

in

many

somehow

he does not think

things

is

that

it

identified with the

this to

different

many

be the relevant sense in

pleasures are also one.

have many instances without any of the instances being

is

A form, after all, can

from the others. In such

a case there would be no one-and-many problem in the required sense.

It is

not the fact

38

Schipper 1965; pp. 44-45. Schipper thus thinks that the one-and-many problem concerning
pleasure

is

OMP3.
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that a

Form

has instances that gives rise to a one-and-many
problem about pleasure;

rather the fact that the

forms. Indeed, the

many

instances of pleasure are instances of different
and contrary

many of a form can be

need not have any one characteristic
nature of that Form, and not

some

Accordingly, the one of pleasure,

many

the

in

In contrast, Protarchus’

common.

single characteristic shared

its

unity, is not

view

all

some

same

quality. Protarchus thus

because they share a single

shown, however,
is

—

in the abstract.

his analysis

it is

that the

What

by

qua many, they

the abstract

is

instances.

all its

characteristic

good or

in the beginning

and only pleasures have, and

that,

The one of a Form

by

virtue of which

all evil.

of the discussion

can be shown to be identical to the good, and for Protarchus
all

way

different in such a

kinds of pleasure can be held to be

quality that

is

it

this

that this quality

is that

means

pleasure

that there is

and goodness are one and the

supposed that pleasure and good are identical qua

common quality,

one of pleasure

is

or are the

same

unities

Socrates has

quality.

simply the nature of pleasure

this nature is is stated at

some

—what

now

pleasure

31b-32b, just before Socrates begins

of the many of pleasure. Pleasure, according to Socrates,

is

a replenishment;

the process of restoring a living being to a condition of harmony following a
40

disruption of that harmony.

Cf
diairesis

Thus,

it

is

by virtue of being

Minardi 1983, pp. 418ff. Minardi thinks that
is

all

replenishments that the

in the Philebus, the

in fact to reveal that the different instances of a

Form

all

purpose of the

resemble differently one

eidos (p. 419).
40

Pleasure therefore necessarily implies this disruption of harmony,

i.e.,

the condition of lack

(kenosis), felt or unfelt, of which pleasure is the subsequent filling (plerosis). For the

view

that

the Philebus presents a unified general account of the nature of pleasure, see Frede 1992; 1993,
both of which challenge the accounts given in Gosling and Taylor 1982, and in Hampton 1990.

For a defense of Frede’s account against those of Gosling
1996.
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& Taylor and Hampton, see Tuozzo

many

pleasures are one.

that single nature.

characteristics.

And

thus, pleasure

Qua many, however,

It is

qua unity has a

single nature, or rather,

it is

pleasure exhibits the most contrary

such characteristics that make Pleasure both

many and

one.

The

following summarizes the one-and-many character of pleasure:
Pleasure

One: Replenishment in living beings

Many: Various kinds of replenishment.
Socrates

now needs to show Protarchus by

an explicit discussion that on the level of the

many, the connections between pleasure and good reveal

that pleasure cannot

be identical

to the good.

We may recall that,

in the

passage on the one-and-many problem, Socrates had

grouped Pleasure together with other “monads” or

What

these unities have in

now, what

it

means

unity of good

for the

may be

common

is that

unities like

Ox, Humanity, and Good.

they neither come-to-be nor perish. Consider,

Form good to be a unity. The

Philebus" explicit view of the

represented in this way:

Good

Here, the good-making properties could not be subordinate species of good, nor are they

determinates of good.

When we

“divide” good in this way,

one-a«<i-many. The good, rather, qua unity

is

when

present in any object

makes
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are not dividing

it

as a

a one-/n-many, a unity of three ideas

together (auv xpiai, 65a2). Each good-making property

each property

we

is

not identical to the good, but

the resulting mixture a

good

thing.

Thus

we can
the

say that the good-making properties are aspects
of the good, so that the unity of

good

is

a unity of aspect rather than of kinds.^'

Kenneth Sayre proposes
1987; p. 64], and the

The good

for

Good

any being

corresponds to the

that in the Philebus,

is identical

with Unity [1987,

the Limit that

is

Form of the being

Unity

is

is

identical with Limit [Sayre,

p. 55;

1983, pp. 168-174].'^^

proper to that being, and this appropriate Limit

in question.

From

Socrates’ remark at 32a9-bl, that

“out of the indefinite and the limit naturally arises the form of
living things” (ck xfiq
ocTieipou

the

Kai Trepaxoq Kaxd (puaiv epv}/uxov yeyovoq eidoq, 32a9-bl), Sayre

Form of a

ratio

living being

of the Limit and the

defines

its

is itself

a combination of peras and the apeiron, a specific

Indefinite.

The Form of any

flourishing or well-being as a kind. Limit

any living being, and any transgression of this
disruption

for

by the Form

entails that pleasure is

nature

is

living being is the Limit that

is

thus responsible for the unity of

limit is a disruption

of its unity. The

as pain, while the restoration to the Form, to the proper Limit,

The good

pleasure.

specified

is felt

infers that

any living being, therefore,

is

is

the condition of unity that

that is proper to its being [Sayre, 1987; p.64j. This view,

always a good for living beings, since according

the restoration of any being to

its

proper

to

it

is

however,

pleasure by

This contradicts the conclusions

limit.

41

Plato’s language at 65a
single

form (oukoCv

things together...”
track

down

the

ei pf|

is

suggestive of aspect. “Then

if

we

cannot catch the good with a

pia dovdpeSa idea x6 dyaSov SripeCaai),

Seth Benardete translates the

initial

clause thus:

good with a single look...” [Benardete, 1993;

p. 82].

let

us grasp

it

by three

“So if we are not able to
The use of lookio translate

‘idea’ renders particularly well the point that fineness, symmetry, and truth are aspects of the

good rather than kinds of good.
42

Richard Kraut [1992; pp. 13-14,
equates

Good with

p.

45

n.

51] similarly suggests that in the Philebus, Plato

Unity.
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of the dialogue, and

it

itself belongs to the

apeiron^^

is

also difficult to reconcile with Socrates’
claim that pleasure in

What emerges from
many. But the good

is

sub-kinds as these forms

parceled out

is that

the good,

also a one-and-many, since there are

good. The good, however,

classifications

the above discussion

is

not a kind like

are.

As

many

Ox or Humanity,

a Form, the

Good

qua

unity, is a one-in-

kinds of things that are

i.e., it is

not divisible into

cuts across genus-species

and determinable-determinate specifications. The Form
of the good

among

the natural kind sub-divisions,

its

many articulated

is

across the

44

various kmd-classifications.
in this

Thus, the one-and-many of the good

may

be summarized

way:

The Good

One: Unity of fineness, proportion, and truth

Many: Various mixtures with proper

The good

is

a unity in the sense that

it

limits (id pexpia).

unites three forms under itself This, however,

does not mean that the Good and Unity are identical Forms.

Indeed,

it is

hard to see

43

Sayre also intends thereby to provide his

own answer to a question that has preoccupied
many commentators on the Philebus, the question, namely, whether the Forms of the middle
dialogues may be found among the four ontological kinds, and if so, in which of the four kinds.
Over a long period this has engendered much controversy, and 1 shall not attempt to deal with the
problem here. Benitez 1989 discusses the various positions that commentators have taken on this
issue. Davis 1979 is an earlier similar discussion. It seems to me, however, that the passage
quoted by Sayre (32a9-bl) only weakly supports Sayre’s inference that each kind of living thing
has an appropriate

Form

that is a

combination of peras and the apeiron. The passage could

instead be interpreted as saying that living things

a definite form.

proper

On

to that kind

the other hand, the

come

Form of each

out of the peras and the apeiron as having

living thing, in the sense of the Limit that

of thing, could be identical to the limiting element

in

it, i.e.,

its

is

peras.

44

Cf Anscombe

1966, and Moravcsik 1992, chapter

These commentators

all

being divisible

manner of a downward branching

in the

parcelled out across, or cutting into, the
cut into the

6.

See also Joseph 1948, pp. 70-73.

explain the interweaving of the forms in terms of one class of Forms

downward branchings

is

downward

into sub-kinds,

branchings.

the form of the Good.
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and other Forms being

One of the forms

that

may

cross-

under what conditions Plato would have said of
any two Forms

By virtue

forms.

of each being one form,

it

would seem

participate in Unity, and that both participate
in the

that

that they are identical

Unity and Good each

form Difference with respect

to

each

45

What

other.

its

being a unity does mean, however,

is that

that constitute the

many of the Good have something

in

more of the
included

abstract

among

the

good-making

as

it

is

common: they

The good mixed

properties.

many of the good,

the various

also included

life,

are not.

The

all

have one or

accordingly,

is

among the many of the

of the Mixture. The many of the class of the Mixture thus divide

which are good mixtures, and those which

good mixtures

first

into

two

class

parts: those

class is clearly that of all

those mixtures whose Tioact are also pexpia.

I

argued in Chapter

II

that the division

elaboration of a determinable into

its

of Pleasure into

determinates. This

may

sub-kinds resembles the

its

be

illustrated in the

following way:

45

The
Plato

Form Unity in Unity would, of course, raise problems about selfhowever, be concerned with that problem here. Richard Kraut says that

participation of the

predication.

comes

I

shall not,

closest to identifying the

Good

with Unity

when

Socrates asserts at 65a that the good

a unity of three ideas. Beauty (fineness) and symmetry (proportion). Kraut says, are tied by
Plato to “some notion of unity,” since fineness and proportion are what result when a limit is
is

placed on what

is

unlimited and excessive {Phil. 24a-26b); and so, “goodness (insofar as involves

beauty and measure)

is

conceptually connected with unity (insofar as what

is

limited

is

thereby

One problem here, again, is the distinction between limit and
Kraut it is when the proper limit is reached that fineness or

unified)” [Kraut 1992; p. 45 n. 51].

proper

limit.

Presumably, for

proportion results, and a living being

should be
being at

in.

all.

But there

then “unified” in the sense that

a prior sense in which a limit

is

it is

in the

condition that

necessary for something to

come

into

In this sense, limit does not necessarily unify an organism in the sense that Kraut

intends. There
Plato,

is

is

is

also the problem of distinguishing the notion of unity that Kraut attributes to

from the form of Unity. This will determine what we

‘conceptual connection’ between the good and unity.
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will

suppose to be the exact

it

Here, any pair

among

the determinates

(j)i. ..(})„

may be

contraries. This clearly could not

be the case with Good in relation to the good-making
properties.
Pleasure, however, with the distinguishing feature that

its

It is

the case with

“determinates,”

i.e.,

the kinds

of pleasure, form a continuum from maximal pleasure with no
admixture of pain

minimal pleasure with maximal admixture of pain or
and Humanity, no problem
judge

their connections with the good;

Pleasure because the hedonist

is

late stage in the discussion

is

it

enough

it,

is different.

claiming that pleasure

one nature (evi xivi

two just as

their

names

are,

this

same thing

is

‘pleasant,’ correctly set

xa'i (puaei

are not concerned to

is

There

is

a problem about

identical to the good. Thus, at a

(60a7-b5) Socrates states the problem in this way:

and moreover

(8do ovopaxa) ‘good’ and

we

Ox

that they be articulated into their

“Philebus says that pleasure has been the right aim for

ought to aim for

In the case of forms like

arises concerning their unity because

subordinate forms. But the case with Pleasure

very

falsity.

to

all

the

living beings

good

down,

for

are

all,

and that everyone

and the two names

some one

thing and possess

pia exeiv), but Socrates says they are not one thing but

and the good and the pleasant possess different natures from

each other, intelligence (TTjv (pp6vr|aiv) partaking of a greater portion of the good than
does pleasure.

Is this

which Protarchus
here

is,

how we

The problem

is

not what

was

stated then, Protarchus, as

assents: “ Exactly so”

it

is

now?” (60a7-b5)

(S9(56pa pcv ouv, 60b6). The problem as

can say more than that ‘Pleasure

is

pleasure,’ but also ‘Pleasure

whether ‘pleasure’ and ‘good’ name the same thing
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—a view

is

—

to

stated

good.’

ascribed by

Socrates to Protarchus both in the passage just
quoted as well as in the passage on the

one-and-many problem,

at 14dff.'" But,

good name the same thing

60a7-b5— “unless 13a7-b5

attributed

is

is

taken to do

Gosling thinks that the view that ‘pleasure’
and

by Socrates
it

to Protarchus /or the first time
at

implicitly” [Gosling, 1975; p. 126].

Socrates’ prefatory remark to the preceding quote
(“That which

previously”-*'

we

also mentioned

A Kai Tipoiepov EpyiiaOripev, 59el0), as well as Socrates’

the end (“/s this not

what was stated then, Protarchus, as

T8 Kai -qv xa xoxe T^eyopeva,

w

it is

However,

question at

now?''-o\> xaux’ eaxiv

npG)xapxe;-60b4-5), strongly indicate

that Socrates is

merely restating something that they had already previously agreed
upon concerning the
interpretation

of Protarchus’ view. And Protarchus

characterization of his

unity of Pleasure

is

own

seems

to accept this

position throughout the dialogue. Protarchus thinks that the

compatible with

‘good’ straightforwardly

for his part

name

the

its

being the good, because the terms ‘pleasure’ and

same thing or

quality. This,

however, does not mean

that (PI) is a definitional truth as either Protarchus or Socrates conceives

‘good’ and ‘pleasant’

different

meanings

name

the

same thing

in a language,

and

is

think

I

of (PI). That

consistent with saying that they have

it is

an assumption of the discussion in the

Philebus that ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ do not have the same meaning. Protarchus wants to

show that, notwithstanding,

the

two terms

refer to the

same object and should,

accordingly, be equated in language. Thus, for Protarchus

good

it is

discovery, so to speak, that pleasure

is

him

The god-given method

that such is not in fact the case.

the

46

Cf Hamlyn,

1955; pp. 292ff
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a matter for conceptual

for living beings. Socrates needs to

is

the

method

show

that will reveal

what

of unity pleasure

sort

pleasure and the good,

But

is

i.e.,

is,

by showing

the god-given

in the division

by displaying the
its

true

between the many forms of

relations

one-and-many

method of Philebus 15d-18d

of pleasures and knowledge

later

on

the

structure.

method applied by Socrates

in the dialogue? Is the

method used

at

least implicitly, if not explicitly, in the divisions?
Mitchell Miller thinks the latter a

fascinating question,” but declines to offer an answer [Miller,
1990; p. 323 n.3]. In
contrast,

that is at

method

work

is

many on
which

De Chiara-Quenzer

is

[1990; 1993] thinks that the god-given method

in the divisions

the

method

of pleasure and of knowledge. Furthermore, she thinks the

there applied quite explicitly, in order to

the level of forms. Thus, the god-given
the

is

one-and-many problem

show

method

that pleasure is both

is

that concerns pleasure.

explanation of how the god-given method addresses the

intended to solve

Here

is

De

one and

OMP

2,

Chiara-Quenzer’

OMP about pleasure:

many problem concerns forms. It is asking how many forms can be one
how one form can be many forms. Thus it is a one and many problem which

This one and

form and

pertains to forms and remains at the level of forms.

The discussion of the method at
16b5-18d2 provides the answer to how one form is many forms or many forms are one
form. One form is many because the one form is a general form which can be
distinguished into a definite number of more specific forms. This makes the one form
many. Many forms are one because the many forms are specific forms of a more general
form. This makes

many forms

The method described at 16-1 8 of the Philebus
many, and it provides a way for determining the
many of a general form. Thus the purpose of the method described at 16-18 of the
explains

how

Philebus

is

provide a

one.

a form can be one and

to explain

way

how pleasure and knowledge can each be one and many, and to
many of pleasure and the many of knowledge

for determining the

[De Chiara-Quenzer 1990; pp. 363-364].

Again, what needs to be added

kinds, but that

since

its

is that

pleasure

kinds are contrary in a

some of the kinds

will not

way

is

thereby revealed not only to have

that

shows

many

that pleasure is not the good,

combine with good. Unlike the contrary kinds unified by

the determinables Color and Shape, the kinds of pleasure are contrary, not to each other,

but to the good

itself.
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Why is the god-given method of the Philebus needed to solve
pleasure, and

how is

it

different

OMP about

from the method of diairesis of the Sophist
and

Statesman! Commentators have often supposed

between the god-given method and the
and some have held

the

that the very

diairetic

that there is

an important similarity

method of the Sophist and Statesman,

same method of division

is

employed

in all these

47

dialogues.

Nevertheless, there are clear differences between them
that call for

comment. The division
division of a kind into

sophist

is

reached.

in the Sophist is bifurcatory, that

two subordinate

The same

thing

is

is, it

proceeds by a downward

kinds, successively until the real definition of the

done

in regard to the definition

Statesman. The god-given method of the Philebus, however,

is

bifurcatory. Recall that, confronted with an indefinite plurality,

by positing a single form (piav i5cav, 16dl), and then
other

number”

(fj

is

in

not exclusively

we

are supposed to begin

after this two, three, “or

xiva aXkov dpiftpov, 16d4) of forms under the

reach the exact number of its sub-forms. This

of the statesman

initial

some

one, until

we

not the familiar scheme from the Sophist

and Statesman.

I

have already mentioned a second difference, namely,

that the divisions

of the

Sophist and Statesman terminate in definitions. Thus, in the Sophist the final definition of
the sophist

is

“woven” together out of the

differentia separated off in the course

of the

47

For instance, Hackforth 1945,
also

McGinley 1977,

p.

21; Ross 1951, p. 131; and Sayre 1983, pp. 122-130.

p. 32.
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See

48

discussion.

There, the structure of the division-eollection

is:

O

where the forms on
those on the

the

Form

is

left

the right side constitute the differentia included in the
definition, and

are the excluded forms. In the Sophist and Statesman, the
definition of

the end result of the analysis and

is

reached via a collection (auvaycoyf]) of

the differentia that are separated off by the diairesis.

But

Philebus the division culminates, not in a definition of the
in the laying out

in the god-given

initial

method of the

one being analyzed, but

of its constituent forms in their precise number. The definition of the

48

The

final definition

of ‘sophist’

Eleatic Stranger. Shall

way we

is

reached

we weave

his

at the

name

very end of the dialogue,

268c5-d5:

at

together from start to finish and

tie

it

up the

did before?

Theaetetus.

Of course.

Eleatic Stranger. Imitation of the contrary-speech-producing, insincere and

unknowing

of the appearance-making kind of copy-making, the word-juggling part of production

marked off as human and not
family” will be saying,

Theaetetus. Absolutely,

it

divine.

Anyone who

seems, the complete

[trans.

Nicholas

P.
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says the sophist

is

truth.

White,

in

Cooper

1997.]

sort

that’s

of this “blood and

initial

one

of the

initial

the

not the outcome of the division.''^ In the division
of pleasures, the definition

is

one of Pleasure

is

given

at the outset

end of the divisions; the definition

is

of the diair esis rather than reached

certainly not the result

at

of a collection of

•

The

differentia.

examples

elaboration of the

in the discussion

many of pleasure

of the god-given method;

recalls the structure

in those

examples

of the

(at 17a-18d), the

49

Although

examples of the god-given method, the nature of the initial one
under study
i.e., by surveying the indefinite plurality
oUnstances and then
“collecting,” in a somewhat tentative manner, some abstract feature by
which the mind can grasp
the nature of the initial one. Donald Davidson describes this initial
collection as “the somewhat
fumbling act of divining, through a process sometimes of sampling, sometimes of
intuiting,
is

in the

discerned through a collection,

the

nature of the unity to be defined or studied” [Davidson 1949;
pp. 33-34]. This, it seems, is’in fact
how Socrates arrived at a definition of pleasure before he began its division into sub-kinds.
50

D.J. Allan, however, says that the diairesis in the passage on the god-given method
results
an “exhaustive definition” of the class being defined [Stenzel 1964; xli]. While this is clearly
true of the divisions in Sophist and Statesman, I don’t think that the enumeration of the
many in
in

the discussion of the god-given method, and a fortiori the subsequent description of the many
of
pleasure, is a definition at all. Each one is, rather, an analysis of the structure of the Form under

discussion.

Meinwald thinks that in the Philebus, Plato is concerned to arrive at
same sort of genus-species classifications that mark the divisions in
the Sophist and Statesman [Meinwald 1992, pp. 378-79; 1991, pp. 67-69]. Meinwald bases her
view on her claim that in the Parmenides, Plato had introduced a distinction between two kinds
Similarly, Constance

definitions according to the

of predication, and that he

is

applying that distinction

The

in the later dialogues.

first

kind,

predication pros heauto (“in relation to itself’), holds by virtue of a relation internal to the
subject’s

own

nature,

and thus reveals the

internal structure

of that nature [1992,

p.

378]. This

is

by such sentences as “The Just is virtuous,” “Triangularity is three-sided,” “Dancing
moves,” and “The Just is just” [1992, p. 379]. Meinwald’s aim is to provide an account of self-

typified

predication in terms of predication pros heauto (hence the fourth example).

The other kind

is

predication pros ta alia (“in relation to the others”), which holds by virtue of a relation that a
subject has to something other than

“The Triangle

is

itself.

It is

intelligible” [1992, p. 380].

the division of pleasures in the Philebus

is

typified

by sentences

like “Aristides is just,”

Meinwald does not address

an application of the god-given method, and her

remarks are meant to apply to the examples of the god-given method

at

17a-18d. However,

neither the examples at 17a-l 8d nor the division of pleasures proceeds in the

species elaboration.
1

8d and

in the

I

think

it

is

crucial that in both the

manner of a genus-

examples of the god-given method

subsequent division of pleasures, the definition of the one under analysis

reached as a result of the divisions, as they are

between predications pros heauto and pros
of the divisions performed on the

initial

and

the question whether

in

Sophist and Statesman.

ta alia

one.
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Thus the

does not mark the difference

is

at 17a-

not

distinction

in the structures

initial

one

is

also posited as

collected together under

it.

known.

It is

the

many sub-forms of the

initial

one that are

This constitutes an important difference between
the

Philebus' god-given method and the diaireseis of the
Sophist and Statesman. In arguing
for her

view

that the god-given

in the Sophist

method

is

the

same method of division

and the Statesman, De Chiara-Quenzer claims

method of division

employs are

that Plato

that is

employed

that differences in the

to be explained in terms

of the aims of the

division rather than as differences in the nature of the divisions
themselves.^' While this
is

a plausible view,

it

doesn’t explain the differences

differences indicate that

it is

I

have just pointed

not the aim alone of the divisions that determines the method

of division to be used; in the Philebus, the nature of the
likewise to have determined the

diairesis

where the

initial

purpose of the diairesis

one

is to

is

mode of division

to

initial

one to be divided seems

be used. Here

we have

its

a type of

already known, or at least intuited, qua unity.

make

The

possible an analysis of its many, by laying out the sub-

kinds of a Form, preparatory to tracing out the connections between
other Forms.

These

out.

Thus the analysis of the many of a Form

its

sub-kinds and

consists not simply in laying out

sub-kinds, but also in discerning the connections of the sub-kinds with other Forms.

Nonetheless, an important similarity in both divisions

there

is

is that, in

a correct definition to be reached and, in the other, there

is

the one case,

a correct

number of

sub-forms to be laid out. Both divisions, therefore, purport to give us a true account of
the nature of the object of the investigation, either

other forms, or

by laying bare

De Chiara-Quenzer

its

by establishing

its

connections with

internal formal structure. In doing so, both

1990, pp. 365ff; 1998, pp. 100-103.
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methods

may be

said to

though

it is

far

aim

carving reality “at the joints.” This

from proving

Attempts to

difficulty

at

that the

two modes of division

state precisely the nature

of specifying what exactly a

are referred to for the

most part as

is

Form

a significant similarity,

are identical.^^

of Plato’s method oidiairesis meet with the

is.^^

In the Philebus, the kinds of pleasure

cidrj (19b2, 20a6, 20c4, 32c4, 33c5, 51e5),

sometimes

as yevT] (52e6) or popcpij (34dl), and sometimes are indicated simply
in reply to the
interrogative

noioq (“Of what

sort?”) [19b3, 42c8, 63c8]. Still, throughout the

discussion of the different kinds of pleasure, there

is

no hint

arbitrary, or that they refer to anything but the real nature

8i8ri

and y£vr| are terms

that

that the divisions could

be

of the thing being divided. For,

normally function in Plato to indicate natural kinds. Plato’s

term for a unit in division qua unit

is

natural kind, but an eiSoq or a yevoc;

to pcpoq, “part.”

is

A part may or may not be a

a natural kind. Referring to Statesman 263a-b,

Gail Fine observes: “Plato draws an important distinction between the parts and the

Mitchell Miller holds that the god-given method of the Philebus constitutes a
distinct

mode of diairesis,

different

new and

from the standard bifurcatory mode of the Sophist and

Statesman. Miller also thinks that the Eleatic Stranger’s final diairesis

in

Statesman (287bff.)

is

an application of the god-given method of the Philebus [Miller, 1990; pp. 341-359]. Both of
Miller’s positions are opposed

god-given method

is

Statesman', “(i)t

this

is

by De Chiara-Quenzer 1990, 1993. Kenneth Sayre thinks

that the

not simply the method of collection and division of the Sophist and

method coupled with an ontological

principle regarding the constitution of

things” [Sayre, 1983; p. 129]. Sayre adds that the divisions which result from application of the

god-given method must reflect the relative contributions of peras and apeiron to each of the
various kinds enumerated in the division (p. 130). But, this

means

the nature of those things as they really are; thus, Sayre’s position
that the

that the divisions
is

must

compatible with the view

god-given method carves reality “at the joints.”
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See Cohen 1973. This

is

a reply to Moravcsik 1973a. Moravcsik replies to

Moravcsik 1973b.
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reflect

Cohen

in

forms of a genus or

Every way of dividing a class succeeds

class.

parts; but not every part is a form.

reality according to forms.

1

980, p. 225].

Every form

believe the

I

Only those carvings

same

is

in dividing

into

that ‘cut reality at the joints’ cut

thus a part; but not every part

distinction holds in the Philebus.

are referred to as pepr| of the

is

a form” [Fine

The only place

Philebus where Socrates refers to the sub-kinds of a yevoq as
pepr]

where the various shapes (axTjpaxi)

it

is at

in

12e7-13al

yevoq Shape

(axfjpa). Socrates never refers to the kinds of pleasure and knowledge
as pepp, but
nearly always as 8i5r| or yevr|. This seems to

me to

indicate that he

is

dividing

them

54

according to their real kinds.

Jacob Klein holds that in the Philebus there are no
sense of this word” [Klein 1972,

does pleasure
“indefinite

make

p. 170].

in itself belong to the class

dyad”

(p. 170), i.e.,

of pleasures “in the

strict

Citing the text at 28a, Klein says that not only

of the apeiron, but the pair pleasure-pain

is

an

a pair of qualitative opposites on a scale. This would

pleasure-pain an instance of the

in Klein’s view, that there are

8i6r|

no

8i5ri

Philebus 28a merely indicates that

if

many of the

apeiron.

of pleasure in the

It is

in

consequence of this,

strict sense.

any pleasures are good,

it

But the

text at

cannot be because of their

54

The

fact that

he refers to the kinds of shape as pepri suggests,

it

seems

uncertain whether the various shapes are kinds of shape in exactly the same

kinds of oxen

fall

to

me,

way

that Plato

is

as different

under the kind Ox, or various kinds of men are sub-kinds of Humanity. The

point seems to be that determinates can be the most contrary to each other (xa evavxic5xaxa
dA,^fjA,oic;)

and

still

can only differ so

remain unified under their determinable term, whereas a putative kind of Ox

much from

belonging to the genus Ox.
distinction

The

It

the other species of Ox before

makes sense

it

ceases to be classifiable as

to ascribe to Plato here an understanding

between genus-species classifications and determinable-determinate

of the

specifications.

divisions of pleasure and of knowledge, however, are not simply determinable-determinate

specifications, even

though they share some of the features of determinable-determinate

relationships.
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indefinite character, and that

good

to pleasure.

On the

is

it

not therefore the apeiron that provides “some
part of the

other hand, thought, knowledge, and

mind (cppovTiaiv Kai

e7uaxf)pTiv Kai vouv, 28a4) are intrinsically of the nature of limit,
whereas, to be an
indefinite

dyad

is to

more and

subject to the

tried to

member of the many of the

the less,

by Socrates

clearly specified

have

be a

show

i.e.,

to

be

apeiron, and thus to be intrinsically

The many of the apeiron has been

indefinite.

terms of abstract qualitative opposites along a scale, as

in

in the previous chapter.

Any pair of indefinites

I

can come to an end

with the imposition of limit, and pleasures are sometimes capable of admitting
proper

But

limits.

for

any pleasure that

arises, there is already

apeiron involved. Thus Socrates claims
at the

same

yiyvecrSai

to

mean

time, in the

Kaxd

(puaiv, 31c2-3). Here, “at the

that pleasure

and knowledge, and

means

it

clearly

as they actually arise or

—

his discussion

that

“by nature pain and pleasure
A,U7it|

arise,

xc Kai fi6ovf)

same time” (dga) could hardly be taken

and pain constitute opposite ends of a scale of indefinites. The
is

—

on

mixed kind” (ev xm koivco yevei aga

remark occurs when Socrates

pain

later

some combination oiperas and

to the class

about to begin his examination of the forms of pleasure

come

that Socrates is assigning the

into being in us,

forms of pleasure and

and as he will enumerate them

in

of the meikton. All such forms are already combinations of

peras and apeiron, for everything that arises

in the

meikton

is

by nature a combination of

per as and apeiron.

Klein’s position,

that

I

on the view

think, is based

have proper limits or due measure

—

view

in the Philebus. If

my

can be

ci5t]

this apparently is the strict sense in

Klein says there can be sibrj of pleasure at

Socrates’

that there

all.

It is

only of things

which alone

not clear, however, that this

is

indeed

interpretation is correct, the various forms of
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pleasure that Socrates proceeds to discuss are not just
pepr] of pleasure; they are
objective articulations of the

many of pleasure, and

in that sense are ei6r|

Socrates often refers to them as such. Pleasure has
ci5ri because

enough

to

be identifiable and

intelligible as determinations

its

of pleasure, and

sub-kinds are definite

of pleasure. There

is

no

reason to restrict the use of ei6r| to apply only to forms of things that
have proper

and Socrates

Nor

I

is

limits,

think does not do so.

there

good reason

to restrict the use

of the term diairesis to refer to division

into the infima species that are the ultimate differentia in a genus-species
classification.

Trevaskis [1960] assumes that such divisions into infima species are the proper
ftmction

of Platonic
diairesis.

and because of this he denies

diairesis,

He points

to the absence

passage on the god-given method,

is at

work

in the division

god-given method involves

of the characteristic terminology of diairesis in the

i.e.,

such terms as

their cognates [Trevaskis, 1960; p. 40].

not what

that the

eibri, pepri,

However, Trevaskis

of pleasure into

biaipew, xepveiv, and

also claims that diairesis

false pleasures at 38aff.

terminology that Trevaskis claims to be characteristic of diairesis

is

On the basis

And yet the

applied in the

passages on the division of pleasures, as well as in passages where Socrates

the division of pleasure.

is

is

referring to

of terminology, one cannot therefore infer that the

55
I

have already cited Socrates’ use of the term

8i5ri to refer to the

forms of pleasure. At

20c4 Socrates speaks of ‘biaipsaiv eibwv f|5ovf)(;.’ In the discussion of malice (cpSovoc;) at
48bff, referring to the different ways in which we can fail to know ourselves and so out of this
ignorance to enjoy the false pleasures connected with malice, Socrates speaks of “cutting” into

xoOxo xpixf) xepveiv, 48d4), or “dividing” (6ie^ea9ai, 48d6), the ways in which
we can lack self-knowledge. Here he refers to the objects of the division as “forms of experience
three (auxo

in

our souls” (el5oc; x6

xwv ev xaiq

malice into two forms, and divides

v|/uxai<;,

(5feA,8,

48e8-9). Further on he divides (xepvo|Li8v, 48a9)

49b6) malicious persons
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into

two kinds. He concludes

division of pleasures

is

not an application of diair esis.

From

the absence of the

characteristic terminology of diairesis in
Philebus 16-17, Trevaskis draws the
reasonable

conclusion that in that passage Plato
classification in

further

and say

may involve

its

concerned, not with diairesis specifically,
but with

is

more general aspect

that Plato is there

[Trevaskis, 1960; p. 42].

I

think

we can go

concerned to discuss a more comprehensive
method that

diairesis into £i8r|, but is not necessarily
restricted to this.

that involves dividing an idea into

It is

a method

whether these parts be 8 i6ti or something

its parts,

Perhaps, then, the method of diairesis need not be seen in
terms of the theory of

Forms of the middle

some

dialogues, or with

particular interpretation of 8i8r| in mind.

Platonic division might be seen rather as a variety of types of analysis

depends on the type of term

to

which

finds himself with a type of term

per genus

Nor

is

whose

et differentiam, unlike the

being applied.

Thus, in the Philebus Plato

analysis cannot be carried out by classification

terms being analyzed in Sophist and Statesman.

the term Pleasure exactly like determinable terms such as Color or Shape.

purpose of the dialogue, moreover,
decide whether pleasure

that ignorance

surely,

it is

whose exact form

is

is

that,

come up with

not to

the good. For this,

of oneself “occurs

language

is

in three

it

The

a definition of Pleasure, but to

necessary to lay out the

many

kinds of

forms” (ev xpiai-v eibeoiv yiyvsadai, 49el). Here,

on Trevaskis’ view,

is

characteristic of diairesis, and

is

applied in

delineating one of the forms of (false) pleasure.
56
It is

just such a

method

that

Moravcsik thinks Plato

dialogues. See Moravcsik 1992, chapter 6.
57

As John

Ackrill argues. See Ackrill 1971, p. 390.
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is

concerned with here and

in other late

pleasure, and then to trace out the combinations of
each of these kinds with the good.
is

thus on the level of sub-forms,

It

of the many, that the connections of Pleasure both

i.e.,

with good and with evil are to be discerned.

And the

precise role oidiairesis

is

to
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articulate the sub-forms

In the Philebus,

of pleasure.

it

can be said that the aim of the division

Pleasure into two classes: those included in the good mixed
it, i.e.,

into

good pleasures and bad.

structure of the divisions, just as

life

is to

divide the

many of

and those excluded from

We can see how this aim does determine the

De Chiara-Quenzer

says

it

does. Thus, if we were to

simplify the diagrammatic sketch of the divisions presented in the previous chapter

might come up with the following

we

illustration:
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The god-given method of the Philebus is to be identified, however, not with diairesis
itself but with dialectic, which includes diairesis. Platonic dialectic thus comprises two distinct
movements: division (biaipeau;) and collection (auvaycoyf)). Davidson 1949, chapter

2,

includes ‘combination’ in Platonic dialectic. In the Philebus, combination refers to the

subsequent mixing together of all the elements that are included
these have been separated by diairesis. But division

is

Thus, at Philebus 17a Socrates contrasts dialectic with

dialectic.

in the

clearly the

proceed haphazardly or too quickly from the one to the

many

more

good mixed

after

life,

crucial element in

eristic in this

way; In

instances; in dialectic,

eristic,

we

we

take care

peaa, 17a3) between the one and the indefinite number of
The discernment of the many forms that fall under the one is thus the critical part of
With reference to the sound and letter examples, Socrates concludes: “But by neither

to discern the intermediates (tcc

instances.
dialectic.

of these are
but what

we

yet wise, either because

we know

makes us knowledgeable about

and what their nature

the unlimited of

letters is this, that

is” (17b6-9).
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it

or because

we know how many

we know

the one;

the sounds are

Pleasure

Good

Pleaauics

Evil Pleasures

Pleasures unmixed

Pleasures mixed with falsity

Pleasures niixeu

wim

Pleasures mixed with pain

propositional falsity

This illustration incorporates the cross-cutting of the forms of good
and
division of pleasures.

What

it

combines with good and with
determined the

evil.

mode of division

bad pleasures under
the many.

shows

itself,

and so

to

is

it is

on the

level

But the nature of the

of the tnany that pleasure

initial

one

to

be divided has also

be used. Pleasure qua unity unifies both good and

it is

The connections may be

that

evil into the

necessary to

show the connections on

illustrated in this

the level of

way:

Pi

This shows the precise points on the level of the

shows

that

it

is

many where

the cross-cuttings occur.

not on the level of the one that pleasure combines or else

with the good. For that to be the case, replenishment, which
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is

fails to

what pleasure

is

It

combine

qua

must be shown

unity,

to

be intrinsically good or

intrinsically evil.

does not think that replenishment in a living being

good

which

seems rather

it

means

to say that pleasure

the good, or that

is

it is

intrinsically

qua unity combines with good.

that for Socrates, replenishment is neither

being a process,

this is

what

is

is

But evidently Socrates

good nor

evil.

But replenishment,

capable of combining contrary things, some good and
some

what Socrates demonstrates

in the examination

It

evil,

and

of the forms of pleasure. Pleasure

cannot be the good because pleasure combines with evil on the level
of the many. This
fact

cannot be learned from the definition of pleasure as replenishment. But

replenishment

shovm, then,

is

a process, and a process

that at the level

is

inherently subject to combination.

must be

It

of the many where such combinations do take place,

pleasure actually does combine contrary forms under

such a

itself, in

way

that pleasure

turns out not to be the good.

Some

pleasures, accordingly, turn out to have the characteristics of good.

true pleasures are

being processes.

is

unperceived.

good
It

in spite

of their being replenishments and therefore

The

in spite

of

should be remembered, however, that in their case the underlying lack

A pleasure that does not involve the perception of a lack is thereby not

subject to anticipation, and hence not subject to falsity. But the existence of kinds of

pleasure that do not combine with falsity and evil does not

mean

that Pleasure in itself

can be good, only that some forms of pleasure can be mixed in with the good human

I

have suggested

is for

the sake

in

life.

Chapter One, however, that the coming-into-being of such pleasures

of nous or mind, and

that this is

what accounts

cannot see the good with a single look (pia idea, 65a 1); yet
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for their being good.

it

is

easy to see that

We

falsity is

contrary to the good, since

is to

it

is

the contrary of one of the

good-making

properties.

say, for Plato falsity itself is a kind of
evil or badness.^^ Thus, if the

Pleasure mingles with

falsity,

then Pleasure as one cannot be good. The

many of

many ways

which pleasure comes-to-be demonstrate how other pleasures
combine with
are not good, such as falsity.

The “division” of pleasures

which pleasure combines with aspects of both good and

in fact

forms that get unified under the Form Pleasure are shown

to

in

things that

shows the many ways

Thus the

evil.

That

in

resulting contrary

be contraries by showing

their connections with contrary forms.

When

Socrates enumerates and examines the

many of pleasure, he and

had of course already decided by a different argument
Nevertheless, the detailed discussion of the

the

good

shows

cuts across only

some of its

this in detail. In the

false pleasures,

and

argument against

I

parts.

to

demonstrate how,

pleasure cannot be the good. For,

is,

The enumeration of the many of pleasure

remainder of this chapter,

will argue that their

that pleasure is not the good.

many of pleasure aims

given the sort of unity-in-multiplicity that pleasure

Protarchus

I

will discuss the various types

of

enumeration constitutes an independent

(PI).

B. Pleasure and Desire
Pleasure, then,

forms

becomes incompatible with

that are contrary to good.

of intrinsic good as defined

Cf McLaughlin

1969;

in

the

good by admitting

into

its

We should recall that according to the Philebus^

(D2) of Chapter One, the good

p. 57.
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is

kinds

notion

a unity of the three

abstract properties of fineness, proportion, and

truth— so

formal properties in an object makes that object good.
intrinsically incapable

that the presence

Any

of any of these

process as such

not

is

of possessing the good-making properties. But for any
process

needs to be shown where the mingling takes place with elements that are
contrary

it

to the

formal properties of good.

For certain pleasures, the

possibility

of mingling

is

introduced by anticipation.

Anticipation plays a crucial role in desire. Thus the discussion of the
pleasures
desire.

is

The

first

type of false

preceded by a discussion of memory and recollection in their relation to
latter

in for the first

discussion sets up the notion of anticipatory pleasure, which

time before the discussion of memory, recollection, and desire,

is

at

brought
32b9-c2:

—

Soc. Well, then assume, in the soul

itself, the expectation of these experiences
the
sweet hope of pleasant things, and the bold, yet fearful and grievous expectation of

painful things.

The hope of pleasant

things (e?iTci(!^6p8vov fibu)

is itself

“sweef’ (fibecov),

i.e.,

pleasant.

Anticipatory pleasure consists in a pleasant expectation or a pleasant hope. The ensuing
discussion clarifies what
to the identification

it

means

for

an experience to be

in the soul itself,

and

this leads

of the soul as the seat of desire. According to Socrates, certain

experiences arise in the body and are extinguished

(KaiaaPcwupeva, 33d3)

in the

body

without ever getting through to the soul, leaving the soul unaffected. In other words, the
soul

is

I

oblivious of some of the body’s experiences; such experiences do not register in

propose the following interpretation of Socrates’ statement that the good

is

a unity of three

ideas: The statement claims nothing more than that the three good-making properties are akin to
each other. The presence of one good-making property in an object does not entail the presence
in it of either of the other two properties; but the presence of one good-making property in an
object is incompatible with the presence of the contraries of the other two good-making

properties in the

same

object.
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the soul at

Socrates proposes to call this condition of the soul anaisthesis,
absence of

all.

perception, rather than forgetting

On

the other hand, aisthesis or perception

“arises in a single experience jointly in the soul and the

body” (ev evi 7rd»£v

yuxiiv Kai TO ad)|ia Koivfj yiyvopevov, 34a3-4), also moves both

Kai KivciaOai, 34a4). Perception

together (KOivfj

motion

(kinesis) in the soul

as defined here

it

is

body

a simultaneous

and the body. Socrates then defines memory as the

preservation of perception (acoiripi'av aiaarjaecoq, 34a).

draw

soul and

xfiv

the following contrast:

By memory

One might

(pvfjiiTi), the soul calls

expect Socrates to

up past experiences

that

has had jointly with the body; by recollection (dvd|iVT|aiq), the soul calls up

experiences that

“whenever the

it

has had by

itself alone.

Instead, Socrates describes dvd|ivr|ai(^ as

soul... without the body, recalls

common with the body” (oxav a pcxd xoO

by

itself...

acopaxoc;

...r\

what

it

has experienced in

v|/uxi •••'cotux’

dveu xoO

ac5)iaxoq ai)xf) ev eauxfj... xoxe dvapijivfjcTKeaOai, 34b6-8). In memory, the soul and
the

body jointly

experience

originally

is

recall the

remembered experience.

In recollection, the

remembered

recalled without the involvement of the body, even if the experience

had by soul and body together. The difference, then,

recalling, jointly

is that

by the soul and the body, of a previous experience;

contrast, is an act

memory

was

involves a

recollection, in

of the soul alone. Recollections are remembrances whose original

connections with the body have been severed, and thenceforth are experienced as being

purely of the soul. This contrast

does not

in fact

is

clearly drawn, but in the ensuing discussion Socrates

use the distinction he has drawn between the two terms.

instead to use the

word

fivijpri to refer to all acts
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of remembering by the

He proceeds
soul.

Socrates brings up the example of a
time, and has no

memory of the

having (35a). In his
that will

own mind,

end his emptied

state;

man who

filling that is

this

experiences a kenosis for the

first

involved in the particular experience he

man would “lay hold of’

(ccpdrixoiT’

av) the

is

filling

but he cannot do so, Socrates says, either by perception
or

by memory (ek’ aiaOfjCTsi sue

lavTipp), since he has never

had the requisite experience

of replenishment (35a6-10). But, nor can he do so by anamnesis, as Socrates
has defined
this term, since

that

anamnesis consists

one has had

in the past.

Now, however,

remains that can lay hold of filling
for

by what

else can

type of kenosis,

the

it

hold of (35bl 1-cl)?” If Socrates

man

has no

from hunger, then
is either:

fillings in general.

It

seems

memory of any

memory. And yet Socrates seems

To

this

seems

past fillings at

is

the only thing that

memory

likely,

(xf)

pvT^pp);

referring to a particular

possible that in this instance,

filling

of a lack;

however, that the example

filling

—and

this

all.

at all,

premise of the example, namely,

Such a man would be incapable of

of a past experience by perception or by

to be claiming that such a

man

could mentally lay hold

by memory.

apparent difficulty J.M. Lee proposes the following solution. At 35ac6-

10, Plato

wants to draw the reader’s attention

of desire

at

the

“Then

memory of a similar

to contradict the

desire, since desire necessitates laying hold

of the requisite

(a)

it is

way, an experience

where a man has never had any kind of experience of kenosis

that case the conclusion

that the

Soerates declares;

the soul, and this clearly by

Socrates speaks

memory of past

refers to a situation

and in

laid

is

e.g., thirst as distinct

memory of which

or (b)

be

in recalling, in a purely mental

first

to

two separate

theses: (a) the impossibility

experience of kenosis', and (b) the necessity, in desire, of mentally
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laying hold of replenishment by either perception
or

already

From

showm

(a)

memory

from 34e9-35a5, Socrates proceeds

[Lee, 1966; p. 33],

to argue for (b)

Having

from 35bl-10.^'

hereon, however, Socrates uses the word pvfjpri to refer
to acts of remembering by

the soul, whether these involve

memory

or recollection as he had just defined these terms.

At the conclusion of the brief passage on memory and

recollection, Socrates remarks that

the reason he goes into

all

soul has apart from the

body most excellently and most palpably”

Socrates

is

fulfillment

one’s mind

interested in

whenever

is,

it

these distinctions

the act by

is

is

is,

“that

we might

grasp the pleasure that the

(34c). Thus,

what

which the mind lays hold of the experience of

experiencing a lack. Such laying hold of an experience in

in Plato’s sense,

an aiaSriaic;, a perception.

Both

iivtjpr|

and
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Thus the argument goes:
1

34e9- 1 5e5: Thirst

.

of what one

is

35a6- 1 0: But one

2.

a desire to be filled; therefore desire

is

is

always for the contrary

experiencing.

who

experiences being empty for the

lay hold of the experience

of being

first

time could not mentally

since he neither has the perception of being

filled,

3.

moment, nor has he any memory of having been filled in the past.
35bl-10: In desire, what lays hold of the filling is the soul, not the body.

4.

35bl 1-cl

filled at the

only by

The argument
first

time,

it

is

:

Therefore

memory that

if the soul
it

has no present perception of what

consistent with holding that

when

memory. The

it

when

soul perceives the

memory of replenishment
is

part of the

is

no perception of the object

that will

fill

it

its

is

has had an experience of thirst

desire either

as something present to itself This

lacks,

and

if that

Socrates

object

is

is

claiming,

not present,

the lack, then the soul does so by

But, Socrates need only be claiming here that once the

perceives the objects of

it

movement of desire.

then, that in desire the soul lays hold of the object that
there

it

mentally lays hold of the experience of replenishment based on

laying hold of an experience by the soul

i.e., if

lacks, then

the soul experiences, say, thirst for the very

experiences no desire; but, subsequently,

followed by replenishment,

it

lays hold of the requisite filling.

mechanism of desire

is

memory.

set going, the soul

by having the object actually presented

to

it,

or else by

memory.
62

Rather than a sensation
Plato

is

or,

more broadly, sense-perception. The term aiaOriaiq

as used

often translated “sensation” but, as Michael Frede has shown, for Plato the verb
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by

ocvd^vriaK; are therefore aiaOrjoeic;.

A preserved perception, when called up and laid

hold of once more in the mind, becomes again a presently perceived
experience. Such
aistheseis play an important role in desire, and are perceptions
of the soul

The discussion of memory and

recollection sets

up the claim

that there are

pleasures which are “of the soul itself’ (6 xf\q vi/uxfiq auxfic;, 33b5-6).
Socrates’ claim that desire (eTuOupi'a)

man who

is

itself.

It

also justifies

not of the body but of the soul (35c-d). Thus, a

has never had any experience of kenosis followed by replenishment would not

be capable

at all

of laying hold

constitutes pleasure.

in his

mind of the experience of fulfillment

Such a man would be incapable of desire. Desire

is

that

a complex

condition of the soul that involves perception, memories or recollections, and
anticipation. Briefly, the

an emptying,

filled,

it

mechanism of desire

remembers or

which then gives

is

as follows:

recalls a past experience in

rise to the anticipation

of a

filling

When the

which

that

soul experiences

empty

up of the lack

state

had been

in the future.

This hope for replenishment constitutes desire, and the anticipation of the fulfillment
pleasure (35a-b). That

is

to say, the anticipation

pleasant experience. Anticipation

is

therefore a

of a pleasant experience

component of desire:

is itself

is

a

a

desire involves the

anticipation of a future pleasurable experience.

aisthanesthai

This
is

may

meant

means

to be

aware of something

—howsoever

this

awareness

may come

involve sensing, noticing, realizing, or understanding something; but

is

a grasping, a taking hold of

often does duty

in translating

the Protagorean

view

that

some

many of these

knowledge

is

narrower meaning of sense-perception,

object,

by the mind. “Perception”

in
is

about.

every case what
the

word

that

uses of the term ^^aisthesis” in Plato. In dealing with

sensation in Theaetetus, Plato uses aia&rioic; with the
but, as

Frede argues,

this is

because Plato

contrasting sense-perception with knowledge. See Michael Frede 1987.
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is

there

Desire also involves the experience of pain, since
pain

is

involved in the

experience of lack. Socrates proceeds to give an example of
anticipatory pleasure. The

example also

raises the contrast

between remembered experience and present experience.

A thirsty man who remembers past occasions on which he has replenished his thirst
experiences a double pain (to biTiXoCv Tfjq
present painful

thirst,

the second

desire. In thirst, the experiences

Soc.

How,

one of us

emptied, he

on the other hand
Prot.

Yes

is

at other

36a7), the

first

on account of the soul’s longing

on account of his

for the object of its

of pleasure and of pain are somehow mingled:

Protarchus, do you

is

^^UTiriq,

mean twofold pain?

sometimes
times he

is

Is

it

not the case that

when

manifest hope of being replenished, and
hopeless of being so?
in

indeed.

Soc. Don’t you think, then, that in longing for replenishment he feels pleasure by his
remembering, but at the same time, being empty he feels pain at these moments?
Prot. Necessarily (36a-b).

Socrates says that the pleasure in this case involves the

which the man’s

thirst

has been

filled;

but then, this

accompanied by some hope of replenishment

complex

state

memory of a past

memory

is

occasion on

pleasant only if it

is

in the future. Thus, for Plato, desire

is

a

of soul that involves the present perception of many elements. Pleasure

an element in desire; there

is

is

the pleasure involved in recalling past occasions of

replenishment, and there are the pleasures involved in anticipations and hopes for future

replenishment.

As

it

will turn out,

moreover, anticipations and memories themselves

involve yet other acts of the soul.
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C. Falsity and the Objects of Pleasure
Plato

now makes an explicit transition from the previous

discussion to the topic of

false pleasures:

Soc. Let us

now use

this

examination of these experiences (xwv TiaaripdKov)

in this

way.

How?

Prot.

Soc. Shall

Or

What

we

rather that

say that these pains and pleasures are true or false (d^rj&eiq

some of them

v|/Eo5sic;)?

Socrates says here clearly proceeds from the previous discussion, where
desire has

been depicted as a complex

state

pleasures or pains can be false,

is

f\

are true, others not? (36c3-7)

that fears, anticipations,

elements

and

of the

it is

soul.

When Protarchus

natural for Socrates to reply

beliefs can be true or false

—

by asking how

objects

by asking

these, after

all,

in turn,

how it

are similarly

in desire.

Protarchus, however, will concede only that beliefs can be true or false, but not
that pleasures

and pains can be

and pains can be

true,

false.

Protarchus does not object to saying that pleasures

only that they can be

this is to say that for Protarchus, the truth

false.

Now an obvious way of interpreting

of a pleasure that involves belief or anticipation

just consists in the occurrence of the pleasure. There

indeed

how

neither in frenzy nor in derangement of mind,

enjoying, but

it

evidence to indicate that this

Socrates understands the point that Protarchus

Socrates remarks: “Neither in a dream, then, nor

Here,

is

is

not enjoying at

seems to me, Socrates

all,

is

is

is

making, since presently

when awake,

there

as

you

assert

(wq

(ppc;),

anyone who ever yet thinks he

nor again thinks he

is in

pain, but

is

is

not” (36e5-8).

ascribing to Protarchus the claim that no one can be
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is

mistaken about the fact that he

is

enjoying or that he

is in

pain. If this

is

a correct

interpretation of Protarchus’ position, then the correlative
notion of falsity that Protarchus

invokes

is

simply non-occurrence. Thus, Protarchus objects to calling
any pleasures false

because to

call

them

false is

merely to say that they have failed to occur, and since

anticipatory pleasures are occurrent pleasures, there

termed

false,

false.

If

such pleasures are connected with a

is

no sense

in

belief, then

which these could be

it is

the belief that

not the pleasure.

In response, Socrates introduces the doxazein-hedesthai analogy.

says, is something (eaxiv ii, 37a2-3),

that

which

pleasure

whether

“that

is

is

it

believed

is

taken (to f|86p£vov)

in

To

believe, he

to take pleasure is also something; moreover,

also something.

ectti ti, 37a7),

And

so: “that

and that

which

in

which

believes,

believes rightly or not, never ceases to be really believing” (37al 1-12), and

which pleasure

Socrates

it is

pleased rightly or not. .never ceases to be really
.

Here, the analogy

is

is

drawn between

that

which

is

believed

taken as both being objects of their corresponding states of

now asks: How

their share in being (5’ ovTcoq

false,

is

which takes pleasure, whether

and that

and

something (to 6o^a(;6pcv6v

taking pleasure” (37b2-3).

soul.

is

is it that,

while both beliefs and pleasures equally have

dpcpdiepa opoicoq, 37b7), only

while pleasures can only be true?

One

possible reply

beliefs can be true or

is that

beliefs are the sort of

thing that can have qualities, while pleasures and pains “are only what they are, they do

not

become

a certain kind”

(povov

amp taxi, tcoic5 live 8e oi) yiyvEaOov, 37c5-6).

Socrates rejects this reply, pointing out that pleasures and pains too can have qualities

like intensity

and magnitude (peyaA,ai xe Kai apiKpai Kai c(p65pa eKdxepai
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And

yiyvovTai, 37c9-10).

if

pleasures can have, for instance, the quality of badness

(Tiovripia), then so can beliefs (37d2-4).

And

“(W)hat

so, finally:

if rightness or the

opposite of rightness (opSoiriq
^ xouvavxiov 6p06xr|xi, 37d6) attaches to any of them?
Shall

we

not say that the belief is

right, if

it

has rightness, and this too of pleasure?”

(37d6-7). This connects pleasure and belief in a

way

not previously recognized; and, as he concludes,

“it

that,

Socrates thinks, Protarchus had

seems

that pleasure often arises for us

not with a right belief (bo^rjq opOriq), but with a false belief’ (bo^riq vj/EuboCq) [37el011].

But

to this Protarchus

once more

replies that, in that case, the belief is false, but the

pleasure itself no one would call false (37el2-38a2). That
that rightness or

At

wrongness are

this point, the

that there is

qualities

argument

is

But so

far,

back where

it

started: Protarchus is

their non-occurrence, in

is

first,

that

which pleasures can be

something by virtue of which the taking

pleasure (hedesthai) and the believing (doxasthai) take place

analogies:

unconvinced

Socrates has merely pointed to a formal analogy between

taking pleasure and believing: in both, there

and x6 bo^a^opevov.

he rejects Socrates’ claim

of pleasures as they are qualities of beliefs.

any sense, other perhaps than

said to be false.

is,

—

respectively, x6 f|56p8vov

Now Socrates extends the argument by invoking two further

of a scribe (ypappaxeuq) within us

our souls, and second, a painter (^coypdcpoq)

our souls. The point of the

new

analogies

is

who

who

writes speeches (A,6yoi) in

paints pictures or images (eIkovec;) in

that our experiences (Tiadfjpaxa) write

speeches and paint images of themselves in our souls. In the case of the scribe, the

mechanism

is

as follows:

“When memory

experiences connected with them seem to

coincides with perceptions, these and the

me then to come close to
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writing speeches in

our souls, and whenever these experiences write true things, what
happens from
true belief and true speech arise in us; and

false, the result is the contrary

whenever

this scribe within us writes

it is

that

what

of these things” (39a3-7). Thus, our experiences inscribe

propositional contents (A,6yoi) in our souls, and the consequent writings in our
souls,
the

memories and

is

recollections, are true or false

i.e.,

depending on whether or not they

coincide with the perceptions that gave rise to them. Similarly, the zographos paints
pictures of our experiences in our souls, and the pictures are true whenever they are
pictures of true beliefs, false

whenever they

are pictures of false beliefs (39c4-5).

Socrates goes on to claim that these writings and pictures are not only about the past and
the present, but about the future as well, and that

pleasures and pains concerning the future

it

is in this

come about

way

that anticipatory

in us (39dl-5). Thus, Socrates

assimilates false pleasures of anticipation in general to pleasures connected with false

beliefs.

In particular, anticipatory pleasures arise in the form of hopes {iXnibsq);

we

are,

Socrates observes, “through our entire lives, always filled with hopes” (39e4-6).

Thus, anticipations and hopes can be inscribed or painted in our souls, and they
are perceived

by the soul

as writings or images.

perceptions of the soul that play a role in desire.

These writings and images become

The

scribe

and the painter analogies are

thus intended as accounts of how beliefs that play a role in desire are represented in the

soul.

The

train

of thought thus

far

may

be summarized in

this

way:

(i)

There are writings of beliefs in the soul (38b-e).

(ii)

Writings of true beliefs are true (39a).

(iii)

Writings of false beliefs are false (39a).

(iv)

There are pictures of beliefs

in the soul (39b-c).
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(v)

Pictures of true beliefs are true pictures (39c).

(vi)

Pictures of false beliefs are false pictures (39c).

(vii)

Pictures of true writings are true pictures [from

(viii)

Pictures of false writings are false pictures [from

(ix)

Pleasures often arise with false beliefs (37e).

(x)

Whenever these writings and pictures are false,
with them are false (40d-e).

(xi)

There

(xii)

We experience pleasures concerning the future (39d).

(xiii)

Pleasures concerning the future often arise with false beliefs (39d-e).

(xiv)

Pleasures concerning the future are connected with the writings and the

are, in the soul, writings

(ii)

and

(v)].

and

(iii)

(vi)].

the pleasures connected

and pictures about the future (39d).

pictures in the soul (39e-40a).

(xv)

Whenever these writings and pictures are false, the anticipatory
pleasures connected with them are false (40d-e).

Socrates extends this to apply to other mental states.

(6

auToq

Xoyoc;, 40e2) holds concerning fear

eaxi Kai

He

says that “the same account”

and anger, “that such things are also

ndvxa xd xoiauxa evioxe;

sometimes false”

(d)c;

pleasures, that

are similar to other pathemata that play a role in desire.

before

this, at

is,

vj/Eubf]

40e3-4).

It is

Some
shortly

40c8, that Protarchus fully indicates his agreement with Socrates’ view; he

accepts the claim not only that anticipatory pleasures can be false, but that in general

those pleasures are false that are accompanied by false beliefs, whether these beliefs be

about the past or the present.

It

has been a matter of some controversy

here to Socrates’ point of view.

It

would seem
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how to

interpret Protarchus’ conversion

that Protarchus’ conversion

was

straightforwardly a matter of his coming to see that certain pleasures,
like beliefs, are

may be

representational states that

false as well as true. This, indeed, is the position

most commentators; but among those who accept

this

view there

of

are significant

differences of interpretation on the details of Socrates’ position.

Some commentators
summary,

assign a crucial role to the zographos analogy. In our

the statement just before the second concluding statement (xv)

was

the

following:
(xiv)

Pleasures concerning the future are connected with the writings and the
pictures in the soul (39e-40a).

In fact, in this brief passage, Socrates had introduced “a further question to answer”

(cipripevoK; Kai t65s ocTiOKpivai, 39e8):
Soc. Is not a just, pious, and

Prot.

Soc.

good man always dear

to the

gods?

Of course.
And what

about

this:

an unjust and absolutely evil

—

man

is

he not the contrary of

that?

Prot. Yes.

Soc.

And

are there not speeches in each of us,

which we name ‘hopes’?

Prot. Yes.

Soc.

And moreover

painted images (xd

sees gold in abundance

coming

(pavidapaxa E^ojypacpTipEva); and one

to be for oneself and the

and one also sees oneself in the painting

many

often

pleasures arising from

it;

(EV£(!^(jOYpacpr||ievov) enjoying oneself in

earnest (39el0-40al2).

Referring to the example given in this passage, Socrates concludes a bit later on: “Then
for the

bad too pleasures are no

false” (Oi)Kouv

v|/

8 u 681 (; 8e

less present, painted in their souls; but these, surely, are

xai xoiq KaKoiq f|6ovai ye oi)8ev f|TTOV Ttdpeiaiv

auxai

tiou, 40b6-7).

Here ‘abxai’ could

110

Ei^^rnypatpruievai,

refer to either ‘8d^coypa(pr|jj,evai

or ‘f|5ovai’.

Two

lines later,

however, Socrates concludes; “The bad, for the most

delight in false pleasures [n/cv)5eaiv fidovaiq xo^^po'^criv],

Thus

‘vi/CDdeaiv’

Protarchus

first

is

good men

straightforwardly applied to ‘tidovaiq.’ (40b6-7).

indicates concurrence with Socrates’ view, replying,

part,

in true ones.”

here that

It is

“What

else?”

(Ti pTiv;-40b8).

1.

The Gosling-Kenny Account
Anthony Kenny (1960) claims

that in this passage, the transition is

false pictures ofpleasure to false pictured pleasures, in such a
as identical.

Kenny

way

made from

that the

two

are seen

thinks that ‘v}/8D68iq’ at 40b7 links with ‘8<;(0Ypa(pr|p8'vai’ rather

than with ‘libovai’ [1960; p. 52].

When, two

‘ij/aubeaiv’ with ‘fiSovaiq’, the transition

pleasures are pictures.

is

lines later, Socrates explicitly links

made. Thus, on

The concluding statement

in our

this

view, anticipatory

summary might then be

rewritten

as follows:

Whenever these pictures are false, the pleasures of anticipation connected
with them are false pictures of pleasure; hence the pleasures are false pleasures.
(xv')

Kenny

realizes,

however, that an additional premise

is

required here, namely, the premise

that pleasure taken in false pictures is false pleasure [1960; p. 52]. Thus,

on Kenny’s

view, (xv') ought to be further rewritten as follows:

Whenever these pictures are false, the pleasures of anticipation connected
with them are false pictures of pleasure; but pleasure taken in false pictures is
(xv")

false pleasure,

hence the pleasures are

Now Kenny’s position assumes that Plato

false pleasures.

assigns a special role to pictures in his

argument. Not just any belief can be connected with pleasures of anticipation.
picture of some future event in one’s

mind

is

To have

a special case of believing that something
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a

will

be so, and

that

makes

in certain cases to

have such a picture

is to

anticipate an event in a

the anticipation itself a pleasurable thing. Hence, while

propositional sense, that

some

picture that event in our

minds

enjoy the event before

has occurred. This seems to

emphasizing the role

it

we may

way

believe, in a

future event will give us pleasure, in certain cases to

is

not merely to believe that

me to

it

will occur;

it

is

also to

be the point behind

that pictures play in anticipating pleasures.

J.C.B. Gosling agrees with

Kenny

that pictures play a special role in anticipatory

pleasure. In an article published before Kenny’s 1960 article, and to which Kenny’s
article

was

a response. Gosling (1959) had proposed the following account of Protarchus’

conversion: At 39c4-5

in

it

is

our argument summary];

e^coypacpriiaevai)

wicked man’s

is

said that pictures (of beliefs) can be true or false [(v) and (vi)

at

40b6-7 the expression “ painted pleasures” ( 1)60 vai

so used that if the i^caypacpfjjiaTa,

i.e.,

the painted images in the

soul, are false, then so are the painted pleasures.

indicates his assent: “Ti pTjv;” (40c3). In the remark that

(“Then for the bad too pleasures are no

To

this Protarchus

prompted Protarchus’ assent

less present, painted in their souls, but these

surely are false”). Gosling thinks that ‘v|/eu5si(;’

is

already meant to apply to either

‘(l^coypacpfjfiaTa’ or ‘fidovai.’

Socrates’ rejoinder to Protarchus’ assent to his earlier

remark [“The bad, for the most

part, delight in false

Xaipouaiv)”] shows

that ‘v|/Eo6Eiq’ in the earlier

to the painted pleasures in the

Socrates’ argument, had

false picture that

come

wicked man’s

soul.

pleasures (v|/Eu8eaiv fi6ovaiq

remark was already being used

Thus Protarchus, as a

to identify the false pleasure in the

of

man’s soul with the

he has of himself enjoying the event he had anticipated.
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result

to refer

Gosling and Kenny agree on

this point: that the

connection

is

established between

the pictures and the pleasures only if Protarchus conflates false pictures
ofpleasure with

false pictured pleasures. But Gosling says that

Protarchus

able to do this, since

is

it’s

Kenny never justifies

in false pictures is false pleasure. Gosling thinks

pleasure

is identified

effected

when

1960;

merely to say that the

with the picture. Rather, Gosling thinks that the conflation

is

Socrates identifies pictures of pleasure with picturing^ of pleasure [Gosling

with false anticipatory
(vi) Pictures

may be

how

the premise that pleasure taken

insufficient

it

This step allows Socrates to ascribe

p. 44].

unclear on Kenny’s account

beliefs.

That

is to

of false beliefs are

falsity to pleasures that are

say, in our

connected

summary,

false

replaced with

(vi')

Picturings of false beliefs are false

and
(viii)

may

Pictures of false writings are false

be taken as equivalent to
63
(viii')

Picturings of false writings are false.

Accordingly, in Gosling’s terms the concluding statement of our summary

is to

be

rewritten as follows:

Whenever these pictures are false, the pleasures of anticipation connected
with them are false picturings of pleasure; but false picturings of pleasure are false
(xv'")

pleasure, hence the pleasures are false pleasures.

The

anticipatory pleasure

anticipated pleasures.
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is

And

thus identified with the pleasurable activity of picturing the

so, as

Gosling had concluded in his

first article:

“(I)t

would

Understanding the pictures and the picturings here, of course, to refer those ones that play a

role in anticipatory pleasure.
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seem
to

that Plato

is

taking

myself and enjoying

that there is

it

no difference between picturing a future pleasure

that pleasure in anticipation; thus in these cases
the pleasure

and

the picture are run together, and the picture of a pleasure and
the pleasure of a picture

taken to be the same” [ 1959

64
,

p.

52 ].

Thus, pleasures of anticipation are a way of enjoying some future event
in

advance of its occurrence. There are

at least

two

object of an anticipation: (a) an event e which

producing an episode of pleasure; or
as a

consequence of e.

distinct events,

expected to be causally responsible for

is

(b) the pleasurable episode itself which

Thus we can distinguish

anticipation of the event

and the indirect object

is e,

is

is

which

it

from the anticipated pleasure p**

expected to follow the occurrence of e. There are then two distinct events that

p* can be about, so that p* can either be:
e

from

the anticipated pleasure. Let us

designate the anticipatory pleasure p*, to distinguish

which

comes about

We might say that the direct

anticipation of the pleasure that the event brings about.

object of anticipation

however, that can be the

is

(a)

a taking pleasure in

expected to bring about another pleasure p**;

or, (b)

some prospective event

a taking pleasure in the
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prospect of p**.

Failure of occurrence, then, could refer to either of two

main

conditions:
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See also Gosling 1960,
future pleasure to oneself

makes
is

it

is

p. 44.

In these

sufficient for

works

it

sounds as

if

Gosling thinks picturing a

having anticipatory pleasure. But

in

(1975), Gosling

clear that he does not think this to be so. Moreover, Gosling thinks that Plato’s account

restricted to anticipations

where someone “gloats” over the prospect of a future pleasure. Such

gloatings constitute a sub-set of pleasures of anticipation [Gosling, 1975; p. 218], In Gosling’s

men

of future pleasures, regardless
of the objective likelihood of e and regardless of the likelihood that p** will really turn out to be

view,

it

is

characteristic of wicked

to gloat over the prospect

pleasurable for them.

Perhaps

in

many

cases, pleasure in the prospect of e cannot really be distinguished from

pleasure in the prospect of p**; nevertheless the two pleasures are logically distinct.
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(Cl): e

occur;

fails to

(C2): e occurs, but p** fails to occur.

The second

condition can also hold in different ways. That

(C2.1): e occurs but p** does not occur at
(C2.2): e occurs, and p** occurs, but p**

is,

(C2) further divides

into:

all;

is

not as anticipated,

i.e., is

of a

different quality, intensity, etc.

The general condition

for the occurrence of anticipatory pleasure

may

then be stated in

the following way:

(AP): For someone S, S has p*

time

at

t,

=

def.

For some event e and for some

[(S believes/pictures e occurring at

tj:

himself having p**

at t2 as

t2 )

later

& (S believes/pictures

a consequence of e)].

(AP) locates anticipatory pleasure as p*, and the anticipated pleasure as p**. In order
specify falsity, however,
separately.

Hence

let

we need to

designate the two different logoi, beliefs or pictures,

the beliefs (doxai) be designated as follows:

<S’s belief that e will occur

5

at t2>

<S’s belief that he will have p**

Then we have

to

at t2 as

a consequence of e>

=

6*.

the following definitions of false anticipatory pleasure:

(Dl): S’s p* at

t,

is false

=

def.

(D2): S’s p* at

t,

is

false

=

def. 5* is false

But, in the example of the wicked

abundance of gold,

it is

man

5

is

false

anticipating

coming

into possession of an

not a propositional belief that causes the

man to have

pleasure of anticipation but rather a picture or an image {phantasma) in his

a false

own mind of

himself in enjoyment as a consequence of coming into possession of the abundance of
gold. Thus, let

<the picture in S’s mind of e occurring

at t2>

=

<the picture in S’s mind of S enjoying himself at
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(p

t2

as a consequence of e>

=

(p*.

Then we have

the following further definitions of false anticipatory
pleasure:

(D3): S’s p* at

tj

is false

= def

(D4): S’s p* at

t,

is false

=

cp is

false

def. cp* is false.

Neither (Dl) nor (D2) provides the definition of a false anticipatory pleasure
that applies
to the

wicked man example, since

in that

example what

mind. Nor can the relevant definition be (D3), because

is false is

it is

a picture in the man’s

clearly specified that e does

occur. Hence, only (D4) remains.

How is (D4) possible? An obvious way would be if (p*
that

is,

p* =

Kenny and

(p*,

so that if p*

is false,

then

cp* is false.

were

identical with p*,

This, in essence,

is

the solution of

Gosling. They share the view that Protarchus comes to accept Socrates’

argument by being made

to see that anticipatory pleasures

can be identified with a

representational state, be this a picture or the process of picturing. According to Kenny,

however, on Plato’s view the wicked man’s anticipatory pleasure

because

—

is false

The wicked man’s pleasure

the anticipated event fails to occur.

because he thinks he will enjoy having the gold in abundance, when in

Kenny then

selfish

man

anticipation

wrong

is

is false

he will not.

he might anticipate

would be a

in anticipating

win £70,000 from a football pool; and being a
spending the entire sum on beer. His pleasure in this

false pleasure, according to Plato, not because he

how

he will spend

it;

but because he

is

mistaken

in

is

necessarily

thinking that he

worth of beer [Kenny, 1960; pp. 51-52].

belief that he will be in enjoyment as a consequence of the anticipated event

In contrast, Gosling’s account allows for p* being false because

(D3)

or

that he will

will enjoy drinking seventy thousand pounds’

that

fact

—

when

presents the following analogous example:

Thus a man might foresee

The man’s

not

a possible definition of false anticipatory pleasure.
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(p

is

turns out to be false, so

a false belief, because the picture of himself that he
had in his soul having the pleasure he
anticipated proves to be false.

Now Kenny thinks the wicked man gets this picture wrong “because he is an evil
man, and the root of all
oneself.

the

man

Which
is

—

includes not

—

as Socrates explains later on, at 48c5-10

knowing what one

determining the

falsity

is

is

not relevant to

of the man’s anticipatory pleasures. In Socrates’ example

this is likewise the case, although

it

is

man

alone, or whether Plato

hold for anticipatory pleasures in general. Kenny, however,

treats the

example as the paradigm case of anticipatory pleasure. Thus,
proper definition of false anticipatory pleasure.

for

67

the

of anticipation: wicked
with

this,

is

it

this to

wicked man
is

not a

men, while

true

.

this

exchange Socrates concludes:

in false pleasure,

good men

in true

ones”

established between badness of character and false pleasures

men tend

to

have false pleasures of anticipation.

however, to say that a wicked

consistent with

is

Now the exchange at 39e-40b establishes

Right after

most part (xa noXXd), delight

(40c 1-2). Hence the link

means

Kenny, (D3)

the claim that false pleasures of anticipation are characteristic of bad

pleasures are characteristic of good men.

39e-

at

not clear whether the exclusion of (Cl)

intended to specify the example of the wicked

“The hdd,for

not knowing

a wicked man. In Kenny’s example,

stipulated as occurring, and thus (Cl)

is

is

will really enjoy” [1960, p. 52]. Thus,

subject to such false belief because he

the event anticipated

40b

evil

to say that a

man

good man can

can correctly predict (Cl).

fail to

It is

It is

consistent

also

predict (Cl), and thereby experience
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Although

it

is

unclear from the text whether “true” here refers to true anticipatory pleasures

alone, or should be taken to apply to true pleasures in general.
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false anticipatory

pleasure—but only by mistake.

anticipatory pleasure

is false

On the

other hand, the wicked

because the picture that he has in his

enjoying his future possession of an abundance of gold— is
false, surely,

fails to predict

know what will

won’t be quite clear

really give

why

wickedness of the

in anticipating or

feel

man

more

to the fact that the

because he

it

him

is

unable

pleasure. Unless

in the

man who

example

the anticipated possession or not.

contrary,

is

is

their calculations.

man

to,

and he

we suppose

is

unable because he

this,

And

I

think,

it

man who

is

clearly, the

Wicked men, however,

at predicting (Cl),

delight

in fact occur,

on the

and could take care not to

that they can rule out (Cl) in

are unable as a rule to predict condition (C2.1)

in their character not to be able to

man

men merely

can hardly be that wicked

It

hoping for pleasure-producing events that do not

Just as the wickedness of the

fails to predict

independent of whether he will actually come

wicked men could be quite adept

it is

turns out to be

wicked man

the contrary of this.

any pleasures of anticipation unless they are certain

because

it

Socrates draws a contrast here between the good

“dear to the gods” and the wicked

upon

and

false anticipatory pleasure.

think, however, that there is

condition (C2.1); he

doesn’t

soul—of himself

because he has failed to predict (C2.1), not (Cl). Thus, for the wicked

example only (D4) defines

I

false,

man’s

do

so.

in Socrates’

example

is

independent of whether

he will actually come upon the hoard of gold that he anticipates, goodness of character
does not seem to be linked to the

ability to accurately predict the occurrence

producing events. Instead, Socrates’ view seems to
has to do with knowing oneself, which, as

me to

Kenny pointed
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of pleasure-

be that goodness of character

out, includes

knowing what one

68

will find pleasant.

pleasant, and that

Furthermore, the good
is

how

man

finds pleasant that

which

to the evil

experience false pleasures of any

man whose

truly

he knows that he will enjoy what he anticipates.
The good

has, not merely true anticipatory pleasures, but true
pleasures generally.

man happens to

is

sort,

it is

man

When the good

only by mistake—in contrast

tendency to experience false anticipatory pleasures reflects
his lack

of self-understanding.

But,

And,

is

the

is

the wicked

first

69

anticipatory pleasures.

that the first type

Now this

seems

means, however, that he was thereby

to focus

I

Kenny

is restricted to false

me mistaken. By

introducing the example of

on anticipatory

restricting the first type

anticipatory ones; he could instead, as

first

of false pleasures

to

wicked man, Socrates evidently meant

sub-type of the

case of false anticipatory pleasure?

type of false pleasure identical with false anticipatory pleasure?

and Gosling both believe

the

man example the paradigm

pleasures. This hardly

of false pleasures to

think, be listing false anticipatory pleasures as a

category of false pleasures. Socrates concludes the passage at

39e-40b with the remark that “for the bad too painted pleasures are no

less present;

but

these, surely, are false” (40c 1-2), thereby explicitly linking badness of character with
false pleasures

of anticipation. But neither here nor elsewhere does Socrates give any

importance to the distinction between false writings of beliefs and false pictures of

And, as Socrates himself points out

at 48c.

69

Gosling 1959, pp. 44ff; Kenny 1960, pp. 50-51. Gosling reaffirms his view in Gosling
1960, in Gosling 1975, pp. 214-215, and in Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp. 431-444. McLaughlin

1969 agrees with Gosling and Kenny on

this point.
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Hopes and

beliefs.

(?i6yoi, 40a6),

anticipations are written in our souls as “speeches ”

and ^'moreover painted images” (Kai

8<:;coYpa(pripeva, 40a9). Socrates,

I

6f]

in anticipation.

But

it’s

order to focus on anticipatory pleasures in general, nor would
that

he meant thereby to

restrict his discussion

anticipatory ones. Socrates

pleasure that

is

of the

first

was focusing momentarily on

characteristic

on pictures here

not clear that he does so in

it

follow

if this

were true

type of false pleasures to false

the kind of anticipatory

of wicked men. Wicked men, that

is,

tend to have images of

themselves in their minds when they anticipate a future pleasure because
to enjoy the objects

writings

Kai id (pavidapaxa

believe, focuses his attention

because pictures do play a special role

i.e.,

of their anticipation in advance and thereby

this allows

them

to increase their

71

But he

pleasures.

is

clearly not saying that only

wicked

men experience

false

anticipatory pleasures.

Either writings or pictures, then, can be connected with false pleasures.

And

these

writings and pictures are false whenever the doxai of which they are the representations
are false doxai. Presently, Socrates continues:
Soc.

And

it

was agreed too, 1 think,
do they not?

that these things, in then producing false beliefs, also

create false believing,

Prot. Yes.

Soc.

What then? Must we

not render these things to pains and pleasures

condition set over against them (xf)v

Prot.

—

xoutmv dvxiaxpocpov £^iv)

in

—a permanent

these cases?

How?

70

As Fred

Miller notes, in Miller 1971, pp. 65

ff.

71

Cf. also D. Frede 1985, pp. 174

ff.

This suggests the following view: That the wicked man thinks of pleasure in terms of
pleasant sensations, and anticipatory pleasures allow him to have more such sensations.
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Soc. That anyone

who feels pleasure in any way whatsoever and no matter
how
heedlessly, always really feels pleasure;
however, at times he feels pleasure at things
that
neither are nor will become (xoic; ouai
ppS’ etii xoiq yEyovooiv evioxe), often and
perhaps at most times at things that are neither about
to be nor will ever come to be
(xoiq pti5e

peUouai

Here, clearly, the reference

tcoxe yEvfjaEaftai) [40dl-10].

is to

specifically the objects of hope

objects of belief both present and future, the latter
being

and

anticipation. Falsity is a

of all pleasures and pains that are based on
possibility for all pleasures that are based

40cl].” False pleasure

is

beliefs, that is to say,

on

emphatically assents: “This, too, Socrates,

permanent condition

logoi.

is

And to

all

it

is

an ever-present

of this Protarchus

necessarily thus so [ouxcoq

defined here in terms of logoi in general; one

dvayKalov,

may

in connection with a belief that turns out to be false and, in that case, Plato

say, the pleasure itself is false.

takes pleasure

One may simply

in.

and accordingly the pleasure
too.

But

And one may

that

it

feel pleasure

would

like to

need not be the thought of a future event that one

believe p to be the case

one took

when p

in (falsely) believing

is

not in fact the case,

p may

be termed false

also believe p to have been the case in the past and take pleasure in

thinking so, and be mistaken in one’s belief and therefore in one’s pleasure. In

cases, the pleasure that

to the distinction

(c^iq)

one has

between

is

based on a mistaken

false writings

connection with false pleasures

is

and

belief.

false pictures

But no importance

of beliefs, as

these

all

is

given

far as their

concerned. Hopes and anticipations, with their

attendant beliefs about the future, are inscribed in our souls either as 56^ai or as

(pavidapaxa
past.

Thus,

I

e(!^CDypa9r|fi8va; but, so can beliefs about the present

think that the

first

and beliefs about the

type of false pleasures consists not in false pleasures of

anticipation alone, but in pleasures based

on

false belief in general.
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2.

Mooradian’s Account

Norman Mooradian
pleasures can be false.

(1992) presents an alternative account of how anticipatory

On Mooradian’s view, the

analogy between believing and taking

pleasure need not be taken to imply that belief and pleasure
are subject to the same kind

of falsity. Instead, the point of the analogy

some way, but

err in different

is

that belief and pleasure could each err in

though closely related ways. Mooradian locates the link

between the two ways of erring

in the notion

Socrates employs in the discussion

of missing the mark (d|iapiav8iv) which

What

at 37eff.

mark, and hence to be incorrect (ouk op&fiv),
to

miss the mark

is

miss the mark

To

is

and belief to miss the

for pleasure

unique to each [1992,

p. 25].

For beliefs

for their contents to be false representations, that is to say, for the

beliefs to misrepresent their objects.

to

is

it is

for

them

On the

other hand, Mooradian thinks, for pleasures

to misidentijy their objects in a certain

way.

explain the idea of misidentifying the objects of pleasure, Mooradian employs

the notion of a proper object.

He

explicates “proper object” as

it

applies to pleasure in

two ways:
(a)

because

it

According

to the first,

“an object would be the proper object of a pleasure

causes the pleasure” [1992,

p. 28].

More

precisely, the

awareness of the

proper object causes the anticipatory pleasure. In the subject’s awareness, the object
intentional object, but, to say that an anticipatory pleasure has a proper object

that

“something in

reality

answers to the intentional object”

subject were to realize that

its

(p. 28).

Furthermore,

proper object does not exist or will not

cease to have the anticipatory pleasure connected with

it.

is to

exist,

an

claim

if the

he would

Thus, the subject has the

anticipatory pleasure because he believes that the proper object of his pleasure will
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is

come

about

at

some

later time.

Using our previous notation we may formulate

this

conception

as follows;

(Ml) For someone

S,

x

is

the proper object of S’s p* at

intentional object of S’s awareness at

time

t,)

&

=

t,

def. {x is the

(S believes that there

is

some

such that x will occur at t 2 > & (S’s belief that x will occur at t
2
causes S to have p* at t,) & [if (S believed that x will not occur at t
then
later

t2

(S

2)

would not have p*

at t,)].

Thus, X qua intentional object must correspond to x qua subsequently existing object.

That
at

is,

the intentional object must be properly identified with the object that

comes about

a later time. The following then gives the definition of false anticipatory pleasure that

corresponds to misidentification of the proper object of pleasure as defined in (Ml):

(Ml.l) For someone

=

def. (S is

S,

and for some intentional object x of S, S’s p*

X will occur

at

12 )

at

& (S believes that there is no time, t
& (S has p* at

aware ofx

at t,)

2,

tj

is false

such that

t,).

Here we have one definition of false anticipatory pleasure

that explicates the notion

“missing the mark,” according to which an anticipatory pleasure

is false

whenever

of

it

is

72

directed an object that the agent believes will not exist.

(b)

this:

The second notion of proper

“something

is

object that

the proper object of a pleasure if we

could be generated without that objecf’ [1992,

p. 28].

anticipatory pleasure has a proper object, the agent

anticipatory pleasure if he

were

to

know that the

72

Bernard Williams had made a similar point

man who,

believing he has

inheritance

is

Mooradian thinks Socrates employs

come upon an

in

to this,

would not want

to

whenever an

have the

Williams 1959. He gives the example of a

not real, his pleasure disappears. That
is

According

the pleasure if it

object does not or will not exist.

inheritance,

properly cause the pleasure only //the object

would not want

is

is

pleased. If the

man

to say, the object

real or exists.

To

finds out that the

of the pleasure can

say this

is

to say, in

Mooradian’s terms, that the object of the anticipatory pleasure has a proper object.
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is

Mooradian gives

the

brain scientist, so that he

but he

beliefs

knows

example of someone whose

comes

to

would be

that these beliefs are false, that

were

is,

he knows that the objects of his

to ask the scientist to manipulate his

way, then any anticipatory pleasures consequent upon the

false, since

by a

have anticipatory pleasures connected with these

beliefs are non-existent. If such a person
beliefs in this

beliefs are manipulated

false beliefs

they would lack their proper object, even though they have
an

intentional object [1992, p. 28]. Here, the subject’s wishing to have
the anticipatory

pleasure depends upon his not knowing that no actual object corresponds to
the
intentional object of his awareness. If he

knew

did not have a real object corresponding to

it,

that the intentional object of his awareness

he would not want to

feel the anticipatory

We may formulate this second

pleasure connected with having the intentional object.

notion of proper object in the following way:

(M2) X

is

the proper object of S’s p* at

t,

=

def. (x is the intentional object

of S’s

& (S believes that there is some later time, such that x
will occur at ) & (S’s belief that x will occur at
causes S to have p* at t,)
& (S wants to have p* at t,) & [if (S knew that x will not occur at then (S
awareness

at t,)

tj,

t2

tj

t2 )

would not want
If the subject

nonetheless

knew that

felt

to

have p*

at t,)].

the proper object of his anticipatory pleasure did not exist but he

the anticipatory pleasure, then his pleasure

would be

false.

corollary giving the corresponding definition of false anticipatory pleasure

(M2.1) For someone

=

def. (S is

gist

t2 )

is:

and for some intentional object x of S, S’s p*

aware of x

will occur at

The

S,

Thus the

at t,)

& (S has p*

& (S knows that there is no time,
at

at

t2 ,

t,

is false

such that x

t,).

of the notion of a proper object of pleasure

is

that a pleasure can fail to be

directed at the right object. Mooradian thus turns around the notion of missing the

and asks, instead, what

it

means

intentional object, hitting the

for

an intentional object to

mark means getting the
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hit its

mark

mark. For the

right object [1992; pp. 46-47].

Hence, “we can think of the point of pleasure as
consisting
object proper to

it.

in

The point of my pleasure of anticipating

its

being directed

riches

is

that

I

Mooradian

my

enjoyment would have been misdirected”
[1992,

fail to

for

the falsity of an anticipatory pleasure depends
upon, but does not consist

the falsity of the representations in the subject’s soul.
in its lacking the object that is proper to

worth. The proper object,

the pleasure

is false

we might

whenever

it

is

“misses”

The

initial refusal to

this

its

been directed at the wrong

certain perceptions,

Thus Mooradian

intended object.

its

relativity

of perception. This

that is ascribed to Protagoras in Theaetetus 152a, in connection

namely those

is

perception. According to this view,

that are referred to

by Plato as aiaOfjacK;, are always

they can never be mistaken about their objects.

and hearings, pleasures, pains,

relativity entails that for

p. 105].

object of his pleasure x

desires,

any pleasure, “there

particular feeling of pleasure,”

mistaken [1996;

object.

account in (1996). Here he proposes that Protarchus’

with Protagoras’ claim there that knowledge

is,

its

accept Socrates’ analogy between pleasure and belief must be seen in

same one

veridical, that

point and

proper object. The failure of the intentional

terms of Protarchus’ acceptance of a certain thesis about the
thesis is the

its

the ground of the anticipatory pleasure, and

thinks that a false anticipatory pleasure fails by misidentijying

Mooradian amplifies

in,

of the pleasure consists

falsity

which gives the pleasure

that

it,

say,

act is explained in terms of its having

are seeings

Thus

p. 36].

an

enjoy actual

future riches. These constitute the proper object
of this pleasure. Should they
materialize,

at

is

and

that the

Thus, what
for

S

to

it

is

and

fears.

Among

The

such aistheseis

thesis of Protagorean

a pleasurable thing special to this

awareness of this pleasurable thing cannot be

means

for

have pleasure
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in

someone S

to

be mistaken about the

x and be mistaken

in thinking that

x

is

a pleasurable object. The “Protagorean Thesis”

may

then be stated as follows:

The Protagorean Thesis (PT): For any person
if S takes pleasure in jc, then x is pleasurable.

The taking

pleasure in x constitutes an aisthesis.

of aisthesis together with the claim

that all states

summarize Protarchus’ view before he accepted
(A3. 1)

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

No

And

S,

and for any object of pleasure

so,

x,

(PT) follows from the definition

of pleasure are aistheseis.

We can then

Socrates’ argument in this way:

aisthesis can be mistaken in regard to

its

object.

All pleasures are aistheseis.

Therefore:

No

pleasure can be mistaken in regard to

(PT) implies that whenever anyone
which, necessarily,

is

is

its

object.

having a pleasure, there must be some object

correctly described as being pleasurable.

Now according to the

representationalist interpretation, Protarchus rejects Socrates’ initial argument because

Protarchus does not accept the view that pleasure

is

a representational

state.

On (PT),

however, Protarchus rejects Socrates’ argument because he thinks that argument
irrelevant to the question

always true because the

whether pleasures can be

fact

for this

remark by Socrates

when awake,

who

false [1996; p. 108]. Pleasures are

of having a pleasure always means

pleasurable thing that correctly

fits

the pleasure as

its

object.

that there is

is

some

Thus we get an explanation

to Protarchus, early in the argument: “Neither in a

as you assert, neither in frenzy nor in derangement of mind,

ever yet thinks he

enjoying, but

is

is

not enjoying at

all,

is

dream nor

there anyone

nor again thinks he

is in

73

pain, but

is

nof’ (36e5-8).

What

Socrates takes Protarchus to have asserted was (PT).

73
It is

possible to put this point in terms of Mooradian’s earlier discussion in (1992);

according to the terms of that discussion, Protarchus rejects Socrates’ initial analogy between
has an
believing and taking pleasure because, on Protarchus’ view, granting that every pleasure
intentional object

(i.e.,

to f|56pevov), the intentional object could not
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fail to

be the same as

its

Given

that this is the case,

how then does

Socrates convince Protarchus that

some

pleasures can be false?

It

might be thought

that Socrates convinces Protarchus

by getting him

to accept

the following argument:

(A3. 2)

(i)

No

aisthesis can be mistaken in regard to

(ii)

Some pleasures can be

(iii)

Therefore'.

The conclusion then allows

Some
that

pleasures are not aistheseis.

some

pleasures can be false.

(a) that anticipatory pleasures are

false.

Mooradian

is

Now,

according to

persuaded by being shown

themselves cognitive states and so can be

or else (b) that anticipatory pleasures are similar

being called

object.

mistaken in regard to their objects.

Mooradian, on the representationalist view Protarchus
either:

its

enough

rejects both these options.

false;

to cognitive states to warrant

On

his view, the scribe

and

painter analogies provide Protarchus with grounds for rejecting the application o/(PT) to

anticipatory pleasures.

The analogies achieve

this,

according to Mooradian, “by giving

an etiology of the pleasures that undermines their claim to be self-verifying with respect
to

something’s being pleasurable” [1996;

p. 109].

In introducing the scribe analogy,

Socrates asks Protarchus to imagine a person who, seeing an object at a distance,

unable to identify the object. The person makes a judgment in his

own mind

is

about what

he sees, and the judgment constitutes a kind of inner speech. This judgment, Mooradian
explains, “is clearly distinguishable

from the perceptual awareness (aiaOpaiq).

It

from memory and other unspecified TraOpiiaxa. The significance of this example

proper
object.

object',

whereas,

in the

case of belief, x6 5o^a(!^6|j.8vov could

However, Mooradian does not

state

it

fail

to

match

its

arises

is

proper

thus in (1996), nor does he there refer to his

discussion in (1992); nonetheless the later discussion
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is, I

think, consistent with the earlier.

that

the

judgment (56^a)

may

duration that

is

described as being about an enduring, public object.

continue after the visual aicOrjaiq has ceased and

confirmed or disconfirmed by future observation. This bears
relativist thesis. If aiaftrjaiq restricts

shovm

to

be

we mean

Mooradian says

p. 109].

that their etiology

Now,

makes

wrong about whether

possible to be

may be

is

irrelevant to

are about enduring, public

any awareness, including judgment, then the thesis

false, since conditions for the verification

have been provided” [1996;

thus

on the general

directly

us to the senses, then the thesis

most knowledge claims, since the majority of such claims
objects. If by aicftrjciq

it

thus has a

It

it

and

falsification

is

of the statements

as regards pleasures of anticipation,

possible for

them

to false: “First,

or not one will have a pleasure. Second,

to take pleasure in the pleasurable event that

does not come about. This

is

it

is

it is

possible

possible,

because this pleasure (of anticipation) comes about through judging and picturing the
pleasure.

The pleasurable event

anticipatory pleasure

to

is

described and pictured in a certain way. Since the

comes about from

belief in the description, the pleasure can be said

be in the future pleasure thus described. Because

this is the case, the features

to the anticipated event will be precisely those features that

anticipate. This

pleasures.

in the

way

means

which

the event pleasurable to

that the relativistic thesis will not be applicable to anticipatory

Taking anticipatory pleasure in x will not make
in

make

it is

felt to

be pleasurable, since

it

it

the case that x

will not

make

those features belief in which give rise to the anticipatory pleasure.

more general terms,

the description

It

will not

as the scribe analogy

it

does

do so since the pleasure

makes

in

is

To

pleasurable

put the point in
will not entail

those cases to which the relativistic

brought about by

clear, attributes objective features to the
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is

the case that x has

it

of how the anticipatory pleasure arises

that the event anticipated is pleasurable, as

thesis applies.

imputed

belief,

and

belief,

world” [1996; pp.

110-111, underscoring supplied].

means how

the pleasure arises,

By

the etiology of an anticipatory pleasure

i.e., its

Mooradian

causation. In cases of perception where (PT)

applies, the description of how the perception arises entails
the veridicality of the content

of the perception, as the following might

illustrate:

(El) For any person S and for some object x of S’s aisthesis,
then X is red.

This

may

if x

appears red to S,

if x

appears red to S,

be made more precise as follows:

(E2) For any person S and for some object x of S’s aisthesis,
then X has the property redness.
In (El) and (E2), the description ‘x appears red to S’ entails that x

property redness. Similarly, where the aisthesis
the property “being pleasurable”

is

is

a pleasure,

attributed to the content

it

is

red or x has the

follows from (PT) that

of the

aisthesis,

incorrigible

way: the causation of the aisthesis with

veridicality

of that content. However, when that content admits any doxai

its

and

this in

an

specific content guarantees the

in its etiology,

veridicality ceases to be guaranteed because doxai attribute objective features to the

world.

And

so, Socrates’ point is

simply that not

that aistheseis are necessarily veridical is

all

aistheseis are veridical, and the

what he succeeds

give up. At the end of the argument, Protarchus

is

in persuading Protarchus to

convinced that in

fact

some

involve judgment, and since judgment involves the possibility of error, then

aistheseis can be mistaken. Socrates’ argument, then, consists in

of both (A3.1) and (A3. 2)
analogies ought to have

is false.

shown

But, if Mooradian

is right,

that anticipatory pleasures

objects’ being pleasurable.
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view

showing

aistheseis

some

that

premise

the scribe and the painter

can be

false in regard to their

(i)

Consider once more Socrates’ example of the wicked

coming

into possession of a hoard of gold.

On Mooradian’s

may be

of two reasons;

anticipatory pleasure

false for either

end up acquiring the anticipated hoard of gold;

or, (b)

it

man

gleefully anticipating

account, the wicked man’s

man does not

(a) the

in fact

turns out that having the gold

is

not really pleasurable. These correspond, respectively, to (Cl) and (C2.1) as
introduced
in the previous section.

assumes

that (Cl) can

But the example of the wicked man, as Socrates presents

be ruled out,

i.e.,

there

the gold, only whether he will really enjoy

consider the

false,

first

it

is

no question of the man’s not acquiring

when he

acquires

namely, that

that

it is

possible to be

can be understood by seeing

by considering

The

it.

Nevertheless

let

us

of Mooradian’s stated conditions for an anticipatory pleasure’s being

wrong about whether or not one

pleasure that one anticipates. Mooradian’s claim, then,

way

it,

its

how the

is that this

will

have a

can be mistaken

comes

anticipatory pleasure

in a

about, that

is,

etiology.

etiology of the man’s anticipatory pleasure presumably

would include items

of belief in the man’s mind concerning such things as the objective value of gold, the
likelihood of his acquiring

enjoy having

it

it,

when he does

the things that he can do with

acquire

it.

But, surely, not

all

it,

and

how much he

will

of these beliefs bear on the

question whether the anticipated pleasure will turn out to be really pleasurable for him.

Now for Mooradian, whether the anticipate^/ pleasure turns out to be really pleasurable is
what the question whether the man’s

anticipator^^ pleasure is veridical or not

We must remember that the two pleasures being compared here are:
the

man

is

amounts

to.

(a) the pleasure that

currently having in connection with his anticipation, and (b) the pleasure that
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he expects to have in the
with respect to (b) only
Socrates

is

future.

if the

Mooradian’s account implies that

content of (b)

calling a false pleasure, and

anticipatory pleasure that

is

part of the content

on Mooradian’s account,

turns out to be false in the right way, that

produce does not come about. But,

is

the pleasure

is, if

(a)

can be veridical

of (a).

It is (a)

(a) is false

which the event

after all, the only item in the etiology

relevant to the falsity of that pleasure

is

the

that

only

if (b)

expected to

is

of the

man ’s

belief that

he will enjoy the anticipated event. The other items, such as his beliefs about the value
of
gold and about the likelihood of his acquiring

it,

though

all

elements in the etiology of the

anticipatory pleasure, are irrelevant to the content of the subsequent anticipated pleasure.

Thus, he

may

hold mistaken beliefs concerning the likelihood that he will acquire gold, or

about the objective value of gold, and

On Mooradian’s

still

enjoy the gold

account, his anticipatory pleasure would

when he
still

eventually acquires

have been

true, for

it.

it is

solely the correctness of his belief that he will enjoy having the gold that determines

whether his anticipatory pleasure

even

if all the other beliefs that

were

to turn out to

after all,

A,6yoc; or

it

is

be

is true.

went

to

If he

does not enjoy the anticipated event, then

make up

the etiology of his anticipatory pleasure

true, his anticipatory pleasure

would

still

have been

false.

And

so,

only the belief that he will enjoy himself whether this be in the form of a

of (pavidapaxa e^coypacprjpeva, that proves to be

false.

Here,

it

seems

to

me,

Mooradian’s view becomes indistinguishable from representationalism. For, on
Mooradian’s view,

falsity

it is still

of (p* than p*

is

(p* that

turns out to be false, and

likewise claimed to be false.
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It is

it

is

as a consequence of the

hard to see

how this

differs

from

representationalism in explaining

why

Protarchus eventually accepted Socrates’

argument.

What Mooradian’s view does

explain well, however,

is

why

Protarchus initially

could not accept Socrates claim of an analogy between the object of taking pleasure and
the object of believing. Mooradian’s discussion succeeds in illustrating

how, as Socrates

thought, the term aiaOriaiq can be applied to different types of mental states. Thus,
Socrates’ argument

showed

that there are different kinds

of aistheseis, not just the

perceptual kind. Protarchus realized that anticipatory pleasures are not just sensations;

they are complex pathemata of the soul that

desires.

Perhaps

Socrates’ point

it

is

would not be

that

emotions

shows Protarchus

states associated

are closely

false

when

involve beliefs, judgments, pictures, or

incorrect to refer to

may

explaining Protarchus’ conversion,

(a) Socrates

may

them

as emotions, and to say that

involve cognitive states as components. But, in

we

still

need to choose between the following options:

that anticipatory pleasures are identical with the cognitive

with them; or (b) Socrates shows Protarchus that anticipatory pleasures

enough associated with these cognitive

states to warrant their

being called

these cognitive states are false. But these, of course, are exactly the options

that a representationalist account

makes

available; Mooradian’s account does not present

a third option.

Perhaps a similar point can be made about Mooradian’s earlier account. The
notion of an intentional object corresponds to either

respectively, to

two

distinct objects

9

or

9*

in

our notation, which

refer,

of anticipation: e and p**. These distinctions

underlie the difference between (Cl) and (C 2 ).
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Now in Mooradian’s account, (Ml.l) and

(M2.2) both specify cases where (Cl) has not been ruled
or

known

wicked

and (M2.1)

is that

it

is

assumed

that (Cl)

can be ruled

pleasure and the object,

of the anticipation,

It

is

in Socrates’

The point of both (Ml.l)

out.

its target,

so to speak. But, to view

in this

it

the source of the failure of fit between the picture in the man’s

example.

either believed

the intentional object of the anticipation fails to correspond to

proper object— it misses

picture of e, that

it is

On the other hand, however,

that e does not or will not hold.

man example

out; in both,

it

is

is, cp,

i.e.,

mind

that is pleasurable.

mislocate

is to

anticipating a future

the target, of this picture. Although p**

the picture of this future pleasure, that

way

its

is, cp*,

is

the indirect object

rather than the

That seems to be the point of the wicked

man

the thought of the man’s future enjoyment that constitutes the intentional

object of his anticipation, which in turn constitutes p*. But the failure of the intentional

object to find

its

proper object

is

not a failure of reference, that

is,

the wicked man’s

anticipation fails not because he misidentifies the intentional object of his anticipation but

rather because he fails to predict a certain future event,

namely the event of his not

enjoying the direct object of his anticipation.

This, however, can hardly be described as a failure to get the right object, as

Mooradian would have

it.

Mooradian believes

false anticipatory pleasure is “to

object depends

of gold: would

this then

anticipatory pleasure?

of the Philebus's notion of a

demonstrate the manner in which taking pleasure in an

upon judgment’s proper

right objecf ’ [1992; pp. 46-47].

that the point

relation to that object

But, suppose the wicked

and hence, upon getting the

man

really did enjoy his hoard

be describable as his having got the right object of his

On Mooradian’ s

account,
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it

would be so

describable.

More

significantly,

on Mooradian’s account,

that the point of the

example

is

that

it

this situation

could not turn out that the wicked

enjoyed the anticipated event as he had pictured
false,

and the pleasure

certain picture right.

would be possible. But,

it

in his

own mind.

that

he cannot get right

is

believe

really

His anticipation

that constitutes the anticipation is false, because

But the picture

man

I

is

he cannot get a

the picture of himself

enjoying the event he anticipated, not simply the picture of the event occurring.

But suppose

it

were

right because he doesn’t

really Plato’s

know what

things are truly pleasurable.

the case that his anticipatory pleasure

that he has in his

doesn’t

mind when he had

know what things

is false

his anticipatory pleasure

would nonetheless be

is false,

not because he

even because he lacks self-knowledge

will really find pleasurable.

fails to get the right object

it

It

get the picture

because the belief or the picture of himself

are truly pleasurable, nor

and does not know what he
not because

view that the wicked man cannot

The

belief or the picture

of his anticipation, but because

it

is false

misrepresents

his future condition with respect to being pleased. Thus, (Ml.l) and (M2.1) are really not

about misidentifying the proper object of pleasure; they are about failure of occurrence of
74

the event that

is

expected to produce the anticipated pleasure.

Cynthia Hampton [1987; 1990] pursues the implications of the view that the wicked man
doesn’t know what things are really pleasurable. According to Hampton, the wicked man has
false beliefs about

what he

will find pleasurable

because he has false beliefs about the

intrinsic

He mistakenly thinks gold is intrinsically valuable, and “this falsifies, i.e. renders
inauthentic, the way he leads his life” [1987, p. 255]. Hampton thinks that the notion of truth that
is at work here is an ontological one; the wicked man “is not living a proper human life, one that
fulfills the human telos by accurately reflecting the proper ordering of reality, i.e., ontological

value of things.

truth” [1987, p.

1

58]. This ordering according to telos is effected

by the Forms, which are thus

Hampton final causes of sensible things. The Form of the Good orders all things towards a
telos, and all the other Forms are thus “aspects of the Good as Cause” [1990, p. 50]. {continued)
for
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J.

Dybikowski [1970a] thinks

pleasure pictured
Socrates had

are

no

in the

man ’s

made a mistake

that the pleasure that Socrates here calls false
is the

mind, that

in 40b6-7,

p** rather than p*. Dybikowski claims that

where he declares

that “for the

bad too pleasures

less present, painted in their souls; but these, surely, are false.” Here,
according to

Dybikowski, Socrates meant to claim
anticipatory pleasure,

false.

is,

is false,

Dybikowski thus

that the pleasure taken in the picture,

i.e.,

the

but instead makes the claim that the pictured pleasure

rejects both

Kenny’s and Gosling’s accounts of how,

is

in the

argument, false pictures of pleasure are identified with pictures of false pleasure. But the
mistake

is

pleasure,

understandable, Dybikowski says, because, “in mentioning the pictured

it

would have been easy

a pleasure which

is

to slip into supposing that a reference

had been made to

experienced; and in the absence of a clear discussion of the distinction

between the pleasure of anticipation and the anticipated pleasure,

which was under discussion” [1970a;

it

would not be

p. 165].

But, surely, in the discussion the distinction between the two pleasures

enough; in attributing

falsity to anticipatory pleasure

picture of the anticipated pleasure in the

on the basis of the

man’s mind, Socrates was

the falsity of one to the falsity of the other.

two pleasures

plain

It

seems

to

me that

are so mingled that one taints the other with

falsity

is

clear

of the

clearly arguing

Socrates’

its falsity.

view

Indeed

is

from

that the

this is

how

Socrates summarizes the matter a bit later on. In introducing the second type of false

The problem with such an account is that it imports into the analysis of the Philebus the
theory of Forms of the middle dialogues, especially the Republic. But the status of the middle
reference
period Forms in the late dialogues is controversial. In my view, the most unequivocal
neither
But
15bff
at
unities,
povdSaq,
to the Forms in the Philebus is the reference to them as
ethical
draw any
here nor elsewhere in the dialogue, it seems to me, does Socrates attempt to
unities.
as
Forms
implications from the status of the
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pleasure, he contrasts this with the

type he has just finished discussing; in the

first

type, false beliefs, as well as true ones,

when they

first

occurred, “filled” or “infected” the

pains and pleasures themselves simultaneously with their condition
(xdq Xvnaq xc Kai

f|6ovdq dpa xou Tiap’ auxaic; TiaSfjpaxoq dvcTu'pTi^aaav, 42a8-9).
Accordingly,
the anticipated pleasure turns out to be false, then the previously

is

“filled” (dv87rip7T>.aaav) with

be so mingled with pleasure that

felt

anticipatory pleasure

What needs explanation

its falsity.

their truth or falsity is

if

is,

communicated

how beliefs

can

to the pleasure

itself.

3.

Fenner’s Account

The Gosling-Kenny account

show how,

tries to

in the

narrower case of

anticipatory pleasure, the picture of the anticipated pleasure in the man’s
identified with the occurrent anticipatory pleasure in the

from constituting a general account of how
pleasure. Terry Fenner (1970) presents

falsity is

man’s

mind

soul. This,

is

however,

is far

communicated from belief to

what amounts

to a generalization

involved in Gosling’s account. In Gosling’s account the crucial element

of the principle
is

the conflation

of the two pleasures due to the absence of a clear distinction between the picturing of a
pleasure and the picture of a pleasure.

36c-40e, a similar

move towards

Now Fenner maintains that in the argument at

conflation

is

effected by the lack of a clear distinction

between pleasure as a process, and pleasure as the product of an

same ambiguity

characterizes belief, that

is,

there

is

activity or process.

The

an ambiguity between belief as

believing and belief as the thing believed. This “process-product ambiguity” enables

Socrates to break

down

Frotarchus’ objection to the view that there
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is

an analogy between

the object of believing and the object of taking pleasure.
Penner thinks this

is

shown

in

the following way:
(1) In the beginning of the

argument

at

31 al -10 Socrates establishes an analogy

between believing and taking pleasure, the point of the analogy being
taking pleasure both take objects.

To

(p

in /?”

may

I

rightly

(p, I still

and

express the relation between these and their objects,

Penner proposes the formal construction
whether or not

that believing

really

(p;

“cp-ing in p"

from

At 37al l-b3

this, the

it

is

asserted that

following analysis of “I wrongly

be derived:

(P7) There exists a cp-ing which
that (p-ing is in

and

I

am

that (p-ing is

doing and there exists a proposition which
wrong.

In Penner’ s analysis, (P7) provides the general principle establishing the logical

connection between taking pleasure in p and believing in p, and drawing a criterion of

wrongness

that is

common to

Plato’s text as ‘not correct,’

if the

(ouk 6p0f|), so

proposition that the cp-ing

oi)K opOf) if p

is false.

‘dpapxccvouaa’
here

75

taking pleasure and believing.

56^a

is

‘f|5ovf|’ is

the

that

is in is false,

any

indicated in

cp-ing in a proposition is not correct

In Plato’s text here, ‘ouk opSf)’

as 8o^cx(^civ; thus ‘belief

understood as ‘taking pleasure

is

so that believing in a proposition p

(“erring,” or “missing the mark”).

same

Wrongness

in’

is

and

is

is

used interchangeably with

At 37d7 what

is

opOfj

is

66^a, and

understood as ‘believing’ or judging’,

is

contrasted with ‘what one

is

pleased

at' In summary, up to 37e9 “correct” and “erring” are reserved for the cp-ing as opposed

to

what the

cp-ing is in [Penner, 1970; p. 173].

75

Penner notes that “cp-ing

in

p"

will often be unidiomatic, but that this does not undercut the

analogy: “(p-ing in p" can stand for “is pleased that p," “believing (in) the proposition/?,”
“believing that /?,” and the like [Penner, 1970; 173
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n. 8].

(2)

At 37el0-l

1

Socrates introduces false belief in connection with
taking

pleasure. According to Penner, Socrates sees this connection
not as that of pleasure being

accompanied by or occurring with

false believing but as that

things believed: “But now, pleasure very often seems to

of being pleased

come

in the false

to us not with true belief,

but with a false belief (Kai pfjv eoikev yc f|8ovf) 7ioA,A,dKiq ou peid
bd^riq opdf^q
dA,?id

pcxd

v|/8u6ou<; f|piv yiyvECTOai).

Here Socrates employs an existence

assumption, which Penner states as follows:
(PIO) There are pleasures

(

=

cases of being pleased) and there are false

propositions such that the pleasures are in one of these false propositions.

Penner does not indicate whether he thinks Socrates,

in the

remark just quoted, means by

56^r|q the believing or the belief, though presumably Penner understands him to
the believing. Protarchus’ reply to this
false but not the pleasure (37el2-38a2).

that

by

xf)v

56^av

is

that in

why

view

Whenever

he thinks

believing

would lead us

to expect.

Here Penner

to Protarchus:

there

is

a pleasure and a false proposition which occur

simultaneously, there
is false

is

a believing

which

is

in the false proposition

&

the

& the believing is with the pleasure & the pleasure is not

false.

Thus, Protarchus

is

is

Protarchus means the believing rather than the belief as the object of

ascribes the following

1 )

such cases the believing (xf)v 66^av)

Penner does not explain either

the believing, as the accusative construction

(P 1

mean

doing either of two things: he

is

denying that

(a) the “(p-ing in p”

relation applies to pleasure; or he is asserting that (b) all pleasure in a belief is simply

pleasure with a believing [Penner 1970; p. 174].

76

Fenner’s translation.
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(3) Socrates

must now show Protarchus

pleasure in a belief or proposition, so that (b)

that there really are cases of taking

and

is false,

that “cp-ing

to pleasure, so that (a) is true. This is achieved
through the scribe

In the course of the analogies, ‘66^a’

believing, that

is,

the shift

sense. In the analogies,

is

comes

made from

66^a

is

what

to refer to

is

inp”

really applies

and painter analogies.

believed rather than to the

the “process” sense of 66^a to

its

“product”

no longer to bo^d^civ but to 5o^a(;6|i8vov (39a4,

77

39bI0-cI, 39c4-5, 40b3).

Writings (ypdppaTa), images (eiKOveq), and painted

pictures ((^coypacpfjpaTa) are also referred to in their “product” sense.
Pleasure
to the “product” sense

of 86^a by the use of tni

is

related

40c9, d8-10, 37e5), and by the use of

(at

the dative for the object of pleasure (at 40b5-c2, 37a9). These grammatical cues
indicate
that pleasure is being thought

of in terms of the

“cp-i^ig in p” relation [Penner,

1970; p.

77

At 39a4 Socrates says

86^a

that

xai ^dyoi,

TE d7,r|0f)(;

whenever our experiences write what

i.e.,

listed as

premise

section.

At 39ac4-5, the images of true

(ii)

true in our souls,

is

true belief and writings arise in us. This

(“Writings of true beliefs are true”)
beliefs

in

is

the statement that

my argument summary earlier in

and statements (twv

d>.Ti8(i)v

is

this

8o^d)v xai ?i6y(ov

eIkovec;) are said to be true, and those of false ones are false; these are premises (v) and (vi) in

the argument
recall;

evil

summary. At 39b 10

the reference

is

40b3 refers to t« ysypappeva as writings

to

twv 8o^aa0evTC0v

in the

mind

as past beliefs that

that are true for

good men,

we

false for

men.

....

78

At 40d8-10, “takes pleasure
8o^d^ovTi eni

at

40c9;

concerning that which

40c 1-2 that

good men
“that in

is

given as xotipovTi etu, which

it is

pained or pleased about

is

paralleled

by

(ecp’

taken”

(I)

XoTisiTai

f)

TOUvavTibv).

It is at

to “delight in” false pleasures (vj;Eu8eaiv TjSovaiq xotlpowcriv),

ones (pbovaiq xaipouoiv d>»r|88aiv);

which pleasure

is

37e5-6 pains and pleasures are said to be capable of being mistaken

at

wicked men are said

in true

at”

(co

at

to f|86pEvov fjSsTai).
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37a9 to 8o^a<^6pEvov

is

defined as

The

result is that Socrates has

now effected

a

shift,

from the notion of being

pleased as accompanied by or occurring with a belief, to the
notion of being pleased in a
79

belief.

If the belief that

one takes pleasure

also to be false; and so, if a proposition
p in

pleasure taken in;?

mental

shift is that the

state

may

of believing,

in

which pleasure

likewise be said to admit of falsity.

state

such a

of taking pleasure

way

that

taking pleasure. Penner’ view

is

Penner says

first

that Plato

in is false, then the believing

was

the

is

shown

to

taken

is

What

is

in a

said

then the

is false,

accomplished by the

be analogous to the mental

what may be said of believing may

summarized

may be

also be said of

remark he makes concerning

Plato;

philosopher to see that “being pleased that...”

is

a

propositional attitude [Penner, 1970; pp. 171-172]. Penner does not in fact claim that
Plato deliberately exploits the ambiguity of doxa to establish his argument; in fact Penner

thinks that Plato

is

unaware of the ambiguity. What Penner thinks Plato was aware of is

the perceptual analogy between believing and taking pleasure; in claiming such an

analogy Plato shows an understanding that pleasures are propositional

80

attitudes.

79

Penner

illustrates that distinction in the first part

of his paper. The difference

is

that

between
(P4)

where

I

I

am

believe

I

going to win the race and

am

I

going to win the race but

am

taking pleasure in

(

= enjoying)

my belief does not “fall within the

skating,

scope” of my

enjoying, and

(P6)

where

I

am

going to win the race and

my belief that am

the proposition 1

I

going to win

am going to

I

am

pleased that

I

am

going to win the race,

the race falls within the scope of my pleasure, so that,

win the race

is

the object of

my being pleased

[Penner, 1970;

i.e.,

p.

168].
80

Dorothea Frede sustains Penner’s general account, but unlike Penner she believes not only
that Plato was aware of the ambiguity of doxa, but that Plato deliberately made use of the
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Thus, on Fenner’s interpretation, pleasures can be

false for Plato

because

pleasures qua propositional attitudes have objects, namely
the propositions in which
pleasures are taken.

Now if some pleasures are propositional attitudes, then Protarchus’

version of hedonism cannot be right.

It

will be recalled

Two that the

from Chapter

following principle applies to Protarchus’ conception of pleasure:

(R2) If X and

and x and

y,

(R2)

may

are

F by

some

which accompanies x and also

virtue of having

(f>.

perhaps be expressed by saying that pleasure

byproduct,

all

are F, then there is

e.g.,

it

consists in

some

feeling or

is

an epiphenomenon or a

some motion

in the soul that

accompanies

processes of restoration. In (R2), this epiphenomenon would be represented by

which accompanies

all

pleasures and

what

all

pleasures are in

But

it

itself

really is

is.

But,

common,

i.e.,

I

have argued

is

what

all

common, and

that for Socrates,

the one of Pleasure,

is

instances of pleasure have in

merely

for Protarchus

what pleasure

its

is,

it

is

(f>,

common.

what pleasure

or what pleasures have in

abstract nature as the process of

81

restoration in living beings.

If this is so, then

what makes Pleasure many, can’t be something

Now,

that

some

what individuates pleasures,

that is to say,

that belongs to this abstract process alone.

pleasures are propositional attitudes implies that they have objects, and

ambiguity to set up the breakdown of the distinction between believing and that which is
believed, and this in order to allow for a similar breakdown of the distinction between taking
pleasure and that in which pleasure

[1962; pp. 73-74] was the

first to

is

taken. See D. Frede 1985, pp. 169-171. Irving Thalberg

propose, as a result of the Philebus discussion, that pleasure

that and similar states be classified and analyzed as propositional attitudes.

81

D. Frede

makes

the

same point

in

1985, p. 172.
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the description of their objects forms part of their
descriptions as pleasures.

way

that falsity

contrarieties

and

among

truth enter into the composition

It is

in this

of the pleasures and create

their kinds.

D. Overestimation, Falsity, and Evil

A second type of false pleasure is one that results from viewing the pleasure either
from a temporal distance or

in proximity with pain or with other pleasures. Here,
again,

desire plays an important role.

long, that

is,

as there

body or the soul

to

is

memory

harmony.

condition of desire the body

it,

and

is

To be

in

need of restoration

is

If the

is at

body

rise to the desire is a bodily lack,

its

variance with (bi'xa) the soul,

may

the soul’s

arise

own pathemata. The

will replenish

its

own

is

to the possibility that

its

nd^oq

is

separate (x®piq) from

experiences (41c2-3). Once more the

own

activity,

was

it

f|5ovf|v

the

even

body

if the lack that gives

that “supplied

pv to rrapexopevov,

some

41c6-7).

through bodily experiences, are perceived by the soul as
essence of desire

is

the soul’s longing for the object that

or the body’s condition, and thus in desire the soul looks forward to

the filling that will restore

the future event that

its

and even though

experience” (8ia

Desires, though they

so

the source of the desire, then while in the

is

that desire belongs to the soul as

pleasure through

to experience desire

or present perception of the object that can restore the

divided (5i8iA.r|7rTai) from the soul in

point here

is

it

to

harmony. But here error

is

due, not to the possibility that

expected to bring the desired replenishment will

its

occurrence will

fail

to the possibility that the expected pleasure,

to

fail to

occur, nor

produce the expected pleasure, but rather

when

it

occurs, will not be as

it

was

anticipated, imagined, estimated, or otherwise projected into a future experience. Thus,
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here anticipation

is

involved, but this second type of false pleasure

anticipatory pleasure. There

of the object of anticipation

its

is

no claim

is false;

is

not a form of

that the pleasure that is experienced

on account

rather the anticipated pleasure itself is false,
because

character turns out to be not as anticipated. This recalls (C2.2) in
our previous

discussion.

The

error about the characteristics of the anticipated pleasure

comes about

as

a result of the soul’s having to project the pleasure into the future, and therefore
having to
estimate

its

intensity or to imagine

its

quality. Socrates

compares

this to

simple vision;

“In the case of sight, viewing magnitudes from afar and from near at hand obscures the
truth

and makes us believe

falsely (v|/eu6fi Tioiei 5o^d(!^8iv)” [41e9-42a2]; similarly with

pains and pleasures.

Now

it

might be thought

of false pleasure, since here too
pleasure. But Socrates

from the

first;

is

that here

it

is

a special case of the

first

type

a false belief that accounts for the falsity of the

quite explicit in contrasting the second type of false pleasure

in the first type the false beliefs

themselves with their

falsity,

were said

to infect the pains

and pleasures

while in the second type the pleasures “are on each occasion

being observed from afar and from near

side

we have merely

at

hand, and

at the

same time

are being placed

by side” (42b). Out of the juxtaposition of pleasures both with other pleasures and
82

with pain comes a distortion in the mind’s view of a future pleasure.

Thus, again.

Projection into the future, of course, need not involve anticipation. Mooradian (1995)
rejects the

view

that the

second type of false pleasure

is

a sub-type of false anticipatory pleasures.

The second type involves estimating the magnitude of a future pleasure [1995; pp. 98-99]. This
type of false pleasure plays a special role

in

akrasia; the akratic person

is

constantly

overestimating the magnitude of the pleasures that he looks forward to or otherwise pictures to
himself. This point was first raised by Cynthia Hampton in Hampton 1987, p. 259. Clearly,

however, estimating can take place simultaneously with anticipation.
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falsity

(and therefore

evil) enters into the constitution

of a pleasure. This second type of

false pleasure, like the first, involves anticipation, but in a different

Socrates proceeds to discuss a third sense of falsity, but
pleasures can be false;

pleasure.

it is

rather a sense in

We can err in categorizing neutral

which

it

would be

it is

way.

not a sense in which

false to call

something a

states as pleasurable states, that

equate pleasure with mere absence of pain. This

is

is,

somewhat out of line with

we can

the

discussion up to this point, since here the putative pleasures are in reality not even
pleasures at

all.

That

is,

there

is

no error

in the perception

of a pleasure; rather there

categorial mistake concerning the identity of the one of Pleasure,

which

is

is

a

equated with

absence of pain rather than with the process of replenishment. In Plato’s account,

absence of pain would refer to the

state in

mistakenly identify pleasure with this

between replenishments. One may then

state, in

which pain

is

absent because the soul then

perceives no condition of lack, and in which consequently the soul has no desire. At 43c,

Socrates

makes a point

that is crucial to his discussion

of true pleasures, namely, that not
83

all

conditions of lack of either the body or the soul are perceived by the soul.

The soul

perceives great changes (fisydA,ai pexaPoA-ai) and these produce pleasures and pains,

but “measured and small changes” (|i8TapoX,ai pexpiai X8 Kai apiKpai) produce no

pleasures and pains because the soul does not perceive them.

83

That the discussion of the third type of falsity
indicated by Socrates himself at 44d2-5.
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is

In the subsequent

relevant to the topic of true pleasures

is

discussion of true pleasures, Socrates will include

those pleasures in which the lack

all

is

unperceived.

The

entire discussion

of the third kind of falsity seems to

me to

be of the nature of

a parenthetical remark. Plato attributes the view to certain “dour persons”
(oi boaxepeiq)

of his acquaintance who, out of overzealousness

in rejecting sensual pleasures,

end up

with “an excessive hatred of the power of pleasure” (peiiiariKOTcov Tqv

trie;

buvapiv) and who recognize nothing healthy (oubev vyiiq) about

The point of

including

it

in the discussion,

however, seems

to

neutral state as pleasurable believe falsely about

Ttepi

be that those

who

what they enjoy

Tou xotfp^iv,” 44a9). Thus the notion of false

it.^^

fibovfjq

think of the

(“v|/ED6fi

6o^d(!^ouai

belief provides a continuity to the

discussion.

E.

Pain and Falsity: Mixed Pleasures

Gosling and Kenny both

restrict Socrates’

enumeration of false pleasures to the

three that have been discussed so far. Perhaps this

applies only to the

first

three kinds.

is

because the notion of false belief

But Socrates introduces a fourth category of

pleasures which he never designates as false, though he clearly considers them to be bad
pleasures. This ought to remind us that in the Philebus, Socrates

Pleasure into good pleasures and bad. Nevertheless,

I

would

is

really dividing

like to argue here that.

84

Nonetheless, Socrates says of their revulsion (buaxspsia) for pleasure that
ignoble” (ouk dyswouc;, 44c6) revulsion. Schofield (1971) has argued that
Plato

is

referring to Speusippus and his followers.
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it

is

a “not

in this discussion,

though the notion of false belief does not enter

into the specification of this fourth

category, the broader notion offalsity does.

The category mixed pleasure
mixed with

not

mean

pain, however, is one

not equivalent to that of bad pleasure

is

way

in

which pleasures can be bad, although

that for Plato, pain is intrinsically evil.

mixed pleasures
not an intrinsic

are

evil,

And

bad pleasures and are inadmissible

how does

its

Being

.

yet Socrates

into the

good

is

this

does

claiming that

life.

If,

then, pain

is

admixture with pleasure result in the pleasure’s

becoming bad?

The only

possible explanation

that

it

is

the fact of its being

What makes mixed

sense renders the pleasure bad.
are usually or even always

is

pleasures bad

accompanied by pain; rather

is

mixed

that in

some

not merely that they

in the very experience

of mixed

85

Nor

are the notions offalse pleasure and

86ff] argues that there

is

no

mixed pleasure

real distinction intended

between

identical.

false

Hackforth [1945;

p.

and mixed pleasures. For a

contrary view, see Dibykowski 1970b.
86

Recall the exchange between Socrates and Philebus in the section on the four ontological
kinds:

Soc.

Does pleasure and pain have

a limit, or are they of the things that receive the

more

and less?
Phil. Yes,
to

of the more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be

be by nature unlimited

Soc.
else

in its

all

good,

if

it

did not happen

fullness and increase.

Kaxov), Philebus; so we must examine something
other than the nature of the apeiron as that which provides some part of the good to

Nor would

pain be

all

bad

(ticcv

pleasure (27e5-28a3).

This passage implies that for Socrates, pain
intrinsically

is

not intrinsically bad or evil, just as pleasure

good.
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is

not

pleasures, something else other than pleasure

involved. In other words, mixed

is

pleasures are experienced as intrinsically involving pain in some
way. John Cooper
writes that, in mixed pleasures “the very experience that
precisely as being painful, or as involving pain in

Cooper goes on
Thus,

in

is

enjoyed

enjoyed in part

is

some way” [Cooper, 1977;

p. 721].

to describe Socrates’ view:

Socrates’ conception of the bodily appetites as forms of distress,
what is enjoyed
an appetite is something that combines pain (the appetite) with pleasure

in satisfying

(its

relief).

If,

for example,

what one enjoys on some occasion

an essential part of the pleasurable experience
similar

is

is

eating-while-hungry, then

the pain or distress of appetite. Other

mixed experiences include scratching an

itch (46a8-9), when that is something
and enjoys, masochistic sexual practices (47a3-9 may suggest
such a case), and malicious pleasures in the theater and elsewhere (48b ff ). In pure
pleasures, by contrast, what is enjoyed is something by its own nature fine and attractive

one takes an

interest in

(Ka7.6v) and not, like these, interesting only because they combine distress with a
contrasting state or process of release or amusement (5 lc6-7): for example, the
discriminating sensory awareness of geometrical designs, clear musical tones, pure
colors,

and fine smells,

satisfaction

in all

of appetites but

of which the use of the senses

is

not linked to the

a direct response to the inherent fineness of the objects

is

being enjoyed, and the pleasures of disciplined discovery and learning (51c-52b)
[Cooper, 1977; p. 721].

In the experience of the

opposite.

is

not to say that x

perceive x badly because

instance of what an x

is

to

pleasures, in other words, pleasure

Now to say that something

confused with y,

we

mixed

we

jc

is

is

bad because,

bad because y

is, i.e., it is

are confusing

it

is

in

is

confused with

our perception of x, x

bad. There

with y, then x as

is

is

is

impure

is

we perceive

therefore to say that

being

a sense in which, if

it

is

a misleading instance and does not reveal what

be an x. To say that a pleasure

its

it

it

a bad

really

does not give us a

87

true perception of the being of pleasure.

Such a pleasure

an untrue instance of what a pleasure really

is.

is

a bad pleasure because

Thus, for Socrates impurity

of badness, so that mixed pleasures are by nature bad pleasures.

Cf. Vlastos 1965, p. 7.
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itself is

it is

a kind

had also asserted

Earlier, Socrates

that pleasures

can only be bad by being

false:

Soc.

What about

their

becoming

this:

can

we speak

of bad beliefs, and of good ones, except in terms of

false or true?

Prot. Indeed not.

Soc. Nor,

except

think, can

I

in its

Prot. But

hardly set

we

perceive (KaxavooOpev) pleasure to be bad in any other

way

being false.

much the contrary, Socrates, of what you have said.
down wicked pains and pleasures as approaching falsity but
it’s

very

For, one

would

as falling in with

a great, but quite another and manifold wickedness.

[axsbov ydp
psydA-ri 5e

xtp V|/8u6si

d^XpKai

pev

7ioA.^fj

oi)

tkxvo Tiovripdq

In his reply, Socrates promises to discuss a

pleasures that Protarchus has referred
in the portion

of this passage that

dv

xiq

Xvnaq

xe

Kai fjbovdq

&Eiri,

oopniTixouaac; 7tovr|pfa.] (40e6-41a4).

to,

have

I

little later

on the kind of wicked pains and

meaning, evidently, the mixed pleasures. But,
italicized, Socrates

has asserted the following

premise:
88

Only

(i)

And

false pleasures are

the point subsequently

bad, so that

(ii)

we

bad pleasures.

made about mixed

pleasures

is

that all

mixed pleasures

are

also have:

All mixed pleasures are bad pleasures.

88

69] charges Plato with confusing/a/^e pleasures and bad pleasures.
Citing the passage at 40b-c, which concludes that wicked men for the most part delight in false
pleasures and true men in good ones, Thalberg compares this with confusing (a) ‘Jones was

Thalberg [1962;

falsely pleased that his
i.e., it

(as

p.

enemy

was wicked of him

Thalberg realizes; cf

terms of the
consist in

its

to

died’ with the different statement (b) ‘Jones

be

pleased, that his

p. 70);

it is

enemy

pleased,

example

not clear that Socrates would have analyzed (b) primarily

in

kind of false pleasure. The wickedness of the pleasure in (b) seems to me to
being a mixed pleasure (i.e., it involves malice); the question whether its component

first

namely the belief that one’s opponent has
mixed pleasure and irrelevant to its wickedness.
belief,

was wrongly

died’. But, (b) is a complicated

died,
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is

true or not,

is

irrelevant to

its

being a

Together,

and

(i)

(iii)

All

(ii) entail:

mixed pleasures

Thus, with mixed pleasures,
being bad but

still

it is

falsity.

not the pain

The

of the true nature of pleasure, so
involving something else which

are false pleasures.

falsity in

mixed

in with

them

mixed pleasure

that accounts for their

consists in

that pleasure is experienced not as

it

is

not,

and which in

it

its

concealment

really is but as

fact is its contrary. Pleasure is

experienced, not as replenishment simpliciter, but as a complex that
involves in an
intrinsic

mixed

way

the contrary experience of kenosis or lack. Thus, falsity

in with the nature

is

once again

of pleasure.'

F.

Conclusion

We can summarize the discussion of false pleasures in the Philebus by listing the
types of error that characterize each of the categories of false pleasure that Socrates has
just given:

(1)

We can err about the propositional content of a pleasure by:
pleasure in a false proposition; b) believing falsely that

we

a) taking

will enjoy the

object of our pleasant anticipation;

(2)

(3)

We can overestimate the magnitude

or the quality of a future pleasure;

We can make a semantic mistake concerning the reference of the term
‘pleasure’ in our experience; and
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(4)

We can err in assessing the phenomenological purity of a pleasurable
experience, mistaking pain to be intrinsically part of certain
kinds of
pleasures.

The

list

makes

it

evident

how different are the various

senses of falsity that Plato employs

in his discussion.

It

might be claimed, however,

together, since even in (4)

it

that

it is

the notion offalse belief iheiX ties

could be said that the fact that pleasure

engenders a false belief about the nature of pleasure. But

is

It is

the fact that

not false belief huX falsity

itself that constitutes the link

some kinds of pleasure somehow

with pain

way from

the

between them.

It is

incorporate falsity in their very natures that

renders them unfit for inclusion in the good mixed

falsity is a criterion for

in

all

false belief applies to the four

kinds of false pleasure in very different ways, and to (3) in a divergent
others.

mixed

them

life.

In Socrates’ argument, therefore,

excluding pleasures from the good

life.

Only pleasures

that

incorporate the good-making characteristics into their natures are to be included in the

good

life;

their

good-making

mingling with

characteristics.

falsity,

however, entails their incompatibility with the

Socrates simultaneously meant to indicate that in our

discourse, the form of falsity enters into the specification of these types of pleasure.

Socrates’ discussion consists in an enumeration of the

that at the level

would be

To

of the many, pleasure links up with

many of Pleasure

falsity in various

in order to

ways, so that

correct to describe the resulting kinds of pleasure as being false in

say that a pleasure

is false is

to

imply

that its correct description involves

the form of falsity. Pleasures that incorporate falsity are

150

still

show
it

some way.
mentioning

pleasures but, qua possible

elements in the good human

life,

they are the contraries of the true pleasures. Thus

Socrates has shown that the form Pleasure

is

one-and-many

in a

way

that

pleasures unlike one another qua pleasures. This does not refute (P3);
refute (PI).

151

it

makes

the

many

does, however,
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